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This dissertation examines three topics in computational macroeconomics and
finance. The first two chapters are closely linked; and the third chapter covers a
separate topic in finance. Throughout the dissertation, I place a strong emphasis on
constructing computational tools and modeling devices; and using them in appropri-
ate applications.
The first chapter examines how a central banks choice of interest rate rule impacts
the rate of mortgage default and welfare. In this chapter, a quantitative equilibrium
(QE) model is constructed that incorporates incomplete markets, aggregate uncer-
tainty, overlapping generations, and realistic mortgage structure. Through a series
of counterfactual simulations, five things are demonstrated: 1) nominal interest rate
rules that exhibit cyclical behavior increase the average default rate and lower aver-
age welfare; 2) welfare can be substantially improved by adopting a modified Taylor
rule that stabilizes house prices; 3) a decrease in the length of the interest rate cycle
will tend to increase the average default rate; 4) if the business and housing cycles
are not aligned, then aggressive inflation targeting will tend to increase the mortgage
default rate; and 5) placing a legal cap on loan-to-value ratios will lower the average
default rate and lessen the intensity of extreme events. In addition to these findings,
this paper also incorporates an important mechanism for default, which had not pre-
viously been included in the QE literature: default spikes happen when income falls
and home equity is degraded at the same time. The paper concludes with a policy
recommendation for central banks: if they wish to crises where many households
default simultaneously, they should either adopt a rule that generates interest rates
with slow-moving cycles or use a modified Taylor rule that also targets house price
growth.
The second chapter generalizes the solution method used in the first and compares
it to more common techniques used in the computational macroeconomics literature,
including the parameterized expectations approach (PEA), projection methods, and
value function iteration. In particular, this chapter compares the speed and accuracy
of the aforementioned modifications to an alternative method that was introduced
separately by Judd (1998), Sutton and Barto (1998), and Van Roy et al. (1997), but
was not developed into a general solution method until Powell (2007) introduced it
to the Operations Research literature. This approach involves rewriting the Bellman
equation in terms of the post-decision state variables, rather than the pre-decision
state variables, as is done in standard dynamic programming applications in eco-
nomics. I show that this approach yields considerable performance benefits over
common global solution methods when the state space is large; and has the added
benefit of not forcing modelers to assume a data generating process for shocks. In
addition to this, I construct two new algorithms that take advantage of this approach
to solve heterogenous agent models.
Finally, the third chapter imports the SIR model from mathematical epidemiol-
ogy; and uses it to construct a model of financial epidemics. In particular, the paper
demonstrates how the SIR model can be microfounded in an economic context to
make predictions about financial epidemics, such as the spread of asset-backed secu-
rities (ABS) and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), the proliferation of zombie financial
institutions, and the expansion of financial bubbles and mean-reverting fads. The
paper proceeds by developing the 1-host SIR model for economic and financial con-
texts; and then moves on to demonstrate how to work with the multi-host version
of the model. In addition to showing how the SIR framework can be used to model
economic interactions, it will also: 1) show how it can be simulated; 2) use it to
develop and estimate a sufficient statistic for the spread of a financial epidemic; and
3) show how policymakers can impose the financial analog of herd immunity–that is,
prevent the spread of a financial epidemic without completely banning the asset or
behavior associated with the epidemic. Importantly, the paper will focus on devel-
oping a neutral framework to describe financial epidemics that can be either bad or
good. That is, the general framework can be applied to epidemics that constitute a
mean-reverting fad or an informational bubble, but ultimately yield little value and
shrink in importance; or epidemics that are long-lasting and yield a new financial in-
strument that generates permanent efficiency gains or previously unrealized hedging
opportunities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTEREST RATE RULES AND MORTGAGE
DEFAULT
Isaiah Hull
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how a central bank’s choice of interest rate rule impacts the rate
of mortgage default and welfare. I do this by constructing a quantitative equilibrium (QE)
model that incorporates incomplete markets, aggregate uncertainty, overlapping genera-
tions, and realistic mortgage structure. Through a series of counterfactual simulations, I
demonstrate five things: 1) nominal interest rate rules that exhibit cyclical behavior in-
crease the average default rate and lower average welfare; 2) welfare can be substantially
improved by adopting a modified Taylor rule that stabilizes house prices; 3) a decrease in
the length of the interest rate cycle will tend to increase the average default rate; 4) if the
business and housing cycles are not aligned, then aggressive inflation targeting will tend to
increase the mortgage default rate; and 5) placing a legal cap on loan-to-value ratios will
lower the average default rate and lessen the intensity of extreme events. In addition to
these findings, my model also incorporates an important mechanism for default, which had
not previously been included in the QE literature: default spikes happen when income falls
and home equity is degraded at the same time. Overall, my results suggest that the uni-
variate time series properties of interest rates (i.e. wavelength, persistence, and variance)
may play a substantial role in generating mass mortgage-default events. If a central bank
wishes to avoid such crises, they should either adopt a rule that generates interest rates
with slow-moving cycles or use a modified Taylor rule that also targets house price growth.
JEL Classification: E50, E52, C63, C68
Keywords: housing, monetary policy, Taylor rule, mortgage default, aggregate uncertainty,
incomplete markets
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1 Introduction
In July of 2000, the Federal Reserve initiated a series of rate cuts that lowered the
effective federal funds rate (FFR) from a peak of 6.54% to 1% in late 2004, dropping
it below 2% by the end of 2001. During this same period, house price growth jumped
from an already high rate of 9.6% to 14.6.%; and grew at an average of 6.8 percentage
points per year faster than it did from 1988 to 2000. In late 2004 to mid-2007, interest
rates shot up once again to 5.25%; and, with a lag, house price growth peaked at 15.9%
and then dropped to -4.6% by mid-2007, falling further as the recession deepened.
Not long after the house price drop, the default rate on first mortgages rose from a
historically stable 1% to a peak of 5.39% in 2009.
After a casual glance at the data, we might conclude that the FFR cycle that
spanned late 2000 to mid-2007 can safely be blamed for Great Recession–that is, it
caused the twin housing and financial crises, bridged by a mortgage default spike.
Indeed, when John Taylor addressed the Jackson Hole conference in 2007, that is
exactly what he argued.1 In this paper, I will not attempt to find the cause of the
“Great Recession”; however, I will try to elucidate how monetary policy can play a
role in preventing such crises. In particular, I ask: how does the central bank’s choice
of interest rate rule impact the frequency and intensity of mortgage default?
To give the reader a sketch of the mechanisms that connect mortgage default crises
and monetary policy, consider what happens during a typical interest rate cycle. First,
assume that the real, risk-free interest rate falls sharply and remains low; and that
these changes are at least weakly transmitted to mortgage interest rates. This will
increase demand for housing by reducing the cost to borrow. If the increase in demand
also pushes up house prices, then household equity positions will improve, allowing
1See Figure 1 in the appendix for a comparison of the Taylor Rule-implied interest rate and the
effective federal funds rate leading up to the crisis.
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homeowners to borrow more (i.e. withdraw additional equity), which could increase
the amount of debt that homeowners hold–and possibly increase household leverage.
Finally, a drop in the risk free rate could divert marginal bank depositors to instead
invest in capital, increasing output (income).
Now, assume that the first part of this cycle is followed by a sharp increase in
interest rates–just as the prolonged period of low interest rates from 2001 to 2004 was
followed by a sharp rise in the FFR. Suddenly, the effects of the housing boom will be
reversed. Demand will collapse, pushing house prices down, and leaving households
who extracted equity or bought homes near the trough of the cycle with negative
equity. This will prevent households from withdrawing equity to smooth consumption
or to refinance into lower interest rate loans should they become available. High
interest rates will also divert investment away from capital, lowering income, and
will push up adjustable-rate mortgage payments with a lag. The combination of low
incomes, high mortgage payments, and negative equity positions will push up default
rates, which will deteriorate financial intermediary balance sheets, and may cause a
credit crunch.
Prior to the Great Recession, few DSGE models contained many of the aforemen-
tioned elements. Additionally, economists had only started to consider how to model
multi-period mortgage structure realistically in general equilibrium.2 And many of
the macro housing models that did exist lacked heterogeneity, eliminating the effect
of a prolonged house price rise completely (Jeske 2005).
In this paper, I attempt to contribute to the now-vibrant housing literature that
has drawn inspiration from Aiygari (1993), and Krusell and Smith (1998). In partic-
ular, I construct a quantitative equilibrium model that incorporates incomplete mar-
kets, aggregate uncertainty, overlapping generations, price stickiness, credit-scoring,
2See Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009) for a multi-period treatment of mortgages.
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optimal default, inter-sectoral productivity correlation, and realistic mortgage struc-
ture. I then calibrate the model to match the cross-sectional and time series di-
mensions in the data; and run a series of counterfactual simulations under different
interest rate rules to determine how they impact default rates and welfare. In addi-
tion to considering popular classes of interest rate rules (e.g. the Taylor Rule), I also
look at more fundamental components of interest rate behavior by testing rules that
generate cycles, but do not endogenously respond to other macrovariables, such as
autoregressive rules and sine wave rules.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to three subliteratures. The first consists of papers that at-
tempt to explain the Great Recession and financial crises in general. The second
consists of macro papers that have attempted to integrate housing. And the final
looks at the optimality of the Taylor rule and other monetary policy rules. I will
review each of these literatures in order below.
2.1 Great Recession Causes Literature
Mian and Sufi (2010) find that household leverage yields considerable predictive power
for the 2007-09 recession. They show that the household debt-to-disposable income
ratio accurately predicts movements in aggregate variables, such as unemployment,
consumer default, and house prices. They suggest that measures of household leverage
could provide a well-grounded empirical basis for explaining macroeconomic fluctua-
tions. This finding is consistent with my theme, which explores interest rate rules as
the cause of household balance sheet deteriorations, which lead to increased default
rates and related macroeconomic fluctuations.
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In a separate paper, Mian and Sufi (2009) consider the importance of the subprime
loans and their securitization in the financial crisis. They perform their analysis at the
county-level; and find three important results. First, they determine that counties
that experienced aggressive growth in subprime lending tended to also experience
the greatest default intensities. Second, they find that the credit expansion in 2002-
2005 was negatively correlated with income growth–an unexpected reversal of normal
credit expansion patterns. And third, they demonstrate that subprime loans tend
to be more common in areas with decreasing income. While my paper does not
explicitly incorporate subprime borrowers, it does provide substantial heterogeneity
and permits a changing, endogenous asset distribution (aggregate uncertainty), which
allows us to consider whether borrower quality declines prior to crises.
Other plausible explanations for the Great Recession include Mayer (2009), who
attempts to explain the crisis through a decline in underwriting standards and a large
post-teaser rate jump on mortgage interest rates. Bucks and Pence (2008) argue that
the large cluster of defaults was caused by a change in the composition of borrowers.
That is, less financially literate individuals were induced to become homeowners.
When they were hit with negative income shocks, they were less able to optimize
budgeting correctly (often ignoring shocks entirely), which lead to a sharp rise in
defaults.
In line with the theme of this paper, Leamer (2007) argues that recessions in the
U.S. have largely been driven (or preceded) by downturns in housing investment and
consumer durables. He claims that monetary policy should explicitly incorporate
housing investment smoothing as an objective; and suggests that a modified Taylor
Rule could incorporate such an objective. Similarly, Ahearne et. al (2005) draws
the connection between monetary policy and house prices. In a study of 18 major
industrial countries, they find that monetary easing typically precedes an increase in
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housing investment and prices.
Hott and Jokipii (2012) further cement the relationship between interest rate
movements and housing investment. Using a multi-country dataset, they show that
deviations in interest rates from the Taylor Rule account for 50% of the housing
overvaluation that occurred prior to the Great Recession. Assesnmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach (2008) find a similar relationship between interest rates and house prices using
a 17-country VAR that spans 1986-2006. They find that a 25 basis point increase in
short term rates pushes down GDP by 0.125% and housing prices by 0.375% with a
lag. However, in contrast to Hott and Jokipii, they argue against using interest rates
to smooth house prices.
Finally, Foote, Geraradi, Goette, and Willen (2008) provide an additional em-
pirical nuance to to the debate. They show that borrowers do not simply default if
they have negative equity or if they receive a negative income shock, but rather, they
default if both conditions are present. They call this the “double trigger” condition
for mortgage default–a term that originated in finance.3 To this author’s knowledge,
this paper is the only rigorously-microfounded model of default in general equilibrium
that replicates this empirical regularity.
2.2 Macro-Housing Literature
This paper also contributes to the macro-housing literature, which has become in-
creasingly focused on heterogeneity, incomplete markets, and aggregate uncertainty.
Early papers in the literature, such as Yang (2006), demonstrated the importance of
lifecycle elements in housing; and devised mechanisms for modeling them correctly.
Li and Yao (2007) showed that the impact of house price changes depend on the de-
gree of heterogeneity in the economy. Indeed, depending on how agents are modeled,
3See Abraham 1993.
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price changes may have no effect on the macroeconomy, but can cause inter-group
wealth transfers.
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2005) contribute one of the foundational papers in this
literature. They incorporate life-cycle elements, property ladders, and credit con-
straints into an equilibrium model with many heterogenous agents. While they greatly
simplify the life-cycle elements (by including only four periods) and build a highly
stylized model with no aggregate uncertainty, they still introduce a housing mar-
ket prototype that is reused elsewhere in the literature. In particular, they assume
that property comes in two varieties: “flats” and “houses”; and explicitly model the
utility-based differences between the two. As for credit constraints, they assume that
wealth cannot fall below some fraction of the value of the property. Finally, they
assume that the supply of both flats and housing is fixed.
Chatterjee, Corbae, and Rios-Rull (2009) expand the literature further by incor-
porating default and credit scoring into a large scale macro context. They model
agents who take out loans and repay them with an unknown probability. This leads
to a system of credit-scoring, where lenders use a known credit-scoring function and
pricing kernel to create loan terms. While this model provides a reasonable structure
for incorporating default into a model with heterogenous agents, it can stay little
about the timing and cause of default, since default probabilities are determined by
an agent’s type (good or bad). In contrast, I allow agents to default optimally and
use decision rules to compute the probability of default.
Other papers in this literature use the new class of rigorously-microfounded macro-
housing models to run policy simulations. Jeske & Krueger (2005), for instance, find
that mortgage interest rate subsidies tend to benefit and to increase homeownership
rates among high-income and high-net worth individuals in general.
Another important part of modeling default choices is determining the structure
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of mortgages, since this may play a large role in determining default behavior. While
there are a number of continuous time finance models that permit variation in pay-
ment schedules and default timing in a partial equilibrium context, this is not true
in general for DSGE models, which frequently do not even model housing. In the
wake of the Great Recession, however, a number of authors have attempted to create
a serious role for mortgage structure in DSGE models. Most notably, Chambers,
Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009) have constructed a general equilibrium model that
permits individuals to choose between FRMs and ARMs–and even to obtain combo
or piggyback loans. While I do not incorporate mortgage choice into my model, I
do borrow modeling devices from the paper, and work to make them tractable in an
environment with default.
Perhaps most closely related to this paper, Iacoviello and Pavan (2010) create a
quantitative equilibrium model that accurately reproduces empirical co-movements in
aggregate debt accumulation and housing investment. In their paper, they introduce
(and borrow) several computational macro modeling devices that permit them to
perform simulations in a realistic environment, but without making the computational
stage intractable. In particular, they use deterministic life-cycle productivity profiles
to generate income heterogeneity, small pension payments after retirement to generate
lifecycle asset accumulation motives, lump-sum taxes to simplify interactions with
government, housing transaction costs that are proportional the to change in housing
position (to make changes larger and infrequent), and a simple no-arbitrage condition
to determine the price of housing. My paper borrows many of the modeling devices
from Iacoviello and Pavan (2010), and adds optimal default, individual credit-scoring,
inter-sectoral productivity correlation, and mortgage structure–and applies them to
a different research question.
Goodhart, Osario, and Tsomocos (2009) attempt to advance the literature by
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creating a template for a new generation of macro-financial models. While they use
only a handful of representative agents (unlike the other referenced housing papers),
they model both default and complex linkages between the financial sector and the
macroeconomy. They include corporate lending, interbank lending, and central bank
lending into a model where most agents can “default.” However, since only a handful
of representative heterogenous agents are used, individual agents do not default in a
strict sense–rather, they choose a repayment rate. Banks respond to this by using
rational expectations to predict repayment rates and to penalize default. Additionally,
interbank and central bank lending is used to rescue banks in the event of mass
defaults.
2.3 Optimal Monetary Policy
Finally, this paper contributes to the part of the optimal monetary policy litera-
ture that examines the welfare properties of interest rate rules. Woodford (2001), a
landmark paper in the subliterature, considers whether the Taylor rule can be ra-
tionalized through a plausible central bank objective. He does this by constructing
a simple model and testing its welfare properties. He finds that Taylor-style rules
perform well, but suffer from two problems: 1) they rely on the output gap being
measured correctly; and 2) they do not vary with the Wicksellian natural rate of
interest, but instead assume a fixed natural interest rate. He suggests that future
work should attempt to “analyze the consequences of inertial rules in the context of
more detailed models.” This is one of the primary objectives of this paper.
Julliard et. al (2006) test the welfare properties of the Taylor rule by constructing
a DSGE model, using Bayesian methods to estimate its parameters, and perform-
ing counterfactual simulations under different parameter values. They find that the
standard Taylor rule performs reasonably well. Ahrend (2010), on the other hand,
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performs an empirical investigation of the Taylor rule in practice; and finds that cen-
tral bank departures from the rule can lead to substantial increases in asset prices.
This paper explores both of these topics in a theoretical context.
Other papers, such as Giannoni (2012) find that simple Taylor-style rules may be
inferior to Wicksellian rules, which permit some type of history-dependence. Giannoni
(2012) claims that such rules are less prone to indeterminacy and are more robust to
model mispecification; and argues that they are especially effective when coupled with
a “high degree of interest rate inertia.” Forlati and Lambertini (2011) also consider
interest rate inertia, but do it in the context of richer model that includes housing.
They find that inertial interest rate rules lead to larger contractions in output.
In summary–I expand on the macro-housing literature by adding optimal default,
credit scoring, inter-sectoral productivity correlation, and mortgage structure to a
quantitative equilibrium model. I add to the largely empirical Great Recession and
financial crisis literature by performing counterfactual simulations using a theoreti-
cally consistent framework and a rigorously-microfounded model. And, finally, I add
to the optimal monetary policy literature by evaluating a variety of different interest
rate rules to determine their impact on default and welfare in a detailed model.
3 The Model
In order to answer the questions above, I start by constructing a macro-housing
model in which agents default optimally. That is, default is not forced, arbitrary,
or determined by type, but emerges from optimization. In building this model, my
primary goal is to attack the problem as simply as possible, but with enough detail
to capture the important features of default and housing choices. For this reason, I
construct a rigorously-microfounded model in the style of Aiyagari (1993), and Krusell
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and Smith (1998).
The initial formulation will focus on a real model with capital and endogenously-
determined house prices. However, I will later modify the model by removing capital
and the endogenous component of house prices. I will also explain how sticky and
flexible prices are added to the model.
In the model, there are infinitely many heterogenous households of measure 1, who
consume non-durables, invest in capital, purchase housing, and choose whether or not
to default on mortgage debt. Firms produce a non-durable good with Cobb-Douglas
technology. There is a representative financial intermediary, which accepts deposits
from households, and then uses those deposits to issue mortgages to households.
The government collects lump-sum taxes, pays pension benefits, insures deposits at
financial intermediaries, and collects housing from deceased agents. Finally, a central
bank implicitly determines the risk-free return on deposits by setting the interbank
lending rate.
3.1 Firms
The firm side of the economy consists of 1) a consumption good producer who rents
capital and labor services; and 2) a technology that permits all households to trans-
form the consumption good into housing units.
3.1.1 Consumption Goods
The consumption goods are produced using Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = e
AtKαt N
1−α
t , (1)
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where At = cA + ρAt−1 + At, A ∼ N(0,σ), and µA = cA1−ρ . Firms maximize profits,
yielding the familiar first order conditions:
wt = (1− α)eAt(Kt
Nt
)α (2)
Rt = αe
At(
Nt
Kt
)1−α − δK , (3)
Note that capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate, δK . Furthermore, Nt
is the mass of employed workers. The mass (or fraction) of workers employed in any
given period is derived from the conditional Markov process for employment and the
assumption that households supply labor inelastically. For simplicity, I have assumed
that this process does not depend on housing investment.
For computational purposes, I discretizeAt using the Rouwenhorst (1995) method,
4
which Kopecky and Suen (2009) argue is more accurate than other approximation al-
gorithms for highly persistent AR(1) processes. In particular, this method allows me
to generate a discrete approximation of an AR(1) process by setting four parameters
and the desired number of states: ρA, qA, σA, and µA, where ρA is the probability of
the highest state, qA is the probability of the lowest state, σA is the desired standard
deviation of the process, and µA is the desired mean of the process. The algorithm
generates the Markov chain and the associated transition probability matrix.
To pin down the mass of employed workers, I use a conditional Markov process that
depends on the technology shock. That is, roughly speaking, when the technology
shock is high, the probability of transitioning into employment will be high (and vice
versa). More specifically, I will calibrate the conditional Markov process to generate
unemployment statistics that match U.S. business cycle data.
I use Pr(′E|E, A) to denote the probability of transitioning to employment state
4See Appendix 1 for an explanation of the Rouwenhorst method.
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′E, given last period’s employment state, E, and this period’s technology shock state,
A. Note that the Markov chain will remain the same in all periods; however, the
transition matrix will change, depending on the state of the technology shock, which
means that we will have a different transition matrix for each state of A.
3.1.2 Housing Investment
The housing investment specification is similar to Glover, Heathcote, Krueger, and
Rios-Rull (2011). In particular, I assume that households have access to a linear tech-
nology that transforms the consumption good into housing. That is, if the household
builds with chit units of the consumption good, it will yield h
n
it new units of housing:
hnit = δ(IHt)c
h
ite
Ut , (4)
where Ut = uH +ρH +H , where H ∼ N(0, σH), IHt is aggregate housing investment,
δ(IHt) is an analogy to capacity utilization,
5 and δ′(IHt) < 0.
Notice that the housing specification implies a relative price limit. No one will
pay more than 1
δ(IHt)eUt
for a unit of housing, since it is possible to generate one using
that many units of the numeraire good. Additionally, I assume that investment is re-
versible,6 so no one will sell housing for less than that price. This implies that house
prices will rise when the economy is hit by a negative housing sector productivity
shock or when housing investment demand increases.
5That is, when housing investment is high, the capacity of the sector to produce an additional
unit is increasingly strained, making it more costly.
6While this is not a particularly realistic assumption, it should not have a qualitative impact on
welfare and default results, since house prices in the model fall when investment is reversed.
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Note that total housing investment can be written as follows:
IHt =
∑
i∈I
δ(IHt)c
h
itµie
Ut = δ(IHt)C
h
t e
Ut , (5)
where µi is agent i’s mass and where IHt and C
h
t are used to denote aggregates.
Additionally, the housing stock evolves as follows:
Ht+1 = Ht + IHt − δHHt, (6)
where δH is housing stock depreciation.
3.2 Households
Households are born at a=1 and work until a=T. After retirement, households receive
a pension, xt, for T
R periods, and then perish with certainty at age T+TR. Note that
this generates a hump-shaped paper asset profile for households, since they must
accumulate assets in order to smooth post-retirement consumption.
At any point in time, heterogeneity across households is driven by two mecha-
nisms: 1) employment status (Eit = 1 or 0); and 2) age-specific productivity, ηa.
Following Heer and Maussner (2008), I assume that the former is generated by a con-
ditional Markov process that depends on non-durables shocks (as given in the firms
section). For the latter, I follow Iacoviello and Pavan (2010) in adopting a single,
deterministic profile for age-specific productivity, which is computed using CPS data.
These two mechanisms for heterogeneity will drive differences in asset holdings and
default decisions.
Unemployed agents receive per period unemployment benefits, xUt , for the dura-
tion of their jobless spells.7 Similarly, retired agents will receive pension benefits of
7In the baseline specification, unemployed agents will receive benefits and will not be taxed. In
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xRt . Employed household i, which is age a at time t receives a wage, wtηa, where∑T
a=1 ηaµa = 1, where µa is the density of age cohort a.
In the baseline model, households consume non-durable goods, cit, and housing
service flows, which are assumed to be directly proportional to their housing stock,
hit.
8 They choose how much to save in bank deposits, dit, how much capital to hold,
kit, how much collateralized debt to borrow in the form of mortgages, bit, and whether
or not to default on the mortgage they hold.
Investment in housing is lumpy; that is, households tend to make large and in-
frequent changes in housing size (i.e. by moving), rather than changing housing size
frequently and in small increments. Here, I follow the standard assumption the lit-
erature that lumpiness is generated by housing stock adjustment costs, φ(hit, hit−1),
which depend on the size of the new and old housing stock.
Furthermore, I adopt Iacoviello and Pavan’s (2010) assumption that houses have a
minimum size, h. While they principally use this assumption to match the empirical
fact that younger households tend to be renters (and that, in fact, households cannot
purchase very small houses), I use this device largely to generate household leverage.
When young households enter the model, they must take out a large mortgage in
order to purchase a house. The high degree of leverage will translate into interest
rate risk exposure–and, thus, a higher probability of default.
Additionally, I assume that all households have access to a small, fixed amount of
non-housing shelter. This includes both defaulters and young households who have
not yet purchased a home. This non-housing shelter can be interpreted as living with
friends or relatives–or staying in a low-quality, but free apartment.9
the original set of simulations, I considered a version of the model without unemployment benefits.
My findings did not differ qualitatively for the two versions of the model.
8The model is later extended to incorporate apartment rentals.
9For a discussion of the impact that non-housing shelter has on the model, see the appendix.
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For simplicity, households are assumed to supply labor inelastically. Additionally,
we may write the household’s instantaneous utility from non-durables consumption
and housing service flows as follows:
u(cit, hit) = γ
c1−σcit
1− σc + (1− γ)
(hit)
1−σh
1− σh (7)
This specification is compatible with Jeske’s (2005) finding that the ratio of housing
to consumption tends to be hump-shaped over the life-cycle. Following Chambers,
Garriga, and Schlafenhauf (2009), we set the curvature parameters for the utility
function to σc = 1 (log utility) and σh = 3, which will give us a hump-shaped profile
for h
c
over the lifecycle that matches the data.
Individuals have two sources of income: wages, net of taxes (Γa,t), from working
at the consumption goods firm and pensions (or unemployment benefits):
yit =
 wtna − Γa,t if employedxt if unemployed or retired (8)
Household i faces the following budget constraint:
cit + φ(hit, hit−1) + dit + pht hit +m
h
it + kit = yit + (1 + rt−1)dit−1 + pt (9)
hit−1(1− δH) + (1 +Rt)kit−1 + bit
Note that pht is the relative price of housing, mit is the mortgage payment, bit is the
unpaid balance on the mortgage, Rt is the return to capital, and kit denotes i’s capital
holdings.
I depart from the current literature in applying a novel constraint that makes
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holders of one-period mortgages behave as if they held long term debt instruments:
bHit ≤

λpht hit if hit − hit−1 > 0
λpht hit if bit−1 < λpthit & hit = hit−1
bit−1 otherwise,
(10)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the collateral constraint–that is, the maximum loan-to-value
ratio.
According to the equation above, if homeowners move (adjust their housing stock),
then they face a collateral constraint in that period, since they must obtain a new
mortgage. Similarly, if they do not move, but carry forward less debt from the pre-
vious period than would be allowed by the collateral constraint in this period, then
they have the option to borrow up to the constraint. Finally, if they did not move
and have exceeded the collateral constraint, then they cannot borrow more, but do
not have to reduce the size of their mortgage. The intent of these constraints is to
achieve the following with one-period mortgages:
1. Avoid “forcing” default. In many endogenous default models, default is ultimately
forced by a collateral constraint that is repeatedly applied to one-period mortgages.
Empirically, this constraint only applies at origination–and not to existing loans. If it
is forcefully applied to existing loans (i.e. by modeling them as repeated one-period
loans), households will default whenever they are unable to borrow enough to repay
last period’s debt (i.e. if house prices fall steeply). This generates a spurious channel
for default (i.e. negative equity immediately triggers default), which is simply an
artifact of one-period loan financing.
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2. Allow mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW). Since we are interested in understand-
ing how the path of interest rates impacts default, allowing for MEW may provide
a critical channel for default. If households can borrow against the values of their
homes, this may cause certain interest rate rules to generate a higher default rate.10
3. Allow negative equity. In one-period loan models with collateral constraints,
households typically cannot have negative equity, since it will violate the collateral
constraint. However, in reality, if the price of housing falls, but individuals choose to
remain in their homes, there is no constraint that forces them to maintain positive
equity. Since negative equity is an important part of most default crises, this con-
straint is maintained to generate more realistic household balance sheets.
Overall, this constraint will make it possible to maintain the simplicity of a one-period
loan framework, while simultaneously generating household balance sheets and de-
fault behavior that more closely approximate what we would observe if 30-period debt
instruments were available.
In addition to this, I borrow a constraint from Iacoviello and Pavan (2010) that
limits borrowing to a fraction, γ, of discounted, remaining lifetime earnings:
bIit = γEt
T−a+j∑
j=t
βT−a+tyij (11)
The purpose behind this constraint is to impose a feasibility condition on repay-
ment. If households cannot reasonably be expected to repay a mortgage with their
remaining income flows, then a financial intermediary will not be willing to originate
10Certain classes of interest rate rules may make it favorable to borrow against the value of your
home immediately prior to a hike in interest rates, which will lead to a high degree of interest rate
risk.
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it. Empirically, this is similar to the income and debt-servicing ratios that banks
require borrowers to meet; however, it is tied to expected, discounted future income,
rather than just current-period income and assets.11 This constraint, coupled with
the previous one, yields the final borrowing constraint:
bit ≤ min{bHit , bIit} (12)
That is, the maximum amount a household can borrow is the minimum implied by
the two borrowing constraints. Furthermore, mortgage interest rates are adjustable
and are given as follows:
r∗it =
(
rt
1− qit + ξt
)
(13)
Note that rt is the rate earned on deposits, qit is household i’s probability of default
(computed from household decision rules),12 and ξt is the mortgage premium.
Default, ψdit, is captured by a binary variable. Defaulters are not able to re-enter
the mortgage market for a period of time, fp. A separate binary variable, ψ
c
it, denotes
whether an individual has defaulted recently enough to be excluded from the mortgage
market.13
In contrast to Chatterjee (2009) and other papers in this literature, I assume that
the housing market exclusion period is fixed, rather than random, for the sake of
tractability. Furthermore, when a household defaults, the model requires that hit = 0
and bit=0. That is, the housing stock (which serves as collateral) is transferred to the
11An alternative–and arguably more realistic–specification of this constraint might incorporate
current asset holdings. The impact of including this modification would be to permit more borrowing
later in the life cycle, since there is no within-cohort heterogeneity. For the purposes of this paper,
I do not consider this constraint explicitly, but may add it as a future extension.
12See the appendix for a shortcut for computing default probabilities without using the decision
rules.
13Note that defaulters have access to non-housing shelter, which means that they will not receive
negative infinity utility from defaulting.
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financial intermediary and the mortgage debt is eliminated.14
Finally, note that some households in the model will perish with housing remain-
ing. In the literature, it is common for the dying generation to either bequest the
housing to the incoming generation or turn it over to the government. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the government takes the housing when the outgoing cohort
perishes.15
Now that all of the pieces of the model in place, we may collect the individual-
level state variables, zit = {dit−1, ψcit−1, ψdit, hit−1, bit−1, kit−1, it, a}, the aggregate-
level state variables, Zt = {Kt, At−1, Ut−1, IHt, At, Ut, cA}, and the parameters Ω =
{α, σc, σh, γ, λ, ρA, ρU , σU , σA, δK , δH , cA, cU , σA,U} to simplify notation. The dynamic
programming problem (DPP) for the household may now be written as follows:
Vit(zit, Zt; Ω) = max{cit,dit,kit,hit,bit,ψdit}u(cit, hit) + (14)
β
∑
A′,U ′,E ′∈{1,0}
Pr(A′)Pr(U ′)Pr(E ′|E, A′)Vit+1(zit+1, Zt+1; Ω)
s.t.
cit + φ(hit, hit−1) + dit + pht hit +m
h
it + kit = yit + (1 + rt−1)dit−1 + (15)
pht hit−1(1− δH) + (1 +Rt)kit−1 + bit
bit ≤ min{bHit , bIit} (16)
If ψcit > 0, then bit, hit = 0. (17)
14It is important to note that 1) the foreclosure process is costly–and, thus, the amount recovered
will be less than the value of the house prior to the foreclosure; and 2) the value of housing at default
will not exceed the size of the mortgage. If it did, the household would simply sell it, rather than
defaulting.
15Note that this will have a fairly insignificant impact on government’s budget constraint, since
each perishing cohort accounts for 1/60th of the population and will tend to draw down its housing
position near the end of the lifecycle.
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mit =
 (1 + r
∗
it−1)bit−1 if ψ
d
it = 0
0 if ψdit = 1
(18)
This problem is solved using a custom approximate dynamic programming (ADP)
algorithm, which is described in the appendix.
3.3 The Financial Intermediary
I adopt a largely novel specification for the financial intermediary that generates a
number of desirable results related to mortgage pricing and solvency. In particular,
I place structure on the financial intermediary’s objective in order to obtain sim-
ple decision rules without solving a dynamic programming problem. I assume the
following:
1. Deposits made at financial intermediaries yield the risk free rate, rt−1.
2. Households may obtain competitively-priced, one-period mortgages from finan-
cial intermediaries, which are subject to the constraints given in the housing
section.
3. Financial intermediaries are risk-neutral.
4. There are infinitely many financial intermediaries, which are represented by a
single financial intermediary with zero net cashflows.
5. Financial intermediaries use rational expectations (i.e. a household’s decision
rules) to determine a household’s probability of defaulting, qit.
6. Financial intermediaries add a state-contingent premium, ξt, to the mortgage
interest rate in order to generate zero net cash flows.
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7. The foreclosure process is costly, leaving financial intermediaries with only a
fraction, Λ of the housing, which they liquidate in the same period at the
market rate, pHt .
Using these assumptions, the intermediary sets the mortgage payment for household
i, who obtained a loan in period t as follows:
mit+1 = (1 + r
∗
it) bit, (19)
where bit is the size of the mortgage. Notice that the interest rate on the mortgage
contains two components: 1) (1+r∗it), which is specific to the individual and accounts
for idiosyncratic default risk; and 2) a spread component, ξt, which is identical for all
borrowers and clears the market.
Furthermore, note that the intermediary will receive mitµi when a household re-
pays a loan originated at time t-1 and ΛpHit hit−1, when it does not. Thus, in order to
obtain zero net cashflows from period t loans and deposits, it must set ξt to solve the
following equation:
(1 + rt)
∑
i
dit−1 +
∑
i
bit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Outflows
=
∑
i
1(ψdit = 0)mit + p
H
t
∑
i
1(ψdit = 1)hit−1(1− δH) +
∑
i
dit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflows
(20)
Notice that dit−1, qit−1, hit−1 are all predetermined at time t. Thus, the intermediary
sets ξt to reduce or increase mortgage volume until net cashflows are zero.
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16There are two important things to note. First, in practice, we use a state-contingent function
to set ξt, rather than setting it in all periods. This adds tractability; and is discussed more in the
appendix. Second, ξt will also have an impact on the default rate and deposits at time t, but the
effects will be substantially smaller than those on mortgage volume.
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3.4 The Government
The government has one function in the model: to make transfer payments to retired
and unemployed individuals using taxes collected. For simplicity, the government is
assumed to use a constant replacement ratio, ζ. That is, it transfers ζwt to retired
and unemployed individuals.
3.4.1 Transfers
In order to cover payments to the unemployed and retired, the government must
allocate the following amount to outgoing transfer payments:
τt = ζwt
 TR+T∑
a=TR+1
µa +
TR+T∑
a=1
(1− Eat)µa
 (21)
Note that
∑TR+T
a=TR+1 µa, the mass of retired individuals, is constant in this model, so
it may be rewritten as µR. The mass of unemployed,
∑TR+T
a=1 (1− Eat)µa, changes over
time, so it is denoted by µUt . This yields:
τt = ζwt(µ
R + µUt ) (22)
That is, the government must collect enough in taxes to pay the mass of retired, µR,
and the mass of unemployed, µUt , ζwt in transfers.
3.4.2 Revenue
For simplicity, I assume the following about taxes: rates scale with productivity and
unemployed agents do not pay taxes. With these assumptions, the tax for employed
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households in cohort a can be written as follows:
Γat = ζwtηa
E
it
µR + µ
U
t
(1− µUt )
− h
D
t
(1− µUt )
(23)
Note that hDt denotes the housing stock that households turn over to the government
in period t after perishing. Additionally, notice that this specification for taxes will
require the government to maintain a balanced budget at all times. That is, aggregate
incoming transfer payments are equal to aggregate outgoing transfer payments:
Γt =
T+TR∑
a=1
(
ζwt
E
it
µR + µ
U
t
(1− µUt )
− h
D
t
(1− µUt )
)
ηaµa + h
D
t = ζwt(µR + µ
U
t ) = τt (24)
To see why this is the case, recall that
∑T
a=1 ηaµa = 1. Since ηa = 0 and 
E
it = 0
when a > T (i.e. individuals are retired), it will also be the case that
∑T+TR
a=1 ηaµa = 1.
Thus,
∑T+TR
a=1 ηa
E
itµa = (1− µUt ), which gives us the above equation.
Note that three components of the tax collected from households vary: 1) the
wage; 2) the age-specific productivity component; and 3) the unemployment rate,
µUt . When an individual’s productivity component is higher (i.e. the individual is
earning more), she will pay more in taxes. This is also true if the wage is higher,
which results in a generally progressive tax. However, an increase in unemployment
will still tend to increase taxes, since the tax base will decline. However, if the wage
also declines,17 this effect may be limited.
In order to test the magnitude of the these effects, I used data from the autoregres-
sive rule simulation with capital and endogenous house prices, which is described later
in the paper. I found that the average tax rate was positively correlated with both
17This might happen if the consumer goods sector is hit with negative productivity shock, since
this will have a negative effect on wage through the productivity decline, but a positive effect through
the increase in unemployment.
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the consumption goods sector shock and aggregate income, which suggests that any
countercyclical tax behavior generated by a shrinking tax base (as described above)
is dominated by the magnitude of wage changes. That is, in the model, aggregate
tax revenue tends to fall when output falls and rise when output rises.
3.5 The Central Bank
I assume that the central bank sets the interbank lending rate. Since each financial
intermediary is indifferent between borrowing from other banks and from households,
the interbank lending rate will also determine the risk-free rate earned on deposits,
rt.
Since the model employs a representative financial intermediary, net interbank
lending is zero and is excluded. In the first set of exogenous interest rate rule simula-
tions, I will assume that the central bank adopts an autoregressive interest rate rule.
I will then test the properties of this rule by varying the autoregressive coefficient to
determine how interest rate persistence impacts default and welfare.
In addition to autoregressive rules, the central bank will also employ other ex-
ogenous interest rate rules, such as a sine wave rule, in different simulations. The
purpose of this exercise will be to capture the impact of certain interest rate behaviors
on default.
The central bank will also employ a number of different rules that endogenously
respond to the economy’s dynamics. In different simulations, these rules will incor-
porate house price level targeting, inflation targeting, house price inflation targeting,
and output gap targeting. The Taylor rule and modifications of it will also be tested
to determine the optimal coefficients for reducing default and maximizing welfare.
Finally, it is important to note that inflation will have real effects in my model,
even in the absence of sticky prices. Since agents are heterogenous and the model
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incorporates realistic mortgage structure, an increase in inflation will reduce the real
value of mortgage debt. Furthermore, inflation will tend to increase the market value
of homes relative to the size of the mortgage contracts that were used to purchase
those homes. This will improve homeowner balance sheets by increasing home equity
positions. Ultimately, these effects (and others) make it possible to perform all of the
analysis in a flexible price–rather than sticky price–framework. However, I will defer
further discussion of sticky prices to later sections and the appendix.
3.6 Aggregate Consistency Conditions
In addition to satisfying individual-level constraints, the economy is also subject to
aggregate consistency conditions. Each constraint requires an aggregate-level variable
to be equal to the weighted sum of the individual-level variables:
Kt =
TR+T∑
a=1
katµa (25)
Nt =
TR+T∑
a=1
Eatµa (26)
Ct =
TR+T∑
a=1
catµa (27)
Γt =
TR+T∑
a=1
Γatµa (28)
Bt =
TR+T∑
a=1
batµa (29)
Dt =
TR+T∑
a=1
datµa (30)
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Ht =
TR+T∑
a=1
hatµa (31)
Cht =
TR+T∑
a=1
chatµa (32)
Φt =
TR+T∑
a=1
φ(hat, hat−1)µa (33)
Yt = Ct + IHt +Kt − (1− δK)Kt−1 + Φt (34)
3.7 Price Stickiness
The model was originally solved and simulated with sticky prices. After further
evaluation, it became clear that sticky prices were not an essential feature of my
model–and, thus, were removed to highlight the importance of other mechanisms.
Below, I briefly describe the version of sticky prices that were originally incorporated
into the model. It is important to note that their inclusion in the model did not result
in qualitatively different results. Other than that, I will restrict further discussion of
the sticky price case to the appendix.
In order to generate sticky prices, I adopt an approach similar to the one taken
in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) and Taylor (1979, 1980), but in a cashless
economy. That is, there is a final goods producer who assembles intermediates with
the following production function:
Yt =
[∫
Yt(j)di
] 1
q
, 0 < q ≤ 1 (35)
Additionally, there is a continuum of intermediate goods firms who use Cobb-Douglas
technology to produce individual varieties:
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Yt(j) = e
AtKt(j)
αNt(j)
1−α, (36)
Intermediate good firm j will choose P (j), K(j), and N(j) to maximize profits:
pit(j) = Pt(j)Yt(j)−RKt(j)−WtNt(j) (37)
I assume that only half of intermediate goods firms are able to set prices in each
period.18 For instance, in period t, all j, such that j ∈ [0, 0.5) will set prices for
periods t and t+1; and in period t+1, all j, such that j ∈ [0.5, 1] will set prices for
periods t+1 and t+2. The price set by intermediate goods firms in period t is denoted
by P¯t. This yields the following optimal price for intermediate goods firms:
P¯t =
Et(P
θ
t VtYt + (1 + rt)
−1P θt+1Vt+1Yt+1)
qEt(P
1
1−q
t + (1 + rt)
−1P
1
1−q
t+1 Yt+1)
, (38)
where θ = 2−q
1−q and Vt is the minimized unit cost of production. Finally, the zero
profit condition yields the following equation for the price index:
Pt =
[
1
2
P
q
1−q
t−1 +
1
2
P¯t
q
1−q
] 1
q
(39)
In each period, I solve for Pt using an approximation scheme, which is outlined in the
appendix.
4 Model Properties
Now that all of the pieces of the model are in place, we may take a more careful
look at the economy, starting with the characteristics of the individuals who default.
18In the flexible price specification, all firms can set prices in all periods.
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Figure 2 shows cumulative density function (CDF) plots of the age, income, home
equity, and capital holding for simulated households. The plots show defaulters in
red and non-defaulters in blue.
There are four useful things to take away from these plots. First, all defaulting
households have negative equity positions, but not all non-defaulters have positive
home equity positions. As outlined earlier, negative equity is a necessary–but not
sufficient–condition for default. Second, the income of defaulters is low relative to
non-defaulters. In fact, 47.86% of defaulters are unemployed; whereas, only 5.7% of
non-defaulters are unemployed. This should not be surprising, since income shocks
are the second trigger. Third, defaulters tend to be substantially younger. In fact,
all defaulters in this particular simulation were under age 50. Individuals over age 50
typically have sufficient home equity and capital holdings to endure shocks to income
and equity. Finally, the capital stocks of non-defaulters tend to be considerably
higher. There are two reasons for this: 1) having more capital helps agents to smooth
shocks that affect wages and house prices, which makes them less likely to default; and
2) the types of agents who are unlikely to default (i.e. older agents with substantial
home equity) have had more time to accumulate capital to smooth consumption
during retirement.
In addition to looking at default, I also consider other properties of individual-
level variables in the model. The household shown in Figure 3 is drawn from the
baseline model’s simulation and is used to demonstrate the degree of heterogeneity
in the model. Note that the household shown experiences multiple unemployment
spells, defaults at an early age, holds a mortgage until age 60, and never manages
to accumulate a substantial amount of assets. As a result, they experience unusually
low consumption in retirement. Figure 4 shows the average household lifecycle profile
for comparison. Note that Figure 4 replicates the stylized facts for U.S. homeowners
29
according to Jeske (2005). That is, they accumulate housing from age 25 until age
50-59, but then stay in the same house or move into a smaller one thereafter. Ad-
ditionally, non-housing consumption increases until about age 40, but then declines
thereafter. Net paper assets are initially negative, but then become positive and grow
as the individual pays off debt and accumulates savings for retirement.
Additionally, note that the age-income profile, as shown in Figure 3 and 4 is cali-
brated to match Consumer Population Survey (CPS) data. That is, income increases
until the individual reaches her early 40s. It then levels off and begins to decline.
Furthermore, the individual in Figure 3 receives a random unemployment shock at
age 62, which lasts a year. And, at age 65, the individual retires and accepts transfers
from the government at the replacement ratio, ζ.
Some of the basic features of the aggregate economy are illustrated in Figure 5,
which shows 100 periods of simulated data. One thing to note is that aggregate
housing is substantially more volatile than consumption, as is also true in the histor-
ical data. Additionally, the simulated economy exhibits leverage cycles, as measured
by the debt-to-income ratio. Finally, over the course of the 100 years of simulated
data, we see significant changes in default rates, which range from 0% to 7%. This is
roughly consistent with the U.S. housing market over the last 50 years.
As far as the calibration of the unemployment rate is concerned–the simulated
rate has a mean of 6.49% and a standard deviation of 1.47% over the full simulation
period (not just the 50 years shown in Figure 6). In the actual data for the U.S. from
1957 to 2012, the mean unemployment rate was 6.03% and the standard deviation
was 1.58%. Additionally, it is important to note that idiosyncratic unemployment
shocks are based off of shocks to consumption good production, which makes the
unemployment rate move with the business cycle.
In addition to examining default in the model, I also consider how macrovariables
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in the model respond to shocks by constructing impulse responses. I assume that the
central bank uses the following standard version of the Taylor rule with α1 = 1.5 and
α2 = .5:
19
rt = r
∗ + α1(pit − pi∗t ) + α2(log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) + t (40)
Note that the impulse responses do not come from a linearized version of the model,
but instead are constructed by solving the nonlinear version, simulating without
shocks initially, and then introducing a single, one-standard deviation shock. All
responses shown are from the full-employment steady state, rather than the ergodic
rate of unemployment steady state.20 Finally, notice that the non-smoothness and
the fluctuations in the impulse responses arise from two things: 1) non-convexities in
the model; and 2) the non-linearity of the solution method. Occasionally-binding con-
straints, house-size minimums, mortgage structure, and post-default housing market
exclusion result in discrete adjustments of individual-level (and aggregate) variables
in response to shocks. Fluctuations may arise from both non-convexities and second
(or higher) order effects, which are captured by the nonlinear solution method.
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses for a positive, one-standard deviation tech-
nology shock. The graphs for output, consumption, capital investment and the hous-
ing stock21 show percentage deviations from steady state. The graphs for the interest
rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio are shown in deviations from their initial values. A
one-standard deviation technology shock increases the productivity of workers and
19In the model, pi∗t = 0 and Y
∗
t is equal to its ergodic mean in the full employment steady state.
20For technical reasons, the ergodic rate of unemployment steady state presents several problems.
Most importantly, however, even if the unemployment rate is fixed at its ergodic mean, macrovari-
ables will continue to fluctuate slightly, since individuals with different characteristics will become
unemployed in different periods.
21Note that there is very little housing investment in the steady state, since depreciation is zero.
The only investment in the steady state is generated by replacing housing from agents who perish.
For this reason, impulse responses are given for the housing stock, rather than housing investment.
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capital, leading to an initial 4.1% increase in output, which decays over the course
of 13 years. Consumption also rises by 3.5%, but does so more slowly and remains
higher for 30 years. The interest rate increases by 200 basis points to respond to the
jump in output; and remains high for 15 years. Investment in physical capital and
the size of the housing stock increases in response to the shock–and remains above
their respective ergodic means longer than output.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses for a positive, one-standard deviation shock
to housing productivity. Note that this shock reduces the price of houses by 6.3%,
which fuels housing investment, resulting in an increase in the stock of housing by
about 2.5% after 7 years. Physical capital investment, however, drops by 13% over
7 years as investment is diverted to housing. The drop in physical capital depresses
output by 0.55% over 7 years; and reduces consumption with a similar magnitude,
but lower and over a longer period of time.
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses for a positive, 100 basis point shock to the
interest rate. First, notice that the shock increases the return to saving, diverting
investment away from capital to bank deposits, which increase by 8% over the course
of 20 years. The reduction in capital investment depresses output by .5% and also
puts downward pressure on consumption. Note, however, that the reduction in con-
sumption (3%) is much larger than the drop in output; and is most likely caused
by the increase in interest rates, which pushes up mortgage payments, constraining
households to consume less. The increase in interest rates puts downward pressure
on housing investment, reducing the housing stock by 3% after 10 years. Average
household leverage rises by 6 percentage points over the course of 20 years, suggest-
ing that households may be withdrawing equity from their homes, even if they are
not buying more housing.
Table 1 shows business cycle moments for 1000 periods of simulated data. This
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is compared to the to the actual business cycle moments for the U.S. using annual
data over the 1957-2011 period.22 In general, the magnitudes of the relative stan-
dard deviations and the signs of the covariances accurately represent the actual data;
however, simulated investment tends to be less volatile and more procyclical than its
empirical counterpart.
Table 2 shows the parameter values used in the autoregressive rule simulations.
Note that some parameter values and all of the simulated business cycle moments
will vary from simulation to simulation. For this reason, Tables 1 and 2 should not
be used to interpret all of the simulated results.
Figure 10 compares the Lorenz Curve for the simulated economy (shown in blue)
with an empirical Lorenz Curve for the United States (show in black). The straight,
red line represents perfect equality. In general, the simulated economy reproduces
the empirical income distribution well with two minor departures: 1) wealth is more
evenly distributed within the top 50% of earners in the simulated data; and 2) the
bottom 50% is relatively poorer in the simulated data.
5 Simulation Results
In the subsections below, I detail the simulation results, starting with what I will
refer to as endogenous interest rate rules. This is intended to refer to any rule that
specifies how interest rates should respond to other macrovariables. Alternatively, we
might refer to them as policy rules. Later on, we will look at exogenous interest rate
rules (or rules that do not specify comovement with other macrovariables) to get a
better sense of how certain types of univariate time series properties of interest rates
affect default and welfare. We will also use these rules to examine shock amplification
22Note that the starting year is 1957 because it is the first year that I have observations for the
housing investment data.
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channels in the model.
Note that the results given in the subsections below are robust to several model
specification changes. In particular, the results do not change qualitatively if we make
any of the following modifications: 1) add sticky prices; 2) remove unemployment
benefits; or 3) remove non-housing shelter. Sticky prices were included in the original
set of simulations, but were removed because they played only a small role in the
model and obscured important mechanisms. The other two items tended to increase
the intensity of welfare results, but did not qualitatively change any findings. All of
these modifications will be discussed briefly in the appendix; however, unless I state
otherwise, all results shown below are for the flexible price case.
5.1 Endogenous Rules
In this section, I will consider endogenous (or policy) rules for setting interest rates.
I will do this by examining the properties of inertial Taylor rules, Taylor rules with
different coefficients, price-level targeting rules, output-targeting rules, and Taylor
rules with a house price targeting component.
5.1.1 Inertial Taylor Rules
I will start this section by considering the class of inertial Taylor rules. This consists
of standard Taylor rules that are augmented by autoregressive components. In the
specification given below, rt is the interest rate set by the central bank, αρ is a
constant term, ρR is the autoregressive parameter, pit is the rate of inflation, pi
∗
t is
the target inflation rate, Yt is aggregate demand, and Y
∗
t is an “efficient” or target
level of aggregate demand. I use the standard Taylor rule coefficients of α1 = 1.5 and
α2 = .5.
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rt = αρ + ρrrt−1 + α1(pit − pi∗t ) + α2(log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) + t (41)
Note that everything in the above equation will be mean zero other than the autore-
gressive component and intercept. Thus, the mean of the interest rate process will
be determined by setting the intercept term. In order to be consistent with later
simulations, I set αρ = (1− ρr)r¯, which will generate an interest rate process with a
mean equal to the ideal rate, r¯.
In order to determine the impact of a higher degree of inertia, I solve and simulate
the model 150 times and at 10 different parameter values. I then fit a curve to the
results. Figure 11 and Figure 12 in the appendix show the curves for default and
average normalized utility respectively. Note that each of these values is plotted
against the value of αρ used in the simulation.
The results suggest that a high degree of interest rate inertia will increase the
default rate and reduce normalized average utility. In particular, increasing the au-
toregressive parameter from 0 (a standard Taylor rule with no inertia) to .9 (a highly
persistent Taylor rule) will increase the default rate from .55% to 2%. Furthermore,
the increase in the default rate does not seem to be offset by utility-increasing benefits
that might come from a slow-moving interest rate. Rather, an individual living in the
economy with no interest rate inertia who is consuming the average amount would
need to be given a 32% increase in consumption in order to be willing to live in the
economy with αρ = .9–a non-trivial difference in living standards.
These results appear to confirm the findings in papers like Forlati and Lam-
bertini (2011), which suggest that inertial interest rate rules lead to deeper output
contractions–and, thus, may harm welfare. However, as we’ll see later, “inertia” itself
may not be driving all of the reductions in welfare we see in this model. Rather, the
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way in which we generate inertia (i.e. by using an autoregressive process) may create
other undesirable univariate time series properties in interest rates–and these may be
responsible for a substantial part of the default rate increase and welfare decline.
5.1.2 Standard Taylor Rules
Next, I’ll consider the set of standard Taylor rules. In the specification given below,
rt is the interest rate set by the central bank, r¯ is the ideal interest rate, pit is the
rate of inflation, pi∗t is the target inflation rate, Yt is aggregate demand, and Y
∗
t is an
“efficient” or target level of aggregate demand.
rt = r¯ + α1(pit − pi∗t ) + α2(log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) + t (42)
For the purposes of this first simulation exercise, I set pi∗t=0 and set Y
∗
t equal to the
ergodic mean of Yt. I then simulate over α1 ∈ (0, 2) with α2 = .5. Additionally,
for the first simulation, productivity shocks in the housing sector and consumption
goods sector are negatively correlated, which makes the price level and housing prices
positively correlated.
My results suggest that default is not minimized at the standard Taylor Rule
coefficient of α1 = 1.5. In fact, the maximum default rate occurs at α1 = 1.3, with
a local minimum at α1 = 2 and a global minimum at α1 = 1.
23 Similarly, utility is
maximized at α1 = 1.
Next, I consider the same simulation, but with positively correlated housing and
consumption sector productivities (and negatively correlated prices). Here, the de-
fault rate is monotonically increasing in the coefficient on inflation. Furthermore,
23In follow-up set of simulations, α2 = .6 was found to be the default-minimizing and utility-
maximizing value of the output gap parameter when α1 = 1. While this isn’t necessarily a global
maximum over the parameter space, it suggests that a Taylor rule with stronger output gap targeting,
but weaker inflation targeting might be an improvement when housing and default are explicitly
taken into consideration.
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welfare is monotonically decreasing as α1 increases, suggesting that the welfare ben-
efits of lower inflation may be outweighed by the higher default rate.
Why is there such an important qualitative difference when the sign of the cor-
relation is changed? The answer lies in house prices. Recall that pht =
1
δIHte
Ut
. If
productivity is positively correlated across sectors, then At will then tend to be low
when Ut is also low. Since the unemployment rate will tend to be high when At is
low, output will also be low, which will depress the price level.24 This will prompt
the central bank to respond by reducing interest rates, which will simulate housing
investment. Since positive housing investment pushes up house prices, the central
bank’s actions will actually tend to destabilize the housing market. That is, when
house prices are high, then central bank will often make them higher. And when
house prices are low, the central bank will tend to push them lower. Additionally, as
the central bank pursues inflation more aggressively, it will become an increasingly
destabilizing force in the housing market.
To summarize–the empirical relationship between housing and consumption sec-
tor productivities is a critical determinant of the efficacy of monetary policy because
it partially determines the comovement of the price level and house prices. If hous-
ing and consumption sector productivities tend to move in opposite directions, then
aggressive inflation targeting will destabilize house prices, leading to higher rates of
default. Conversely, if they move in the same direction, then aggressive inflation
targeting will tend to stabilize house prices, reducing default.
24It is important to note that an adverse technology shock does not increase the price level in my
model. While it will push up the unit costs of production, it will simultaneously increase the rate
of unemployment, which will have a strong, countervailing impact.
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5.1.3 House Price Targeting
Next, I consider Taylor rules that incorporate house prices. The functional form for
the rule is given below:
rt = r¯ + α1(pit − pi∗t ) + α2(log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) + α3(log(pht )− log(ph∗)) + t (43)
Note that pht is the price of housing and p
h∗ is the ergodic mean of house prices.
For the purposes of this simulation exercise, I set α1 = 1.5 and α2 = .5; and then
varied α3 from 0 to 1. The primary impact from this rule is to smooth house prices
by affecting the housing investment component of price. That is, when investment
increases or housing productivity is falls, pht will rise. If such a rule were in place,
the central bank would respond by raising interest rates to push housing investment
(and prices) down.
One important thing to note is that the central bank is still placing normal weights
on inflation and the output gap; however, it has simply added a competing objective:
house price smoothing. While this new term might occasionally lead to undesirable
effects (i.e. high interest rates when output is low), the effects will be tempered by
the original components of the rule. Thus, a recession (if accompanied by fast house
price growth) will be met with a smaller reduction in the interest rate than would
otherwise happen.
In my simulations, this rule substantially outperforms the standard version of
the Taylor rule with respect to default rate minimization and welfare maximization.
When α3 = 0, this rule is equivalent to a Taylor rule with typical coefficients. As α3
increases, the house price targeting component becomes increasingly important. As
can be seen in Figures 13 and 14, when α3 = 1, the default rate is 35% lower than
it would be under a standard Taylor rule. Furthermore, in order to be indifferent
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between the standard Taylor rule and the same rule with a house price targeting
component, a household who is consuming the average amount would need to receive
a consumption increase of 23%.
This suggests that there could be substantial welfare gains to house price level
targeting. However, it is important to emphasize two nuances here: 1) even when
α3 = 1, the central bank is not targeting only house price level deviations. Rather,
it is adding a house price targeting component to a typical Taylor rule. And 2) the
ergodic mean of house prices is known in the model, but not in reality. That is,
unlike price level targeting, there is no obvious or reasonable range of levels to target.
Furthermore, unlike inflation targeting, it is not clear what the appropriate rate of
growth of house prices is.
The second nuance raises an important question: if the central bank does not know
what the correct house price level or rate target is, should it just ignore house prices
entirely and use a standard Taylor rule, inflation-target, or price-level target instead?
I would suggest that ignoring housing altogether is, in fact, taking a position on it;
and is no safer than explicitly including housing in the rule with an imperfect target.
One possible strategy for getting around this problem might be to only activate the
house price component if house price inflation passes out of some safe band of growth:
rt = r¯+pit +α1(pit−pi∗t ) +α2(log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) +α3f(log(pht )− log(pht−1)) + t (44)
f(log(pht )− log(pht−1)) =

log(pht )− log(pht−1) if (log(pht )− log(pht−1)) > νU
log(pht )− log(pht−1) if (log(pht )− log(pht−1)) < νL
0 otherwise,
That is, if the growth rate of house prices is greater than some upper bound, νU , then
activate the housing component of the rule. Alternatively, if the growth rate of house
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prices falls below some lower bound, νL, then activate the housing component. This
will permit the central bank to conduct monetary policy as usual in normal times, but
still respond to house price growth that is highly abnormal relative to its historical
trend when it occurs.
5.1.4 House Price Inflation Targeting
For the sake of completeness, I perform simulations for house price inflation targeting
in addition to house price level targeting. Here, instead of targeting the ergodic house
price level, the central bank attempts to make house prices move slowly, whether they
are returning to the ergodic house price level or departing from it:
rt = r¯+ pit + α1(pit − pi∗t ) + α2(log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) + α3(log(pht )− log(pht−1)) + t (45)
Note that this approach has interesting implications for housing booms: if house
prices start growing rapidly, but taper off as the boom reaches its height, then the
central bank will respond by sharply raising the interest rate initially, but then lower-
ing it as the boom continues. This is very different from a house price level targeting
rule, which will tighten monetary policy as the boom continues; and will keep it tight
even after the peak, when house price growth becomes negative.
Additionally, recall that there is no obvious “ideal” rate of house price growth in
the actual economy. Rather, there is perhaps some rate of growth that is consistent
with fundamentals and is unlikely to result in a large price growth reversal in the
future; however, it is unknown and probably changes over time. In contrast, the model
presented in this paper is stationary, which renders a positive or negative house price
growth target meaningless. It is also not clear whether fast house price growth ever
deteriorates welfare; although, based on the results in this paper, fast drops in house
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prices appear to reduce welfare because they outpace equity position improvements
from mortgage payments–and result in negative equity, which is a necessary condition
for default.
For all of the reasons above, this section will be considered for the sake of thorough-
ness, but will not be treated as a rule that could plausibly be used for policy-making
purposes–at least not without a substantial amount of additional work and thought.
The results for house price inflation targeting suggest that default is minimized
and welfare is maximized when α3 = 1.2–that is, when the central bank changes
the interest rate faster than the rate of house price growth. Note that there are
two plausible explanations for this result: first, prolonged periods of house price
increases are mitigated by aggressive interest rate hikes. And second (and perhaps
more importantly), rapid house price declines are slowed by aggressive interest rate
reductions.
5.1.5 Price Level Targeting
Next, I consider the class of price-level targeting rules, using the following specifica-
tion:
rt = r¯ + αp(log(Pt)− log(P ∗)) + t (46)
This rule will increase the interest rate when the price level exceeds its ergodic
mean, P ∗; and reduce it otherwise. I performed simulations for αp ∈ (0, 1) with
positively correlated productivities, and found that default is minimized and welfare is
maximized at αp = 0.5. Beyond αp = 0.5, welfare declines and default increases. This
should not be surprising, since strong price-level targeting can generate high interest
rates when income and house prices are low. That is, if income is low and house prices
are low, but the price level is high, then the central bank will respond by pushing up
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the interest rate. In the model, this would have particularly severe consequences for
default. Conversely, under an inflation-targeting or output-gap targeting regime, this
is much less likely to happen.
Similar to the inflation-targeting results, I find that price-level targeting performs
poorly when productivities are positively correlated across sectors. In particular,
default is minimized and welfare is maximized when αp = 0. That is–an interest rate
that follows a white noise process around the ideal rate is preferable to price level
targeting if house prices and the price level tend to move in opposite directions.
5.1.6 Output Smoothing Rules
Next, I’ll consider rules that smooth the output gap. In the specification given below,
rt is the interest rate set by the central bank, r¯ is the ideal interest rate, Yt is aggregate
demand, and Y ∗t is an “efficient” or target level of aggregate demand.
rt = r¯ + αY (log(Yt)− log(Y ∗t )) + t (47)
For the purposes of this simulation exercise, I set Y ∗t equal to the ergodic mean of
Yt. I then simulate over αY ∈ (0, 1.5). I find the following three things: 1) increasing
αY from 0 to 1.5 more than doubles the default rate; 2) positive correlation between
sectoral productivities amplifies the increase in default caused by aggressive output
smoothing; and 3) a moderate amount of output smoothing (αY = .5) maximizes
welfare, even if it increases the rate of default, as long as sectoral productivities are
negatively correlated (i.e. house prices and the price level are positively correlated).
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5.1.7 Regulating Mortgage Contracts
A final strategy that might be employed is to place legal limits on on the availability
of certain mortgage contracts.25 If, for instance, banks were limited to offering fixed
rate mortgages (FRMs) or low LTV ratio mortgages to individuals with poor credit
histories or low incomes, this might help to eliminate one of the necessary conditions
for default for many high-risk borrowers. Even if those individuals paid higher risk
premia on FRMs or were excluded from the housing market temporarily (i.e. until
they could make a sufficiently large downpayment), the impact might still be welfare-
improving if it mitigated the aggregate risk that this group of borrowers imposes on
the housing and mortgage markets.
Since mortgage choice is outside of the scope of this paper, I examine this problem
by looking specifically at the LTV issue. In particular, I simulate the economy for
an LTV ratio cap of .7 and of 1.1. I find that increasing the LTV ratio to 1.1 (i.e.
allowing individuals to take out mortgages greater than the value of their homes)
increases the average default rate by only 22.3%; however, it makes the economy
more susceptible to catastrophes. When the cap is .7, the default rate never exceeds
10%. However, when the cap is 1.1, it exceeds 10% multiple times–and has a max
default rate of 16.67%.
This suggests that regulating LTV maximums might be a way to create stability.
Even though the impact of such a regulation will not be highly visible (i.e. it will not
dramatically slash the default rate), it may prevent a crisis in which many households
default at the same time; and house prices fall for a prolonged period of time.
25Note that an alternative policy might involve taxing LTV ratios or placing stricter limitations
on mortgages purchased by Freddie Mac.
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5.1.8 Measures of Mispricing and Instability
In the years since the Great Recession, several papers have looked at the use of
macroprudential policy and its role in creating financial stability without monetary
intervention. Alichi, Ryoo, and Hong (2012), for instance, look at macroprudential
policy in South Korea. In particular, they consider the taxation of financial interme-
diaries’ key financial ratios, such as the assets to non-core liabilities ratio. They also
consider limiting or targeting other measures of leverage.
While I do not show results for macroprudential policy simulations, my model can
be extended to incorporate some of these policies. For instance, the government in
the model could generate some of its revenue by placing a tax on originations that
is proportional to the LTV ratio. However, some macroprudential policies, such as
the choice to tax non-core liabilities, as outlined in Shin’s (2010) memo, could not be
evaluated in my framework without the introduction substantial changes.
Finally, Aydin and Volkan (2011) suggest that modified monetary policy rules
can be used to promote stability and discourage mispricing. They focus on non-
financial sector borrowing spreads, bank foreign exchange leverage, credit volume,
and asset prices as potential targets. The set of interest rate rules they suggest can
be represented by the following equation:
rt = ρmrt−1 + (1− ρm){ρpip˜it + ρyY˜d,t + ρψψ˜t}+ m,t (48)
Note that rt−1 is the lagged interest rate, p˜it is the inflation rate’s deviation from
its target, Y˜t is output’s deviation from its target, and ψ˜t captures the target financial
variable’s deviation from its target. In my model, this variable might be a key financial
ratio, such as the debt-to-income ratio, the mortgage volume-to-income ratio, or
the house price-to-GDP ratio–all of which could provide a measure of mispricing or
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instability. Alternatively, the average default risk premium from my model could be
used to measure risk in the financial sector.
In short–macroprudential policies that either focus on taxation or are incorpo-
rated into interest rate rules may provide a reasonable alternative to house price level
(or growth) targeting. Rather than picking an arbitrary threshold for “acceptable”
growth, the central bank can make an attempt to prevent financial ratios from de-
viating from historically stable values. While this may sometimes lead to tighter
policy during contractions or looser policy during expansions, it will help to prevent
the creation of financial vulnerabilities that have the possibility of greatly amplifying
crises.
5.1.9 OER and House Prices
One final consideration is whether there is a need to target house prices when owner-
equivalent rent (OER) is already incorporated into price indices like the CPI. That
is, if the price index in my model were closer to the CPI, it might already capture
house price growth; and there would be no need to modify the Taylor Rule, since it
would already respond to house price increases.
In fact, OER is not a reasonable proxy for house prices–at least not in the years
leading up to the Great Recession. As Cecchetti (2007) points out in a VOX editorial,
targeting an inflation measure that incorporates OER is not equivalent to targeting
an inflation measure that incorporates house prices. Between 2000 and 2007, OER
increased by a mere 3.17% per year; whereas, house prices increased by 8.48% each
year. Since OER accounts for roughly 30% of core CPI, changing this definition
(or targeting house prices separately) would lead to dramatically different policy
decisions.
Thus, relying on the OER component of CPI to capture house price growth may
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be misguided; and is unlikely to prevent future crises. For this reason, it may make
sense to target house prices or house price growth separately. See the appendix for
an extended discussion of this topic.
5.2 Exogenous Interest Rate Rules
In the next set of simulations, I consider exogenous interest rate rules that have differ-
ent types of univariate time series properties. The purpose behind these simulations
is to determine whether certain properties are more likely to increase the default rate
and lower welfare. In addition to this, we will also look more closely at the model
by removing several critical components; and then adding them back one at a time.
We will start by looking at the class of autoregressive interest rate rules in a model
without capital or endogenous house prices.
5.2.1 Autoregressive Interest Rate Rules
In order to get the simulated interest rate to approximate federal funds rate (FFR)
movements, I estimated the univariate time series properties of the FFR. This entailed
two steps: first, I performed an AR(1) regression on the FFR series from 1970-2010 to
recover the autoregressive coefficient (.76). Next, I computed the standard deviation
of the residual series (0.0156).
In the baseline autoregressive interest rate rule simulation, I used the aforemen-
tioned FFR properties to simulate the interest rate. For computational purposes, I
discretized the AR(1) process using the Rouwenhorst method (1995), which is dis-
cussed further in the appendix. I also removed capital and the endogenous component
of house prices from the baseline simulation in order to examine the simplest version
before adding further complexity.26
26Parameter values for the baseline are shown in Table 2.
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For the purposes of this simulation, I assume that the central bank adopts a
variety of different interest rate rules by varying the autoregressive parameter on the
interest rate lag (ρr) between -1 and 1.
27 In each case, I set the constant term, cr
to µr(1 − ρr), where µr is the average interest rate target. This ensures that each
simulation has the same average interest rate. In each case, I solve and simulate the
model for a different ρr and cr 150 times; and plot the main result in Figure 14. Note
that the blue, solid line plots the simulated data, and the red, dotted line marks the
estimated autoregressive coefficient for the annual FFR series.
Figure 15 shows a curve fitted to the default rate-autoregressive parameter pairs
from the 150 simulations. Notice that the average default rate in the economy is
minimized when the autoregressive coefficient is zero–that is, when the interest rate
is a white noise process. Making the interest rate more persistent (by increasing the
coefficient) or making it more volatile (by making the coefficient negative) generates
a higher average rate of default. For example, adopting an interest rate that has
the same univariate time series properties as the FFR will generate a default rate of
1.57%; whereas, adopting a white noise interest rate will generate an average default
rate of 1.4%.
Of course, this is not the full story. This analysis completely ignores the possibility
of endogenous interest rate responses to other macrovariables, which eliminates the
virtue of having an interest rate rule entirely. However, this finding demonstrates
something important: even if critical default amplifiers that are affected by interest
rates (i.e. endogenous house prices) are ignored, adopting an interest rate rule that
generates as much persistence as we see in the FFR leads to a default rate that is
12.14% higher than a white noise interest rate in the simulated data. This suggests
27Note that simulations were conducted close to–but not at–the boundary values in order to avoid
introducing nonstationary into the model.
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that there could be welfare gains from making the FFR less persistent, but without
introducing volatility, which we’ve also shown also generates default. Later on, I
will demonstrate that the gains might be substantially larger when we add default
amplifiers.
In addition to looking at default, it is important to consider how the rule fares
along other dimensions. If, for instance, interest rate persistence leads to a higher
rate of default, but does so by generating a higher rate of homeownership (and, thus,
adding more marginal borrowers), then persistence may have an positive impact on
welfare overall. In fact, as shown in Figure 15, the exact opposite is true.
Figure 16 plots normalized, average utility against the autoregressive coefficient.
In the graph, average utility is maximized when the autoregressive coefficient close
to zero. For comparison’s sake, consider an individual who is in the economy with
a white noise interest rate and is consuming the average amount of the consumption
good. In order to offset the utility loss of moving from the white noise interest rate
economy to the economy with an interest rate that has the same univariate time series
properties as the FFR, this individual will need to have her consumption increased
by 11%.
When looking at the remaining simulation results, I will omit the findings for
negatively autocorrelated interest rate rules, since these are less likely to be relevant
for policy purposes. However, it is fair to state that interest rate volatility in general
tends to push up the default rate–and this is perhaps the most important reason why
negatively autocorrelated rates generate more default than white noise. Indeed, in
a separate set of simulations, I found that increasing the standard deviation of the
interest rate shock from .01 to .05 increased default by 20.8.%.
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5.2.2 Adding Endogenous House Prices
Next, I expand on the baseline version of the model used in the autoregressive rule
simulations by making house prices endogenous. This is done by adding the capacity
utilization term, δ(IHt), as discussed in the model section. This makes the price
of a unit of housing equal to 1
δ(IHt)eUt
units of consumption. The purpose here is
to match another important facet of the relationship between interest rates and de-
fault: when interest rates rise, financing new homes with a mortgage becomes more
expensive, which pushes down housing investment. In the model without endogenous
house prices, this effect could actually reduce the default rate by preventing marginal
borrowers from obtaining homes. However, in the case with endogenous prices, ris-
ing interest rates will deteriorate housing equity positions by pushing down prices.
This will tend to push up the default rate and amplify the effects of interest rates on
housing cycles.
There’s one more important thing to notice about this particular form for house
prices: when the default rate rises and financial intermediaries foreclose on homes,
housing investment from earlier periods will be reversed when intermediaries liquidate
it, pulling prices down further. This will help the model to match the observation
that rising foreclosure rates often depress house prices further.
Figure 17 yields two additional insights. First, the rate of default is higher at all
autoregressive coefficients. Even when the interest rate follows a white noise process,
the default rate is roughly 276% higher when house prices are endogenous. This
suggests that the impact of interest rates on house prices may be one of the most
important channels for default.
Adding endogenous house prices not only increases the default rate, but also
amplifies the effects of persistence and volatility. For example, a white noise process
generates a default rate of 3.95%; whereas, an interest rate with the persistence of
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the FFR series generates a default rate of 4.7%–a 23% increase. This is more than
twice as large proportionally as the change without endogenous house prices.
In Figure 18, we can see that the impact of interest rate persistence on utility
is more pronounced. An individual in the white noise interest rate economy who is
consuming the average level of the consumption good will now need a 18.18% increase
in consumption in order to be willing to switch to the economy with the FFR-like
interest rate rule.
5.2.3 Adding Capital
Finally, we add capital, which completes the model outlined originally. Capital will
play several important roles. First, it will add another source of aggregate uncertainty
to the model. Second, it will give households another asset they can use to hedge
against house price drops. And third, it will add an additional channel through which
interest rates may affect default. That is, if the interest rate on deposits falls relative
to the return to capital, marginal households will invest in capital instead, increasing
output. Conversely, an increase in interest rates will divert investment away from
capital into deposits. Applying the logic of the double trigger requirement for default,
lower income will not cause default by itself, but will cause more households to satisfy
a necessary condition of default.
Figure 19 shows the results for the default rate. One important thing to notice
is that the average default rate is substantially lower in this economy than in the
economy with endogenous house prices, but no capital. In particular, when the
interest rate is a white noise process, the economy has a default rate that is only
44.21% of the rate for the economy with endogenous house prices, but no capital.
Importantly, however, the original results have not changed. Higher interest rate
persistence still leads to higher default rates. In fact, moving from a white noise
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interest rate rule to a rule with an autoregressive coefficient of .76 increases the
default rate by 30.95%. This is similar to the economy without endogenous house
prices, but is considerably smaller than the case with endogenous house prices, but
no capital.
Figure 20 shows similar, but dampened results for welfare. Normalized average
utility drops as the interest rate becomes more persistent. In this case, however, the
decline is more gradual. Using the welfare metric invoked in the previous simula-
tion exercises again, the average individual’s consumption would have to increase by
12.66% in the economy with ρF = .76 in order to to make him as well off as he would
be under a white noise interest rate.
5.2.4 Sine Wave Rules
In the section on autoregressive rules, I considered the persistence and volatility prop-
erties of interest rate rules. One major finding was that either increased persistence or
increased volatility would generate a higher rate of default. This section is intended
to add a small, but important, nuance to the earlier findings. Here, the importance
of cyclicality will be considered explicitly, rather than using persistence as a proxy. I
will do this by having the central bank use a time-based sine wave rule to set interest
rates.
In particular, a rule will consist of setting the z, g, and n parameters in the
equation below:
rt =
sin(zt) + 1
g
+ n (49)
Note that n is the minimum interest rate, g determines the maximum interest
rate, and z will change the wavelength of the interest rate cycle. For the purposes
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of this simulation exercise, I set g to 25 and n to .02, which creates an upper bound
for the interest rate at .1 and a lower bound at .02. I then vary z to generate a
different wavelength for each simulation. I found that default is minimized when
the wavelength of interest rate cycle is 22 years and utility is maximized when the
wavelength is 17 years. For comparison’s sake, if the nominal FFR’s low frequency
trend is removed, it has maintained an approximate wavelength of 5-10 years since
1956. Furthermore, if the interest rate is simulated at this approximate wavelength
(7.5 years), the default rate increases by 1.27 percentage points over the minimum
rate, suggesting that there could be welfare gains to increasing the wavelength of
interest rate cycles.
This finding adds an important nuance to the findings from the previous section:
persistence generates default because it creates cycles–not because it causes interest
rates to move slowly. In fact, within the class of interest rates that exhibit cycles, slow
moving interest rates (i.e. ones with long cycle wavelengths) may be preferable to fast
ones. If this point seems too subtle, consider the following: if the average wavelength
of a cycle were 60 years, then many households would never hold a mortgage during
the turning point of an interest rate cycle. Conversely, if the average wavelength of
a cycle were 5 years, then almost every homeowner will hold a mortgage during the
turning point of a cycle. If these turning points are critical times for default–as we
have argued thus far–then the wavelength of an interest rate cycle may be a critical
consideration when constructing an interest rate rule.
Furthermore, if the cycles are longer, then house price equity declines (insofar
as they are related to interest rates) will happen much more slowly. That is, if the
interest rate moves very slowly, then the partial, negative effect that an increase in
interest rates will have on home equity will be smaller than the size of mortgage
payments. That is, in most periods, households will tend to improve their equity
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positions over time. This will make it easier for younger households to deal with
income shocks without defaulting. It will also prevent them from experiencing sharp
payment increases associated with holding an ARM during a rapid increase in interest
rates.
Finally, it is important to note that OLG models with realistic life cycles and
mortgage structure are uniquely qualified to solve this class of problem. Had I used
infinitely-lived agents with one period mortgages, it is not clear that I could say
anything at all about optimal wavelength, since it depends critically on lifecycle
elements.
5.3 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between a central bank’s choice of interest rate
rule, the mortgage default rate, and welfare. I do this by constructing a quantitative
equilibrium model with rigorous microfoundations; and incorporate aggregate uncer-
tainty, incomplete markets, overlapping-generations, credit-scoring, optimal default,
inter-sectoral productivity correlation, and realistic mortgage structure. I then use
this model to perform counterfactual simulations with a variety of interest rate rules,
including modified Taylor rules, price-level targeting rules, autoregressive rules, and
sine wave rules.
I find that the univariate time series properties implied by an interest rate rule
are a critical determinant of default rates. In particular, rules that generate short
interest rate cycles (i.e. have a shorter wavelength) tend to generate higher rates of
default. For instance, the FFR series has an average wavelength that is substantially
shorter than the optimal length implied by the simulation exercises.28
28I find the optimal wavelength to be 22 years for default-minimization and 17 years for utility
maximization.
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In addition to looking at the univariate time series properties, I also considered
the importance of inter-sectoral productivity correlation. For the class of Taylor rules,
very aggressive inflation targeting increased the default rate in an economy with pos-
itively correlated housing and consumption goods sector productivities. In contrast,
in an economy with negatively correlated productivities, aggressive inflation targeting
pushed down the default rate after initially increasing it. Furthermore, I suggested
this may be related to the properties of house prices in the model: if sectoral pro-
ductivities are negatively correlated, then an interest rate that is strongly procylical
(for the consumption goods sector) will tend to stabilize house prices. Conversely, if
sectoral productivities are positively correlated, then an interest rate that is strongly
procyclical will destabilize house prices.
Next, I considered price-level targeting rules. In contrast to an inflation target
or output-gap target, a price-level target will continue to push up interest rates if
the price level is high, even if income is low and house prices are low. With that
said, a price-level targeting coefficient of .5 outperformed both white noise rules and
rules with higher coefficients with respect to both default-minimization and welfare-
maximization. This suggests that the business cycle stabilization benefits that come
from weak price level targeting may outweigh the costs (i.e. high interest rates at
bad times).
In addition to price-level targeting rules, I also examined house price level target-
ing rules. I found that modifying the Taylor Rule to add a house price level targeting
component substantially reduced the average default rate and increased average wel-
fare; however, it might not be possible to implement such a rule, since it would require
the central bank to identify a target house price level or growth rate. With this said,
it may still be possible to adopt such a more limited form of this rule if central banks
only activate the house price component when growth is abnormally high or low.
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Finally, I explored who actually defaulted in the model: young households29 with
little to no capital, negative equity, and low incomes. No households that had positive
equity defaulted, even if they lacked employment. Additionally, even if households
had negative equity, they never defaulted unless they also had a sufficiently low in-
come or were unemployed. This suggests that the “double trigger” mechanism for
default as described by Foote, Geraradi, Goette, and Willen (2008) is an accurate way
to capture the behavior of optimizing agents in a DSGE model with default. Fur-
thermore, it indicates that central banks should be mindful of this condition when
implementing policy; and should actively avoid creating situations where many house-
holds have negative equity and low incomes simultaneously. This may involve slowing
down interest rate cycles (i.e. increasing the interest rate wavelength), so that new
borrowers are unlikely to enter the market at a turning point–or to experience house
price declines at a rate that exceeds equity gains from mortgage payments.
29See Figure 21 for the age-default profile from the baseline simulation.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Taylor Rule vs. Effective Federal Funds Rate
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Year
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
(P
er
ce
nt
)
 
 
Taylor Rule
EFFR
Figure 2: Characteristics of Defaulters and Non-Defaulters
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Figure 3: Individual-Level Variables for Random Household
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Figure 4: Individual-Level Variables for Average Household
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Figure 5: 100 Periods of Simulated Aggregate Data
0 20 40 60 80 100
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
Year
A
G
G
RE
G
AT
E 
HO
US
IN
G
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Year
D
EB
T 
TO
 IN
CO
M
E 
RA
TI
O
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
Year
A
G
G
RE
G
AT
E 
CO
NS
UM
PT
IO
N
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Year
D
EF
A
UL
T 
RA
TE
Figure 6: 50 Periods of Simulated Unemployment Data
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Figure 7: Technology Shock Impulse Responses
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Figure 8: Housing Productivity Shock Impulse Responses
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Figure 9: Monetary (Interest Rate) Shock Impulse Responses
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Figure 10: Empirical and Theoretical Lorenz Curves
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Figure 11: Default with Inertial Taylor Rule
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Figure 12: Welfare with Inertial Taylor Rule
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Figure 13: Default with House Price Level Targeting
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Figure 14: Welfare with House Price Level Targeting
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Figure 15: Default without House Prices or Capital
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Figure 16: Welfare without House Prices or Capital
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Figure 17: Default with Endogenous House Prices
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Figure 18: Welfare with Endogenous House Prices
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Figure 19: Default with Endogenous House Prices and Capital
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Figure 20: Welfare with Endogenous House Prices and Capital
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Figure 21: Age-Default Rate Profile
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Figure 22: 150-Period AR(1) Series for Consumption Sector Productivity
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Figure 23: 150-Period Rouwenhorst Approximation
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Figure 24: Ergodic Employment Rate Convergence
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Figure 25: 150-Period LoM-Generated Unemployment Rate
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Table 1: Simulated vs. Actual (1957-2011) Moments of Log Detrended
Data30
Actual Simulated
X σX
σY
ρX,Y
σX
σY
ρX,Y
C 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.78
IH 3.94 0.38 2.51 0.68
IK 2.43 0.53 1.31 0.64
U 0.38 -0.34 0.135 -0.1
Table 2: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor .97
ζ Replacement Ratio .4
α Capital’s Share in production .33
cA AR(1) Technology Process Constant Term 0
σA Standard Deviation of Technology Shock 0.03
ρA Technology Level AR(1) Coefficient 0.8
cH AR(1) Housing Productivity Process Constant Term 0
σH Standard Deviation of Housing Productivity Shock .1
ρH Housing Productivity AR(1) Coefficient 0.8
δK Physical Capital Depreciation Rate .07
δH Housing Depreciation Rate 0
λ Max LTV Ratio 1
γ Fraction of Lifetime Earnings Borrowable .3
fp Default Exclusion Period 1
30These simulations are performed with δH = .1; however, for most simulations results shown,
δH = 0.
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7.2 Extended Discussion of Topics
7.2.1 Sticky Prices
The original set of simulations was performed using the sticky price version of the
model. However, after comparing the results to the flexible price version, it became
clear that sticky prices play a limited role in my model. For this reason, they were
replaced by the flexible price results in order to clarify the importance of critical
mechanisms in the model. One reason why we might expect sticky prices to have
a limited impact is because the unemployment rate in the model is pinned down
by aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, it is not possible to have a strong
employment response after a monetary shock. Note that this differs substantially
from the standard New Keynesian model, which features elastic labor supply, flexible
wages, sticky prices, and demand-determined output in order to generate large output
and employment responses to monetary shocks. At most, my model will generate mild
output changes through the sticky price mechanism.
With this said, my results are “robust” to the inclusion of sticky prices. That
is, when sticky prices are incorporated into the model in the way described in the
paper, there are no substantial qualitative differences in my results. In some cases,
the intensities of default and welfare results are slightly stronger when sticky prices
are introduced; however, the magnitudes of the impacts are generally quite small.
7.2.2 Unemployment Benefits
Originally, simulations were performed without unemployment benefits in the model.
This tended to push up default rates and to overstate the welfare impact of rules
that caused default. Later, unemployment benefits were introduced for two reasons:
1) to ensure that consumption is always non-zero, even when a household is unem-
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ployed (and, thus, avoid the need to set an arbitrary lower bound for utility from
consumption); and 2) to avoid triggering defaults that might not immediately be
caused by unemployment. No major qualitative results changed after introducing
unemployment benefits into the model; however, the intensity of some results have
been reduced by its inclusion.
7.2.3 Non-Housing Shelter
While incorporating non-housing shelter is not equivalent to adding a rental market to
the model (since no one pays for the shelter), it provides young households and low-
income households in the model with an attractive alternative to becoming highly
leveraged. Instead, these groups have the option accumulate assets, live in non-
housing shelter, and then purchase a home with a larger downpayment.31
The simulation results confirm the intuition above. When non-housing shelter
is introduced into the model,32 the default rate drops by 51%. Furthermore, the
homeownership rate drops from 93% to 74%, since households do not need to quickly
purchase a home after entering the model. Relatedly, the median age of first time
borrowers at the date of the mortgage origination rises from 27 to 31. While aggregate
home equity in the economy drops by 26%, the impact is much less when we instead
consider average equity among homeowners, which is only reduced by 6%.
Finally, while excluding non-housing shelter (or a rental market) will tend to
magnify the intensity of my results by pushing up default rates and lowering the
utility associated with not owning a house, it does not appear to have a qualitative
impact on my results. At least in the case of autoregressive rules, the relationships
were identical with and without non-housing shelter.
31Note that this will not be an attractive option in the case without non-housing shelter because
housing’s contribution to utility will be large and negative if an individual holds no housing.
32Note that the comparison simulations were run using an autoregressive interest rate rule with
a coefficient of .76
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7.2.4 OER and House Prices
The Bank of England, which adopted an inflation target of 2% in 2003, recently
debated whether or not to revise the CPI to incorporate house prices in order to
deal with this issue.33 Since the the Office of National Statistics’ (ONS) measure
of CPI excluded both housing prices and OER, the measure of inflation completely
missed the run up in house prices prior to the Great Recession. In order to improve
future results, the ONS plans to construct a separate measure of the CPI that will
incorporate OER, but not house prices.
While this choice might not be as important in the U.S., where the FOMC is
permitted to use discretion, it might be substantially more important for central
banks that claim to target only inflation or are legally-required to keep inflation
below a target threshold. In particular, re-defining the CPI to incorporate house
prices, rather than OER, would have resulted in tighter monetary policy in many
countries in the years leading up to the Great Recession.
It is important to note, however, that constructing an alternative version of the
CPI that incorporates house prices, rather than OER, might not be a conceptually
accurate measure of the “price level,” even if it yields better results for inflation-
targeting central banks. Cecchetti (2007), for instance, points out that OER captures
the opportunity cost of living in a house; whereas, a measure of the level of house
prices confuses increases in cost with increases in the value of assets.
Thus, redefining the CPI in countries that have a legal mandate to target inflation
could be a useful strategy for preventing the inflation of housing bubbles, even if doing
so is not entirely conceptually accurate. It will permit the central bank to continue to
communicate a clear target for a highly visible measurement of inflation; and it will
make the choice to continue with rate hikes easier, since the public will see that the
33See Osborne’s (2007) letter to King.
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rate of inflation is high, even if non-house price growth is contained. If house prices
are not explicitly included in the index, adding OER could still provide a significant
improvement for central banks that target an inflation measure that does not include
the cost of housing at all.
7.3 Solution Algorithms
7.3.1 The Rouwenhorst Method
I use a number of routines to generate and calibrate the exogenous processes in the
model. Central to most of these routines is the Rouwenhorst method (1995), which
is used to discretize AR(1) processes into conditional Markov processes. Kopecky
and Suen (2009) argue that this method is more accurate than other approximation
algorithms for highly persistent AR(1) processes. Additionally, once the algorithm is
constructed, we may generate a Markov process (i.e. the series of TFP shocks) by
setting four parameters only: ρ, q, σ, and µ, where ρ is the probability of the highest
state, q is the probability of the lowest state, σ is the desired standard deviation of
the process, and µ is the mean of the process.
The Rouwenhorst method works by creating an initial Markov transition matrix
for a 2-state approximation to an AR(1) process. It then uses that matrix as an input
for the next step, where a 3-state approximation is created. This recursion continues
until the desired level of discretization is achieved. In our case, exogenous processes
are approximated with 7-state chains, which is standard in the literature. As outlined
in Kopecky and Suen (2009), the process works as follows:
Step 1: Create the initial 2-state Markov transition matrix.
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P2 =
 p 1− p
1− q q

Step 2: Next, construct the 3-state Markov matrix as follows:
P3 =

p2 2p(1− p) (1− p)2
p(1− q) pq + (1− p)(1− q) q(1− p)
(1− q)2 2q(1− q) q2

Step 3: Construct the nth-state Markov matrix in two steps. First, compute the
following:
 Pn−1 0
0′ 0
+ (1− p)
 0 Pn−1
0 0′
+ (1− q)
 0′ 0
Pn−1 0
+ q
 0 0′
0 Pn−1

Next, divide all rows 2 through (n-1) by 2 to complete the nth-state Markov matrix.
Note that 0′ denotes a (n-1) row vector and 0 denotes a (n-1) column vector. This
will yield an AR(1) process with an autoregressive coefficient of p+q-1.
Note that the Markov chain associated with the probability matrix is constructed
by discretizing the interval [µ−v, µ+v] into the same number of states as the matrix,
where v =
√
n−1
(p+q−1)2)−1σ. This will generate a process with a standard deviation of
σ. In our case, the mean is 1 the standard deviation is .05.
As an example of the Rouwenhorst Method, consider Figures 22 an 23. The first
is a 150-period series with an autoregressive coefficient of .8 and a mean of 1. The
second graph is a discrete, 7-state Rouwenhorst approximation.
Note also that the standard deviation of the approximated series over 2000 periods
is .0491 and the mean is .9959, which suggests that the 7-state chain provides a
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reasonably accurate approximation to an actual AR(1) process with the same mean,
standard deviation, and autoregressive coefficient.
7.3.2 Unemployment Rate
The computation of individual unemployment spells and aggregate unemployment is
done in the following steps:
Step 1: Draw a series of consumption productivity shocks.
Step 2: For each individual and time period, use the conditional Markov chain
to compute the probability of becoming employed given the current consumption
productivity shock and the previous period’s employment state. Note that the prob-
ability of becoming employed will be higher if the agent was employed last period
and if the consumption productivity shock is larger.
Step 3: For each individual and time period, draw a real number from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0,1]. If the number drawn is greater than the conditional
probability of employment, then the agent becomes unemployed. Otherwise, he be-
comes employed.
Step 4: Compute the unemployment rate as the fraction of agents who are em-
ployed in a given period.
Step 5: Adjust the conditional Markov transition matrix probabilities and re-simulate
until individual-level uemployment spell profiles and the unemployment rate match
calibration targets.
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Note that this model is calibrated to generate an unemployment rate that fluctu-
ates between 4% and 12%. Figure 25 shows a 50-period sample of the unemployment
rate generated using this method.
7.3.3 Ergodic Rate of Unemployment
Since the ergodic rate of unemployment is used as an input in the solution algorithm,
it is necessary to compute it prior to solving the model. With Markov processes, we
can typically compute the steady state analytically; however, since there is a different
Markov transition matrix for each TFP state, I instead solve for the ergodic rate of
unemployment by simulating an individual employment path for over 50,000 periods
and computing the fraction of periods unemployed.
I re-simulated and recalibrated to achieve a target ergodic unemployment rate of
6.3%. Figure 24 shows convergence in the employment rate after 5,000 simulation
periods.
7.3.4 Krusell and Smith (1998) for Unemployment
In the model, the future unemployment rate affects factor prices, which means that
agents must be able to form expectations about future unemployment rates. We use
the Krusell and Smith algorithm in the following way to compute the law of motion
for unemployment:
Step 1: Compute the unemployment rate in each period for a 5,000 period sim-
ulation of the economy.
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Step 2: Update the law of motion coefficients. Construct a set of regressors by
interacting the previous period unemployment rate and a consumption sector shock
state-specific constant with a binary variable that equals one if the current shock
state is j and 0 otherwise.
In this case, the estimating equation is is the following, where UR(t) denotes the
unemployment rate at time t, S(t) denotes the index of the consumption sector state
at time t, C(j) denotes a state-specific constant, G(j) denotes the coefficient on capi-
tal, 1{.} denotes an indicator function, and ns denotes the number of states:
UR(t) =
ns∑
j=1
C(j)1{S(t) = j}+
ns∑
j=1
G(j)UR(t− 1)1{S(t) = j} (50)
This law of motion is then checked for fit. If R2 is sufficiently high, then the law of
motion is adopted–and agents use it to form expectations about future factor prices.
If the fit is poor, then a longer simulation is performed and the law is re-estimated.
Figure 25 shows the predicted unemployment rate for 150 periods.
7.4 Solution Method
Since the model contains many individual-level and aggregate-level continuous states,
I employ three methods to make it computational feasible. First, I use GPU com-
puting as outlined in Aldritch et. al (2010) to perform all matrix operations in my
solution method.34 Next, I use an approximate dynamic programming algorithm for
simulations that would otherwise have prohibitively long run times. And, finally, I
use a modification of Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010) to limit the household’s choice
34These operations are performed using an Nvidia GeForce GTX 560 Ti 2b with 384 CUDA cores.
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set to the ergodic set in the cases where I do not solve using backwards recursion.
The DDP is solved for households in one of two ways. First, in the cases where
we have no capital or endogenous house prices, I solve the problem for the house-
hold using backwards recursion with cubic polynomial interpolation. For the more
involved simulations, I use an approximate dynamic programming algorithm that is
a modification of an algorithm in Powell (2007). It involves the following steps:
7.4.1 ADP Algorithm
Step 1: Draw a sequence of exogenous shocks for 5,000 periods and agents.
Step 2: Initialize the future value of all post-decision states and simulate the values
of the aggregate variables using the initial laws of motion.
Step 3: For each household, step forward in time by choosing consumption, housing,
capital, deposits, mortgage debt, and whether or not to default.
Step 4: After each household’s choice, update the value of the post-decision state
using the following equation:35
V (s) = αjVnew(s) + (1− αj)Vold(s) (51)
Note that j denotes the number of times we have iterated through all households.
Step 5: After each household’s problem is solved using the forward-pass portion of
35Note that the new value of the post-decision state will always be different, since it will depend
on the particular set of shocks drawn; however, V(s) will start to approximate the expectation of the
pre-decision state as we visit s more times and with different sets of shocks. This is why a variable
step size αj is used, which declines as the iteration number increases
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the algorithm, we perform the back-propagation step. That is, we use the updated,
post-decision state values to perform backwards recursion. After each household’s
step, we update the value of being in each post-decision state. Notice that–unlike the
forward step–this gives us an unbiased estimate of being in each of these states.
Step 6: For all states, evaluate the post-decision value and compute the change
from the previous iteration. If the maximum absolute change falls below the specified
tolerance, terminate the algorithm and update the laws of motion for the aggregate
states. If the tolerance criterion is not satisfied, then return to step 1.
7.4.2 Verification
In all cases were I use the ADP algorithm to solve the household’s problem, I also solve
the problem once for a baseline case using backwards recursion and cubic polynomial
interpolation. This allows me to verify the quality of the approximation without
solving and simulating 150 times using the more computationally-intensive approach.
7.4.3 Krusell & Smith (1998) Algorithm
After the optimal path for agents is determined in each step, the aggregate variables
are updated, and their laws of motion are estimated using a modification the Krusell
and Smith algorithm that uses neural networks.
7.4.4 State-Contingent Pricing Algorithm for Mortgage Market
In order to select a value of ξt that generates zero net cashflows for the financial inter-
mediary, I use state-contingent pricing. That is, at each point in time, the financial
intermediary observes Zt and sets a corresponding ξ(Zt) to set cashflows equal to
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zero.36
The algorithm consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Set ξ(Zt) equal to the risk-free rate plus a fixed premium in all periods.
Step 2: Solve and simulate the model. Compute the average net cashflow for each
set of aggregate states, Zt.
Step 3: Modify the state-contingent mapping by setting ξ(j) = ξ(j)+CO∗NCF (j),
where CO > 0 and NCF(j) is the net cash-flow in state j. That is, if net cashflows are
positive, then reduce ξ(j) by a small number that is proportional to the net cashflow.
If they are negative, then increase ξ(j) by a small number that is proportional to the
net cashflow.37
Step 4: Repeat step 2. Check whether the maximum absolute net cashflow in each
state falls below the tolerance value.
Step 5: Repeat steps 3 and 4 until all states have a maximum absolute net cashflow
that falls under the tolerance value.
Note that this algorithm is nested within the main solution method; and will guar-
antee that deviations from market clearing in the mortgage market are small.
36Note that cashflows deviate from zero in some periods, but deviations are at least two orders
of magnitude smaller than the aggregate housing stock, which we use for comparison.
37As mentioned in the section on financial intermediaries–the primary impact of ξt will be on
borrowing at time t. Thus, increasing ξt will tend to increase net cashflows by reducing borrowing.
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7.4.5 Price Level Approximation Using a Single Layer, 20-Node Neural
Network
In order to compute the current price level, we must be able to solve for the expected
value of a function of the next period price level, unit cost, and output. In order to
simplify the computation, I apply approximation methods. In particular, I compute
the price level as a state-contingent mapping using the following algorithm:
Step 1: Initialize the price level for all states.
Step 2: Solve the household’s problem and perform the aggregation step using the
state-contingent mapping for Pt.
Step 3: Compute P¯t and then Pt in each period, given the values of Pt+1, Vt+1,
and Yt+1 from the previous iteration.
Step 4: Train a single-layer, 20-node neural network to approximate the nonlin-
ear relationship between the aggregate states of the economy and Pt. Use the neural
network to update the state-contingent mapping for P .
Step 5: Compute the maximum absolute difference between the new and old P in
each state. If the maximum absolute difference is below the tolerance threshold, ter-
minate this step and continue with the main algorithm. Otherwise, go back to Step 2.
Note that this part of the algorithm could be done by regressing Pt on basis functions.
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I find that neural networks work particularly well because they have a low computa-
tional burden, provide a highly accurate nonlinear approximation, and do not require
a substantial amount of restrictions the function being approximated.
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CHAPTER 2
APPROXIMATE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
WITH POST-DECISION STATES AS A
SOLUTION METHOD FOR DSGE MODELS
Isaiah Hull
ABSTRACT
Dynamic programming (DP) is often used to solve DSGE models when a global solution
is desired. DP using forward iteration (infinite horizon problems) or backwards recursion
(finite horizon problems) will satisfy the Contraction Mapping Theorem (CMT) and its ac-
curacy can adjusted through the coarseness of the state space grid and the size of the conver-
gence criterion. However, both of these common solution methods rely on the discretization
of the state space and thus suffer from the curse of dimensionality, making making them
undesirable for problems with many continuous state variables. In macroeconomics, modi-
fications of these approaches that parameterize expectations (PEA), parameterize some set
of functional equations (projection methods), or interpolate between state space nodes are
often employed to yield a higher degree of accuracy for a given program run time. In this
paper, I compare the speed and accuracy of the aforementioned modifications to an alter-
native method that was introduced separately by Judd (1998), Sutton and Barto (1998),
and Van Roy et al. (1997), but was not developed into a general solution method until
Powell (2007) introduced it to the Operations Research literature. This approach involves
rewriting the Bellman equation in terms of the post-decision state variables, rather than
the pre-decision state variables, as is done in standard dynamic programming applications
in economics. I show that this approach yields considerable performance benefits over com-
mon global solution methods when the state space is large; and has the added benefit of
not forcing modelers to assume a data generating process for shocks. In addition to this, I
construct two new algorithms that take advantage of this approach to solve heterogenous
agent models.
JEL Classification: C60, C61, C63
Keywords: Dynamic Programming, Projection Methods, Parameterized Expectation Ap-
proach, Value Function Iteration, Heterogenous Agents, Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium Models, Solution Methods
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1 Introduction
Dynamic programming (DP) was originally developed as a solution method for multi-
period decision problems in Operations Research. The purpose of dynamic program-
ming was to break down complex problems into a series of smaller, tractable problems.
Prior to DP, solving multi-period decision problems required the complete enumera-
tion and evaluation of all possible sequences of decisions. Bellman’s innovation was
to reduce the dimensionality of such decision problems through the Principle of Op-
timality (Bellman 1954):
PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMALITY. An optimal policy has the property that
whatever the initial state and initial decisions are, the remaining decisions
must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from
the first decisions.
The practical implication of this principle is that we can rule out many decision
paths when solving multi-period problems. This reduces the number of functional
evaluations we must perform in order to determine the optimal choice of controls at
a given state. For example, consider a decision maker who is in state s0 ∈ s in a
deterministic choice problem; and is considering choosing controls c1 ∈ c, which will
move her to state s1. In order for her know the discounted lifetime utility derived from
that choice, she must not only be able to compute the instantaneous utility associated
with the choice, but she must also know the choices she will make in all future states,
contingent upon arriving at s1. The optimality principle makes this choice problem
simpler by ruling out all future decision paths that are suboptimal. That is, she can
now compare the discounted lifetime utilities associated with different control choices
in the present period, under the assumption that she will follow an optimal path after
her choice of controls move her to the next state. Furthermore, she can compute the
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value of being in the current state, s0, under the assumption that she will follow the
optimal path starting in the current period.
To understand how this simplifies a typical multi-period choice problem, consider
how deterministic, finite horizon choice problems are solved using dynamic program-
ming. We start with the final period, where the path of optimal future decisions is
clear. That is, the agent dies and there are no decisions to make. Thus, utility is zero
in all future periods. This suggests the optimal decision in this period is to maximize
instantaneous utility, given the resources available (state) at the start of the period.
Furthermore, it allows us to move to the second-to-last period of time–and solve the
same problem again, under the assumption that we will maximize instantaneous util-
ity in the period following. We can now follow this backwards iteration process until
the initial period.
As an example of the principle of optimality, consider a three-period, finite hori-
zon problem, where the only state variable is the amount of the consumption good
stored in the previous period, s. For simplicity, assume that a household can choose
to either store one unit (s = 1) or none (s = 0). Furthermore, assume that the
household starts with no stored units of the consumption good (s = 0), receives a
deterministic endowment of the consumption good, y, in the first two periods, and
must choose how much to consume, c, in each period. If we solve this problem with-
out the Principle of Optimality, we do not rule out any possible decision paths, which
means that we must enumerate and evaluate four decision paths in order to choose
controls in the initial period: {s1, s2} = {1, 0}, {1, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 0}. However, if we
apply the Principle of Optimality, then we can rule out paths where the household
stores consumption in the third period–and thus gives up third period consumption
with no future gain–leaving us with the following possible decision paths in the initial
period: {s1, s2} = {1, 0}, {0, 0}. Notice that applying the Principle of Optimality has
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reduced the dimensionality of the household’s second period decision problem by half.
While the Principle of Optimality allows us to reduce the dimensionality of DP
problems, it does not eliminate the problem entirely. In fact, numerical dynamic
programming is said to suffer from “the curse of dimensionality” when there are
many state variables. That is, the number of function evaluations needed to identify
the optimal controls at a given state will grow rapidly in the number of state variables.
For example, if we have N state variables that can each take on two values, then the
dimensionality of the decision problem1 at a given state is 2N . That is, each additional
state variable will double the dimensionality of the problem. Furthermore, if we add a
continuous state variable, such as the capital stock, the problem will become infinite-
dimensional, which will require us to use approximation methods. The most common
way to deal with this problem is to discretize the continuous state variables. However,
this approach quickly becomes computationally infeasible when the model has many
continuous state variables. This problem–the curse of dimensionality–places a limit
on the amount of detail that can be incorporated into DSGE models.
One common strategy for reducing dimensionality is to use a coarse grid to ap-
proximate continuous state variables. If, for instance, we want to target a program
run time of 12 hours, then we might successively decrease the number of discrete
states that represent continuous state variable until the program can reliably con-
verge within our targeted time limit. The tradeoff, of course, is that the accuracy of
the solution will be lower than what could be achieved if the continuous state were
discretized more finely.2 Alternatively, we might consider some minimum tolerance
1To be more precise, the dimensionality of the problem should also incorporate the size of the
action space–that is, the dimensionality of the controls. We can write the dimensionality of the
problem more precisely as 2Nx|c|, where |c| is the dimensionality of the controls.
2For example, the first order conditions might imply that the household’s bond holdings should
be .55, but if continuous bond holdings are represented by a five-node discrete grid over the interval
[0,1] that does not include .5 (e.g. {0,.25,.5,.75,1}), then this won’t be possible. As a result, bond
holdings will deviate slightly from optimality.
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level or criterion for accuracy; and then set the coarseness of the grid in order to
achieve it. We can then compare the time needed to achieve this criterion under
different approaches.
Another strategy for dimensionality-reduction involves using a highly coarse state
space grid, but interpolating between nodes in the state space. The previous approach–
sometimes referred to as a “look-up table” approach–restricts the set of maxima can-
didates to a discrete set of states. In contrast, this approach allows the maximum to
fall between two nodes. In many cases, this approach will outperform the “look-up
table” approach by allowing us to satisfy the same convergence criterion or tolerance
in a shorter period of time. However, it will become increasingly costly in stochastic
problems as more exogenous states are added.
Other approaches to dimensionality-reduction involve constructing policy function
approximations (i.e. functions that map states to decisions) that minimize the ex-
post residuals of the Euler equations. Often, such approximations are done using a
family of orthogonal polynomials, such as Chebychev polynomials, to transform the
state variables. Some other options involve using collocation methods, splines, or
finite element methods to approximate the policy or value functions. One benefit to
this approach is that it gives us a continuous approximation of the policy or value
function, rather than a “look-up table.” A major drawback, however, is that it is
often difficult to choose a good initial parameterization.
Finally, when dynamic programming problems are stochastic, we face another ma-
jor challenge: the time t state and choice of controls will not be sufficient to determine
the state at time t+1, since shocks will arrive after choices are made in period t or
at the start of period t+1. Rather, the state and choice of controls–combined with
knowledge of the data generating processes for the exogenous variables–will deter-
mine the distribution of future states–and, therefore, distribution of future values.
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In order to solve such problems, we will have to take an expectation over the value
of the next period state. Typically, when the exogenous processes in the model are
continuous, we will deal with the expectation by using quadrature methods or dis-
cretizing the process. The discretization approach, which is more computationally
tractable (and, relatedly, more popular), works well when there is a simple exogenous
process with known properties; however, it becomes increasingly ineffective and com-
putationally costly when there are multiple exogenous processes with complicated
dependence structures. This places substantial limitations on what can be done with
DSGE models moving forward.
The purpose of this paper is to explore a recently-developed technique from the
Operations Research (OR) literature (Powell 2007) and the Engineering literature
(Bertsekas 2011) as a method for solving DSGE models; and as means of overcoming
the aforementioned problems associated with more traditional approaches to numer-
ical dynamic programming. In particular, this paper will describe the technique,
compare its performance with common solution methods in computational macroe-
conomics, suggest where it can be most usefully employed, and examine several algo-
rithmic refinements. In the OR literature, this method is referred to as approximate
dynamic programming with post-decision states (hereafter, ADP); and entails writing
the Bellman Equation around post-decision state variables, rather than pre-decision
state variables, as is typically done in macroeconomic applications.
2 Literature Review
In this paper, I will introduce and evaluate several new algorithms for solving dynamic
programming problems nested within DSGE models. In particular, these algorithms
will be built around a post-decision state version of the Bellman equation, rather
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than the pre-decision state version. This approach will enable practitioners to solve
two classes of models that are typically computationally intractable: 1) models with
many continuous state variables; and 2) models with several correlated exogenous
processes. However, the formal tests will focus on the former. Furthermore, this
method is substantially easier to implement than other solution methods that do not
suffer from the curse of dimensionality, such the parameterized expectations approach
and projection methods.
The baseline method used in this paper was introduced by Van Roy et al. (1997)
in a neuro-dynamic programming application. It was first used to solve a retail inven-
tory management problem with 33 state variables. Standard dynamic programming
methods, such as value function iteration (infinite horizon) and backwards recursion
(finite horizon) could not feasibly solve problems with such large state spaces. Even
if all of the variables were discretized into the coarsest possible grid, it would still
contain 233 (8.59 billion) nodes. In comparison, the neuro-dynamic programming
algorithm they constructed around post-decision states delivered decision rules that
yielded substantial efficiency improvements over more heuristic approaches that were
used in the absence of a formal decision rule.
This technique first entered the economics literature though Judd (1998), which
explained how to construct the post-decision state Bellman equation. However, Judd
(1998) did not exploit this method to construct any solution algorithms. Similarly,
Sutton and Barto (1998) introduced the technique to the reinforcement learning lit-
erature, but did so originally without any substantial applications. Rather, it was
used primarily as a strategy for absorbing the action space into the state space.3
3In many dynamic programming applications, the endogenous component of the state space is
determined by the realizations of the shock at the start of the period and the controls selected
thereafter. In some of these applications, the dimensionality of the problem can be reduced simply
by eliminating the choice of controls; and instead considering only the result of those choices (i.e.
the end-of-period endogenous states).
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Powell (2007) developed the method introduced by Van Roy et al. (1997) into a
set of solution algorithms for high dimensionality optimization problems. However,
all of the algorithms in Powell (2007) were designed for a partial equilibrium context
in OR; and most focused on a particular type of problem that is not common in
general equilibrium macroeconomic models: inventory management. In problems of
this variety, an agent faces random demands for a product and must choose how much
inventory to hold. The inventory constraint in such models looks as follows:
It+1 = max{It +Rt − t+1, 0}
Here, It is the current period inventory level, Rt is the amount of product the agent
adds to inventory in the current period, and t+1 is the amount of product consumers
want to purchase at the start of the next period. Powell (2007) suggests that this
variety of problem lends itself well to a post-decision representation of the state space,
since both the control and shock affect the state in a simple, additive way. Using this
approach allows us to write the post-decision state as Rˆt = It + Rt. It is important
to note that, in general, macroeconomic dynamic programming problems do not take
this form. With the possible exception of models that include multiple assets, this
particular benefit of writing problems in terms of post-decision states will not apply
to most work in macroeconomics.
Within OR, Powell (2012) provides the most recent survey of work that has been
done using post-decision state dynamic programming algorithms. Papers such as
Maxwell (2011) and Simao et al. (2009) use the post-decision state formulation to
solve problems that involve ambulance deployment and large-scale fleet management
respectively. Papers such as Powell and Ryzhov (2010) extend the initial algorithm
by demonstrating how Bayesian methods can be used to update the value function
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at all states, rather than just the states visited on the simulation path.
Within the computational macroeconomics literature, my paper is most closely
associated with work that attempts to overcome the curse of dimensionality. In
particular, techniques such as the Parameterized Expectations Approach (PEA), in-
troduced by Sargent (1987), Marcet (1988), and Den Haan and Marcet (1990), and
Projection Methods, introduced by Judd (1992) and McGrattan (1999), provide gen-
eral strategies for solving optimization problems with large state spaces. More recent
work, such as Maliar and Maliar (2005) and Judd et al. (2011), demonstrates how
to improve the stability and speed of such approaches. Papers such as Krusell and
Smith (1998), Den Haan and Rendahl (2010), Maliar, Maliar, and Valli (2010), and
Algan, Allais, and Den Haan (2008) provide algorithmic strategies for solving models
that have large state spaces as a consequence of having many heterogenous agents.
Heer and Maussner (2008) evaluates existing solution algorithms for standard
business cycle models with flexible labor supply. In particular, they compare value
function iteration, the extended deterministic path method, log-linearization around
the steady state, the parameterized expectations approach, and projection meth-
ods. They conclude that log-linearization around the steady state is sufficiently accu-
rate if the practitioner is primarily interested in generating business cycle moments.
The other approaches mentioned presented substantial computational challenges; and
yielded very little gain in terms of improvements in simulated business cycle moment
accuracy.
I extend the aforementioned literature by 1) introducing a global solution method
for DSGE models from the OR literature, 2) providing several refinements to the
solution method, and 3) evaluating it relative to common global solution methods. In
addition to this, I demonstrate when the algorithm can most usefully be employed;
and also discuss when it is unlikely to outperform more traditional approaches.
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3 Mathematical Preliminaries: The Pre-Decision
State Bellman Equation
I will start by describing the formulation of the Bellman Equation with pre-decision
state variables; and will then move on to the approach for post-decision state variables.
This construction of the Bellman Equation will focus on an infinitely-lived agent who
faces a deterministic choice problem, which requires her to choose a set of controls,
ct. A set of states, st, summarizes all information needed to make a choice at time t.
Combined with ct, st pins down the future state according to a transition function:
st+1 = T (ct, st). Finally, a set of constraints, ct ∈ Γ(st−1), limits the choice of
controls. After applying the Principle of Optimality as described in the introduction
and originally in Bellman (1954), the value of being in the initial state can be written
as follows:
V (s0) = max{ct}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) (1)
s.t. st+1 = T (ct, st), ct ∈ Γ(st−1), ∀t = 0, 1, ...
That is, the value of being in the initial, pre-decision state (i.e. before controls are
selected) is the maximum, discounted lifetime utility that can be achieved through
an infinite sequence of control choices. Note that computing V (s0) is a difficult task,
since it depends on the optimal, infinite sequence of controls. However, Bellman’s
important insight was that we could rewrite V (s0) as follows:
V (s0) = maxc0{u(c0) + β[max{ct}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
βtu(ct)] (2)
s.t. st+1 = T (ct, st), ct ∈ Γ(st−1), ∀t = 0, 1, ...}
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Now, notice that we can exploit the recursive property of this equation to rewrite it
as follows:
V (s0) = maxc0{u(c0) + β [max{ct+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct+1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
V (T (s0,c0))
(3)
s.t. st+1 = T (ct, st), ct ∈ Γ(st−1), ∀t = 0, 1, ...}
→ V (s0) = maxc0u(c0) + βV (s1) s.t. s1 = T (c0, s0), c0 ∈ Γ(s0) (4)
This equation–the Bellman equation–is much simpler in the sense that it permits
us to break a multi-period decision problem down into a series of smaller, tractable
steps, where only one set of controls must be selected at a time. However, it is more
complicated in the sense that it now requires knowledge of an unknown function,
V. Analytical dynamic programming solves this problem by recovering the algebraic
expression for the value function, V, but is limited in application. In contrast, nu-
merical dynamic programming–the focus of this paper–constructs an approximation
of V and is applied to a wide variety of multi-period choice problems.
Next, I will augment household’s problem to incorporate exogenous processes,
which are denoted by xt+1 = f(xt, t+1). The subscript t+1 indicates that the ex-
ogenous shocks arrive at the start of period t+1 and before time t+1 controls are
chosen. Note that the joint transition function for states now captures the impact of
exogenous shocks: st = T (ct, st−1, xt−1, t).4 Furthermore, I assume that the feasible
set of control choices also depends on the exogenous process: ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt). The
4This transition function is written as a joint process; however, it is important to note that st+1
depends on xt and st, but xt+1 is independent of st and ct.
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value of being in the initial state may now be written as follows:
V (s0, x1) = max{ct}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtE[u(ct)|s0, x1] (5)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), ∀t = 0, 1, ...
Again, I will exploit the recursive nature of V (s0, x1) to rewrite it as follows:
V (s0, x1) = maxc0{u(c0) + β [max{ct+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt−1E[u(ct+1)|s0, x1]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[V (T (c1,s0,x1)])
(6)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), ∀t = 0, 1, ...}
This yields the stochastic version of the Bellman equation:
V (s0, x1) = maxc0u(c0) + βE[V (s1, x2)] (7)
s.t. s1 = T (c1, s0, x1), c1 ∈ Γ(s0, x1), x2 ∈ f(x1, 2)
More generally, the Bellman equation can be written as follows:
V (st−1, xt) = maxctu(ct) + βE[V (st, xt+1)] (8)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt+1 ∈ f(xt, t+1)
The derivations above yield both the deterministic and stochastic versions of the
standard Bellman Equation in terms of pre-decision state variables. In the next
section, I will explain how to rewrite the Bellman equation in terms of post-decision
states. This mathematically simple modification will afford computational modelers a
tremendous amount of flexibility; and will render otherwise intractable DSGE models
solvable.
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4 The Post-Decision State Bellman Equation
In this section, I will construct the Bellman equation in terms of post-decision state
variables, roughly following (but also expanding on) the treatment of this subject in
Powell (2007) and Bertsekas (2011). Additionally, I will focus on building an adap-
tation that is well-suited to the timing conventions and model properties of standard
DSGE models, rather than OR or Engineering applications. This exposition will be-
gin with a comparison of pre-decision and post-decision states to make this distinction
clear. A pre-decision state consists of last period’s endogenous state variables, st−1,
and this period’s exogenous processes, xt. This state is “pre-decision” because it is
determined entirely before the time t controls, ct, are selected. In contrast, the post-
decision state consists of this period’s endogenous state variables, st, and exogenous
processes, xt. Recall from the construction of the Bellman equation in the previous
section that st = T (ct, st−1, xt). That is, near the start of time t, st−1 and xt are
pinned down. Once ct is chosen, st will be pinned down, too. This yield the post-
decision state–that is, the state immediately after we have selected controls. Figure
1 in the appendix shows this relationship through the arrival of new information in
discrete time model.
Note that the value of a post decision state is the maximum, expected, discounted
utility that the agent can achieve immediately after controls have been selected. Using
this definition, the post-decision state value function, V x(st−1, xt−1), can be written
as follows:
V x(st−1, xt−1) = E{max{ct+s}∞s=0
∞∑
s=0
βsE[u(ct+s)|st−1, xt]|st−1, xt−1} (9)
s.t. st+s = T (ct+s, st+s−1, xt+s), ct+s ∈ Γ(st+s−1, xt+s), xt+s ∈ f(xt+s−1, t+s), ∀s = 0, 1, ...
Notice that the agent will not choose ct until xt has been realized. This is why
V x(st−1, xt−1) can be written as the expectation, conditional on the information set
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st−1, xt−1, of the maximum, expected, discounted utility that the agent will receive
after xt arrives.
With this definition in place, it is now possible to simplify the problem by reorga-
nizing the terms inside of the outermost expectation, just as we did for the standard
pre-decision Bellman equation.
V x(st−1, xt−1) = E{maxct{u(ct) +max{ct+s+1}∞s=0βE[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s+1)|st−1, xt]}|st−1, xt−1} (10)
s.t. st+s = T (ct+s, st+s−1, xt+s), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt ∈ f(xt−1, t), ∀t = 0, 1, ...
Next, using the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE) yields the following:
max{ct+s+1}∞s=0E[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s+1)|st−1, xt] = (11)
max{ct+s+1}∞s=0E{E[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s+1)|st, xt+1]st−1, xt}
This expression may be rewritten:
max{ct+s+1}∞s=0E{E[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s+1)|st, xt+1]st−1, xt} = (12)
E{ max
{ct+s+1}∞s=0
E[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s+1)|st, xt+1]st−1, xt}
Next, notice that the last expression can be rewritten in terms of a value function:
E{ max
{ct+s+1}∞s=0
E[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s+1)|st, xt+1]st−1, xt} = (13)
E{V (st, xt+1)|st−1, xt}
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This permits a rewriting of equation (10) as follows:
V x(st−1, xt−1) = E{maxct{u(ct) + βE[V (st, xt+1)|st−1, xt]}|st−1, xt−1} (14)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt ∈ f(xt−1, t),
Finally, (14) can be written in terms of V (st−1, xt) and simplified by the the Law of
Iterated Expectations:
V x(st−1, xt−1) = E{V (st−1, xt)|st−1, xt−1} (15)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt ∈ f(xt−1, t),
Stepping forward in time yields the following:
V x(st, xt) = E{V (st, xt+1)|st, xt} (16)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt+1 ∈ f(xt, t),
Finally, to demonstrate the connection between the pre-decision and post-decision
Bellman equations, I prove the following claim:
V (st−1, xt) = maxctu(ct) + βV
x(st, xt) (17)
Start by recalling the standard Bellman equation for a stochastic dynamic program-
ming problem:
V (st−1, xt) = maxctu(ct) + βE[V (st, xt+1)|st−1, xt] (18)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt+1 ∈ f(xt, t+1)
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Next, note that (st−1, xt)–the pre-decision state–pins down ct, which then pins down
st:
st = T (Γ(st−1, xt), st−1, st) (19)
This suggests that the information set can be written as (st, xt):
V (st−1, xt) = maxctu(ct) + βE[V (st, xt+1)|st, xt] (20)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt+1 ∈ f(xt, t+1)
Recalling (16) yields the folkowing:
V (st−1, xt) = maxctu(ct) + βV
x(st, xt) (21)
s.t. St = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt+1 ∈ f(xt, t+1)
These three derived properties can be used to make statements about the relationship
between the pre-decision and post-decision Bellman equation. If (16) is substituted
into (21), it yields the standard, pre-decision Bellman equation. On the other hand,
if (21) is substituted into (15), it yields the following post-decision state Bellman
equation:
V x(st−1, xt−1) = E{maxctu(ct) + βV x(st, xt)|st−1, xt−1} (22)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt ∈ f(xt−1, t), ∀t = 0, 1, ...
There are two important things to note. First, the expectations operator is outside
of the maximum operator. This differs from the standard, pre-decision state Bellman
equation. And second, the problem within the expectation is deterministic.
Van de Roy (1997), Judd (1998), and Barto and Sutton (1998) all separately
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identified this alternative form of the Bellman equation, but did not use it to de-
velop solution algorithms. Powell (2007) and Bertsekas (2011) provided the first
general descriptions of how it could be used to construct solution algorithms for OR
and Engineering applications respectively. In particular, they demonstrated that it
was most valuable in high-dimensional dynamic programming problems, as well as
problems where the stochastic processes were complicated or unknown. Modern, com-
putational textbook approaches to solving DSGE models, such as those in Heer and
Maussner (2009) and DeJong and Dave (2007), do not discuss either the post-decision
state Bellman equation or the associated algorithms.
This paper adds four things to the literature. First, it provides formal derivations
for the three previously mentioned useful relationships between pre-decision and post-
decision Bellman equations.5 Second, it introduces the post-decision state Bellman
equation and associated algorithms as a general approach to solving DSGE models.
Third, it provides a formal comparison of this approach to more common approaches
in the literature for global DSGE solution methods. And fourth, it proposes new
algorithms for solving DSGE models that use this method. In the following section,
I will describe the baseline algorithm that will be used to apply this method.
5 The Post-Decision State Dynamic Programming
Solution Algorithm
In the previous section, I demonstrated how to construct the post-decision state Bell-
man equation. Next, I will discuss two algorithms that take advantage of this alter-
native approach to dynamic programming. Both of these solution methods fall under
5While the derivations are relatively simple, they are not given explicitly in Judd (1998), Barto
and Sutton (1998), Powell (2007) or Bertsekas (2011).
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the family of solution methods referred to as ADP with post-decision state variables.
The first approach is forward dynamic programming with post-decision states.6 The
second approach is a refinement that incorporates a “backwards propagation” step.
The algorithms described in this section will follow those outlined in Powell (2007)
and Bertsekas (2011).
Before we begin the explicit construction of the algorithm, it is useful to recall the
form of the post-decision Bellman equation from the previous section:
V x(st−1, xt−1) = E{maxctu(ct) + βV x(st, xt)|xt−1, xt−1} (23)
s.t. st = T (ct, st−1, xt), ct ∈ Γ(st−1, xt), xt ∈ f(xt−1, t),
Notice again that the maximization step is inside of the expectation. This property of
the post-decision state Bellman equation initially appears to make things more com-
plicated, but actually makes it substantially easier to solve certain classes of models.
In particular, it will make it possible to construct algorithms that first perform the
maximization step; and then compute the expectation afterwards. This first step is
then combined with draws from the exogenous processes, which transition the agent
to the next step; and then a smoothing step, which computes the expectation outside
of the maximization step. The baseline algorithm is outlined below and follows Powell
(2007).
Algorithm 1.1: Forward Dynamic Programming with Post-Decision State
Variables (Infinite Horizon, Representative Agent)
Step 0: i. Initialize the “look-up table” approximation of the value function in all
6This is sometimes referred to as neuro-dynamic programming or reinforcement learning with
post-decision states.
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states. That is, for each state, (s ∈ s, x ∈ x), assign a starting value to V 0(s, x),
where the superscript 0 indicates that this is an approximation taken at the 0th iter-
ation.
ii. Initialize the state, (s ∈ s, x ∈ x). For representative agent, infinite horizon
models, it may be natural to assume the the agent starts in the steady state.
iii. Increment the iteration counter to n=n+1.
Step 1: Choose a simulation period length, T. Generate a sample of the exoge-
nous processes, Xt, for the simulation period: 1,...,T.
Step 2: For all periods, t=1,...T, perform the following three steps:
i. Choose controls to maximize the expression inside of the expectation of V (st−1, xt−1)
for a particular realization of xt:
V˜ n(st−1, xt−1) = maxctu(ct) + βV
n−1
(st, xt)
ii. Compute the expectation by updating the value function approximation, V n−1:
V n(st−1, xt−1) = (1− αn−1)V¯ n−1(st−1, xt−1) + αn−1V˜ n(st−1, xt−1)
Note that α denotes the step size. We index it with n to indicate that it may change
with the iteration. It may also be stochastic.
iii. Use the result from the maximization step, st, and the realization of the ex-
ogenous processes, xt+1, to compute the next period’s pre-decision state.
Step 3: Check convergence criterion. If satisfied, go to Step 4. If not satisfied,
increment n and go to Step 1.
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Step 4: Return the value function approximation, V (s, x)N , in the form of a look-up
table.
Now that the basic algorithm has been described, it will be useful to examine
Steps 1 and 2 in greater detail. Start with Step 1, where a sample of the exogenous
processes is drawn. In a standard DSGE model with a representative agent, these
processes might capture things like productivity shocks or monetary shocks. Usually,
it is assumed that these exogenous variables follow a continuous process, which can be
approximated through discretization. Often, Tauchen’s method (1986) is employed
to construct a Markov chain and transition matrix that approximate the continuous
analog. Alternatively, quadrature methods can be used as a separate strategy for
approximation.
One of the benefits of using Algorithm 1.1 is that it is possible to avoid computing
expectations using either of these approaches. That is, the household’s dynamic
programming problem can be solved without ever employing quadrature methods
or transforming the assumed continuous, exogenous processes into discrete Markov
processes. To understand why this is important, consider the two examples given
below.
Example #1: Correlated Exogenous Processes
In a model with several sectors or several assets, it is common to have two exogenous
processes that are positively correlated empirically. Solving computational models
will often require the assumption that processes are orthogonal for the sake of sim-
plicity. Assuming this makes it possible to take expectations without explicitly ac-
counting for the dependence between the processes. That is, if z and q are the
108
exogenous variables in the household’s problem, then zt−1 will yield the pre-shock
distribution of zt, and qt−1 will yield the pre-shock distribution qt. However, if we
assume that these processes are dependent, then zt depends not only on zt−1, but
also on qt and, therefore, qt−1. This not only requires us to use more technically so-
phisticated quadrature methods or discretization techniques (i.e. conditional Markov
processes), but also requires us to use a higher dimensional approximation in order
to capture the dependence relationship accurately.
In contrast, if Algorithm 1.1 is employed, then it is not necessary to devise a
strategy for computing the expectation. Being able to simulate the exogenous process
will be sufficient. This could be done, for instance, by using a copula simulator to
generate series for the exogenous processes before the algorithm is even initiated. Step
2(ii) will then compute an approximation of the expectation that will improve as the
simulation length increases. This suggests that constructing and solving a model with
many exogenous processes that depend on each other will be no more difficult than
constructing and solving a model with the same number of independent processes.
Example #2: Exogenous Processes with Unknown Functional Form
Consider a model in which a household may hold many classes of assets. Assume
further that the returns to those assets depend on exogenous processes; and that those
processes exhibit dependence. Working with a pre-decision state value function, it
will be necessary to use technically sophisticated methods (i.e. copula estimation or
multiple conditional Markov processes); and then make functional form assumptions
about the joint distribution from which shocks are drawn. In contrast, using post-
decision state variables, a practitioner can simply perform simulations with the actual
asset data without ever performing the intermediate steps.
In short, examples 1 and 2 demonstrate one of the major benefits of using the
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post-decision state value function: it makes it possible to bypass difficult expectations
without ever explicitly computing them. Furthermore, in some situations, it makes it
possible to avoid making any assumptions at all about the exogenous processes in the
model, which can both limit model error and use of highly sophisticated techniques.
I will now return to Step 2 in greater detail, which is the other major departure
from standard dynamic programming algorithms used in macroeconomics. In par-
ticular, in substep (i), controls were selected to maximize a deterministic function,
which is a substantial departure from what is normally done in stochastic problems.
This has the primary benefit of reducing the dimensionality of the problem. Substep
(ii) may also look unfamiliar, even though it is similar to smoothing step often used
in pre-decision dynamic programming algorithms. Here, it not only plays the role of
smoothing changes in the value function approximation, but it also implicitly com-
putes the expected value of being in state (st−1, xt−1). To understand why this is the
case, notice that the maximum value of V˜ (st−1, xt−1) will depend on the realization
of xt. Thus, arriving at (st−1, xt−1) for a second, third, and fourth time, but with a
different realization of st will provide more information about the value of being in
state (st−1, xt−1). Furthermore, the frequency with which agents encounter certain
realizations of xt will provide information about the probabilities of realizations.
We will now consider a refinement of Algorithm 1.1 that will improve the approx-
imation of the value function, enabling faster convergence for a particular level of
accuracy. This approach is best suited to OLG models, but I will also suggest an ex-
tension for the infinite horizon case. Furthermore, I will discuss a second refinement
that does not appear in Powell (2007) or Bertsekas (2011). Note that tests will only
be performed for the infinite horizon case; and that algorithms for both the OLG case
are provided for completeness.
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Algorithm 1.2: Double-Pass Forward Dynamic Programming with
Post-Decision State Variables (OLG)
Step 0: i. Initialize the “look-up table” approximation of the value function in all
states. That is, for each state, (s ∈ s, x ∈ x, a ∈ a, S ∈ S, X ∈ X), assign a starting
value to V
0
a(S,X, s, x), where the superscript 0 indicates that this is an approxima-
tion taken at the 0th iteration and where a is the household’s age.7 Note that capital
letters represent aggregate variables.
ii. Initialize the state, (s0 ∈ s, x0 ∈ x, a0 ∈ a, S0 ∈ S, X0 ∈ X). For overlapping
generations models, there may be natural initial states for idiosyncratic shocks and
endogenous, individual-specific state variables (i.e. a household may start with no
assets), but aggregate-level state variables will depend on period when the household
enters the model–and, thus, must be initialized separately for each agent.8
iii. Initialize the aggregation method states using the Krusell and Smith algorithm
(1998) or Den Haan and Rendahl’s explicit aggregation method (2010).
iv. Increment the iteration counter to n=n+1.
Step 1: Choose a simulation period length, T. Generate a sample of the exoge-
nous processes, (Xt, xa,t), for the simulation period (1,...,T) and for all ages (1, ...a¯),
where xa,t denotes the set of individual-specific state variables for the age a household
7Recall that finite horizon dynamic programming problems require us to use different approxi-
mations of the value function at each age, since the structure of the choice problem fundamentally
changes over the lifecycle. Additionally, note that we could also include a ∈ a as a deterministic
state variable.
8For a more complete treatment of initializing state variables in OLG macro models, see Heer
and Maussner (2009).
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at time t.
Step 2: For all periods, t=1,...T, and all ages, 1,...,a¯, perform the following three
steps:
i. Perform the “forward pass” portion of the algorithm. Choose controls to max-
imize the expression inside of the expectation of
Va(St−1, Xt−1, sa,t−1, xa,t−1) for a particular realization of (Xt, xa,t):
V˜ na (St−1, Xt−1, sa,t−1, xa,t−1) = maxCtu(Ct) + βV
n−1
a+1(St, Xt, sa,t, xa,t)
ii. Perform the backwards propagation through time (BTT) for each agent. This
involves updating V na using information gained about the values of states from future
periods, but on the same state trajectory. This can be accomplished by recursively
computing V˜a in each period each agent is alive, starting in their respective terminal
periods:
V˜ na (St−1, Xt−1, sa,t−1, xa,t−1) = u(Cˆt) + βV˜
n−1
a+1 (St, Xt, ˆsa,t, xa,t)
Note that carets are used to denote endogenous state variables that were selected
on the forward-pass step of the algorithm.
iii. Compute the expectation by updating the value function approximation, V n−1a :
V na (St−1, Xt−1, sa,t−1, xa,t−1) = (1−αn−1)V¯an−1(St−1, Xt−1)+αn−1V˜ na (St−1, Xt−1, sa,t−1, xa,t−1)
iv. Use the result from the maximization step, sa,t, the realization of the exogenous
processes, Xt+1, xa,t+1, and the aggregate state, St, to compute the next period’s pre-
decision state.
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Step 3: Check convergence criterion. If satisfied, go to Step 4. If not satisfied,
increment n and go to Step 1.
Step 4: Update the paths and laws of motion for the aggregate states. Check the
aggregate convergence criterion. If satisfied, go to Step 5. If not satisfied, go to Step
1.
Step 5: Return the value function approximation, Va(S,X)
N , in the form of a look-
up table.
The most important departure from Algorithm 1.1 can be found in Step 2(ii).
Here, we perform the BTT step, which permits us to construct an unbiased approx-
imation of the value function. When the “forward pass” portion of the algorithm is
performed, it generates a value function approximation that depends heavily on the
value function initialization. However, when V˜ na+1 replaces V¯
n−1
a+1 as an update to V˜
n
a ,
the value function approximation incorporates information about the utility derived
in future states on this particular simulation trajectory.
Finally, we will consider two algorithm refinements that do not appear in Powell
(2007) or Bertsekas (2011). The first extends Algorithm 1.2 to the infinite horizon
case; and the second adds information sharing as a strategy for solving heterogenous
agents models using either Algorithm. For the sake of parsimony, truncated versions
of each algorithm will be presented; each omits steps that included in either Algorithm
1.1 or 1.2.
Algorithm 1.3: Double-Pass Forward Dynamic Programming with
Post-Decision State Variables (Infinite Horizon)
Step 0: See Algorithm 1.2.
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Step 1: Choose a simulation period length, T, and a cutoff length, T¯ , where T > T¯ .
Generate a sample of the exogenous processes, Xt, for the simulation period: 1,...,T.
Step 2: For periods, t=1,...,T, perform the following three steps:
i. Choose controls to maximize the expression inside of the expectation of V (St−1, Xt−1)
for a particular realization of Xt:
V˜ n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) = maxctu(ct) + βV
n−1
(St, Xt, sit, xit)
ii. Perform the backwards propagation through time (BTT) step. This involves
updating V n using information gained about the values of states from future periods,
but on the same state trajectory. This can be accomplished by recursively computing
˜˜V n in each period, starting in period T:
˜˜V n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) = u(cˆt) + βV˜ n−1(St, Xt, sˆit, xit)
Note that carets are used to denote household-level endogenous state variables that
were selected on the forward-pass step of the algorithm.
iii. For 1,...,T¯ , set V˜ n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1)=
˜˜V n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1).
iv. Compute the expectation by updating the value function approximation, V n−1:
V n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) = (1− αn−1)V¯ n−1(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) +
αn−1V˜ n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1)
v. Use the result from the maximization step, sit, the realization of the exogenous
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processes, Xt+1, xit+1, and the aggregate state, St, to compute the next period’s pre-
decision state.
Step 3: Check convergence criterion. If satisfied, go to Step 4. If not satisfied,
increment n and go to Step 1.
Step 4: Return the value function approximation, V (s, x)N , in the form of a look-up
table.
Algorithm 1.3 differs from Algorithm 1.2 in two important ways. First, it covers
the infinite horizon case. And second, it only performs the BTT step on a subset of
the data: 1, .., T¯ , where T > T¯ . The reason why only a subset of the data is used is
because ˜˜V n is recursively constructed, which means that it will be downward-biased in
finite sample approximations, since it will miss the value attributable to periods T +
1, ...∞. Now, if an agent is in period 10 and T is large, then the recursively computed
value function approximation in that period will not be substantially downward-
biased, since T-10 is large, which means that any value from T + 1, ...,∞ will be
heavily discounted and therefore negligible. On the other hand, if the agent is at T-1,
then the future streams of utility from T +1, ...,∞ will be important, which will yield
a substantial downward-bias. For this reason, the algorithm only performs the BTT
step on 1, ..., T¯ . Furthermore, note that the larger T − T¯ is, the less biased the value
function approximations will be, but the longer it will take to achieve convergence,
since it will not be possible to fully exploit BTT.
Finally, I will discuss an algorithm refinement that is useful for both infinite
horizon and OLG macro models. The focus of this algorithm will be to integrate
information from all agents’ choices into the value function approximation. Since
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computational approaches to heterogenous agents models may require households to
solve problems in parallel, it is an open question how and when each agent should
assimilate information from other agents’ choices. I will proceed with the infinite
horizon case, but it is important to note that this approach can easily be generalized
to OLG models.
Algorithm 1.4: Double-Pass Forward Dynamic Programming with
Post-Decision State Variables and Information-Sharing (Infinite Horizon,
Heterogenous Agents)
Step 0-Step2(iii): See Algorithm 1.3.
Step 2(iv): Compute the agent-specific expectation by updating the value function
approximations, V n−1i , separately for each household: V
n
i (St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) =
(1− αn−1)V¯ n−1i (St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) + αn−1V˜ ni (St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1)
Note that α denotes the step size. We index it with n to indicate that it may change
with the iteration. Note that i indexes the households.
iv. Average the value function approximations across households to share all available
information:
V n(St−1, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) =
∑
i∈I V¯
n
i (St−1,, Xt−1, sit−1, xit−1) f(i)
Note that I is the set of all households and f(i) is the mass of household i. For
example, if there are K agents of equal mass in the model, then f(i)= 1
K
, for all i.
Alternatively, the distribution might be written as function of state variables.
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Step 2(v) - Step 5: See Algorithm 1.3.
It is important now to gain a full understanding of the merits of Algorithm 1.4.
A good place to start is by comparing it to an extension of Algorithm 1.3 with
heterogenous agents, but without information sharing. Here, households solve their
decision problems simultaneously, but do so without the benefit of what other agents
have learned. If information-sharing is imposed in a model with 10,000 heteroge-
nous agents, then each agent gains information about the value of 10,000 state-path
trajectories after each iteration–a substantial improvement over one.
Another possible approach to this problem would involve sharing information
across agents within iterations. In the limit, this approach might entail using the same
value function approximation for all agents. This approach has two benefits: first,
it provides agents with more information about the values of states within iteration,
leading to faster convergence if all other things are equal; and second, in the limiting
case (one value function approximation only), it substantially reduces the amount of
data that must be held in memory (down from 10,000 arrays to 1). However, there
is a substantial drawback to using this approach, rather than the one outlined in
Algorithm 1.4: it does not lend itself to parallelization. That is, it is not possible
to solve each household’s problem in isolation on a separate CPU or GPU core if
household i’s value function approximation depends on household j’s approximation.
For this reason, the algorithm defers information-sharing and performs it as an end-
of-iteration task. This will not prevent further parallelization, since heterogenous
agent models require aggregation and law of motion estimation at the end of each
iteration, regardless of how the household problem is solved.
I have now outlined the four primary algorithms that are the focus of this paper.
In the next section, I will briefly review global solution methods that are common
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in the DSGE literature, which can be used as performance benchmarks. In particu-
lar, I will focus on value function iteration, backwards recursion, interpolation, the
parameterized expectations approach, and projection methods.
6 Review of Global Solution Methods for DSGE
Models
In this section, I will briefly review common global solution methods for DSGE mod-
els. I will then evaluate the performance of some of these methods in the following
sections; and will compare the results to those of algorithms that make use of post-
decision state variables. I will begin the overview with a review of value function
iteration.
6.1 Value Function Iteration
Value function iteration (VFI) is used to solve infinite horizon dynamic programming
problems. It involves discretizing the state space, iterating over all states, and then
updating the value function approximation until some measure of convergence is
achieved. It can be used as a standalone solution method or it can serve as a first
step for more advanced solution methods. The basic algorithm for VFI is presented
below. Since it can easily be extended to the heterogenous agents case, I do not
provide a separate solution algorithm.
Algorithm 2.1: Value Function Iteration
Step 0: Discretize the state space. For a representative agent model, choose a grid
for endogenous state variables, s = {s1, ..., sN}, where sh < sj if h < j. Use Tauchen’s
method (1986) to discretize the exogenous processes, x, into a K-state Markov chain
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with an associated transition matrix, P , where element pk,l is the probability of tran-
sitioning from state k to l. For heterogenous agents models, do this for both aggregate
and individual-level state variables.
Step 1: Initialize the value function, V 0(si, xj), at all grid points, s x x.
Step 2: For each grid point, (i,j), compute the value of choosing all possible post-
decision values of s, sm: wm(si, xj) = u(si, xj, sm) + β
∑K
l=1 pj,lV
0(sm, xl).
Step 3: For each grid point, (i,j), identify the index associated with the choice of
endogenous state variables that maximizes wm(si, xj), m
∗. Construct V 1 as follows
for all (i,j): V 1(si, xj) = wm∗ .
Step 4: Check for convergence using the following metric:
maxi=1,...N,j=1,...,K |V 1(si, xj)− V 0(si, xj)| ≤ 
If the convergence criterion is satisfied, stop the algorithm and compute the policy
function. If not, set V0 = V1 and return to Step 1.
Next, I will discuss the basic algorithm for finite horizon choice problems for OLG
models. Additionally, I will discuss refinements to both VFI and backwards recursion
in later sections.
6.2 Backwards Recursion
Backwards recursion is the finite horizon analog of VFI. That is, it is a solution
method that relies on the discretization of the endogenous state variables; and the
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conversion of the continuous exogenous processes into discrete Markov chains with
associated transition probability matrices. In comparison to VFI, it has one com-
putational advantage and one disadvantage. The advantage is that the agent lives
a finite number of periods, which means that there will be a set of terminal states
whose value we can compute exactly by maximizing the instantaneous utility function
in the final period. Furthermore, this set of terminal states will serve as a starting
point for the backwards recursion–that is, the construction of all previous period value
functions. The disadvantage of using an OLG model that requires backwards recur-
sion as a solution method is that it requires us to solve for separate value function
approximations for each age. Alternatively, this can be accomplished by introducing
a deterministic state for age. This is a computational trade-off that should be con-
sidered carefully when choosing an OLG model, rather than an heterogenous agents
model with infinitely-lived agents. The basic algorithm for backwards recursion is
outlined below.
Algorithm 2.2: Backwards Recursion
Step 0: Discretize the state space. Choose a grid for endogenous, aggregate state
variables, S = {S1, ..., SN}, where Sh < Sj if h < j. Discretize the exogenous
processes, X, into a K-state Markov chain with an associated transition matrix, P ,
where element pk,l is the probability of transitioning from state k to l. For heteroge-
nous agents models, do this for both aggregate and individual-level state variables.
Choose a maximum age, a¯, where A = 1, ..., a¯.
Step 1: At a¯, solve Va¯(si, xj) = maxsmu(si, xj, sm), at all grid points, s x x.
Step 2: Using the value of each state at age a¯ determined in Step 1, compute the
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value of choosing all possible post-decision state, sm, at age a¯− 1:
wa¯−1m (si, xj) = u(si, xj, sm) + β
∑K
l=1 pj,lV
a¯(sm, xl).
Step 3: For each grid point, (i,j), identify the index associated with the choice of
endogenous state variables that maximizes wm(si, sj), m
∗. Construct V a¯−1 as follows
for all (i,j): V amax−1(Si, Xj) = wm∗ .
Step 4: Repeat Steps 2-3 for a¯−2, ..., 1. Use the resulting age-specific value functions
to determine the age-specific policy functions. For heterogenous agents models, nest
Steps 1-4 within an aggregation algorithm, as described earlier.
Since VFI and backwards recursion both revolve around discretizing the state
space, they also both suffer from the curse of dimensionality when the household’s
choice problem involves many continuous state variables. Similarly, improvements to
both approaches rely on the same family of techniques. In particular, linear and cubic
interpolation are two common strategies for overcoming the curse of dimensionality
when such solution methods are applied. For the sake of parsimony, I will avoid
discussing a separate algorithm for these approaches, but will instead discuss how
interpolation can be added to 2.4 and 2.5.
6.3 Interpolation
The primary purpose behind interpolation is to reduce the number of nodes in the
state space without incurring a corresponding reduction in accuracy. This is accom-
plished by dividing the maximization routine of Algorithms 2.1 and 2.2 into two steps.
In the first step, maximization is performed over a sparse grid. Once the node that
maximizes the value function is identified, interpolation is performed. The purpose
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behind this is to provide a continuous approximation to the value function in the area
between the candidate maximum and its neighboring nodes. A maximization routine
for continuous functions can then be employed to identify the true maximum.
One important thing to note about this method is that it will become increasingly
costly as the dimensionality of the exogenous component of the state space increases.
In particular, if a problem has K possible exogenous states the agent can transition
into from her current state, then K interpolations must be performed. Moving for-
ward, I will not perform tests for interpolation or other improvements for discretiza-
tion methods, since they can also be applied to the new algorithms proposed in the
paper; and, thus, do not constitute an advantage of VFI or backwards recursion.
6.4 Parameterized Expectation Approach (PEA)
The Parameterized Expectations Approach (PEA) differs from the solution methods
we have considered so far in that it does not involve the discretization of the state
space. Instead, it requires us to construct continuous approximations of the expec-
tational components of the first order conditions. These approximations are created
through the repetition of three steps. First, a set of approximating functions are
chosen and parameterized. Second, decisions are simulated based on the chosen pa-
rameterization. And third, some convergence criterion is checked to determine if the
simulated decisions were sufficiently close to optimal.
One important thing to note about PEA is that it is not vulnerable to the curse
of dimensionality in the same sense that VFI and backwards recursion are. In solu-
tion methods that use discretization, adding more state variables–and, in particular,
continuous state variables–substantially increases the number of function evaluations
that must be performed to identify the maximum. In contrast, with PEA, adding
another state variable adds no such requirement. It does, however, make it more
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difficult to choose an initial parameterization for the expectational terms.
The algorithm below constructs a general description of PEA, following Heer and
Maussner (2009) and Den Haan and Marcet (1990). While the algorithm is for the
infinite horizon case, it can easily be extended to capture finite horizon applications.
Algorithm 2.3: Parameterized Expectations Approach (PEA)
Step 0: Identify all model equations, including first order conditions, constraints,
and exogenous processes.
Step 1: Choose an initial functional form and parameterization for the expecta-
tional components of the first order conditions. Here, we will represent this by
Gh(St−1, Xt, sit−1, xit; θ0h), where Gh is a function that approximates the h
th expec-
tational term and using parameters θ0h. Typically, high order polynomials are used
to construct G. Assume that the realization of the expectational component at time
t+1 is ψhit+1, which means that ψ
h
it+1 = Gh(St−1, Xt, sit−1, xit) + uit and uit ∼ iid.
Step 2: Using the expectational term approximations, the initial values, and T peri-
ods worth of simulated exogenous processes, compute the values of the endogenous,
individual-level state variables in each period and for each agent. Increase the value
of n, the parameter value iteration counter.
Step 3: Discard observations for periods T˜ and lower to eliminate bias introduced
by initial values. Use the data for all periods after T˜ , all agents, and all expectational
components to estimate the parameter values using the following objective function:
θˆn = argminθn
∑
i∈I
∑T−1
t=T˜+1
∑
h∈H(ψ
h
it+1 −Gh(St−1, Xt, sit−1, xit; θn)2
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Step 4: Set θn = (1− αn)θn−1 + αnθˆn. Check the following convergence criterion:
max(θˆn − θn−1) < , where max() is performed element-wise. If the condition is sat-
isfied, then stop. Otherwise, return to Step 2.
In the next section, we will consider a class of solution methods called Projection
Methods (PM). This approach nests PEA; and provides computational modelers with
a highly flexible tool that can be used to solve dynamic choice problems.
6.5 Projection Methods (PM)
Projection Methods (PM) are difficult to characterize because they cover a wide
variety of approaches to solving multi-period choice problems. Broadly, PM consists of
many tools that can be used to approximate common functions in choice problems (i.e.
value functions, decision rules, expectational equations, etc.). The PM approach is
typically performed by choosing the functional form for an approximation, computing
the residual of that approximation, and then using some method to minimize the
residual. Below, we will consider a basic algorithm for PM, which follows Heer and
Maussner (2009) and Heer and Maussner (2008).
Algorithm 2.4: Projection Methods (PM)
Step 0: Identify a set of optimality conditions or functional equations, gˆ(S,X, s, x; θ),
that have an associated residual. Choose a family of basis functions, ξ(S,X, s, x), and
a degree of approximation, ρ, where gˆ(S,X, s, x; θ) =
∑ρ
k=0 φkξk(S,X, s, x). Note that
Chebychev Polynomials are a common choice in the literature; and have the benefit
of being an orthogonal class of polynomials, which reduces multicollinearity in Step 3.
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Step 1: Define the residual function R(S,X, s, x; θ) = G(gˆ(S,X, s, x; θ)).
Step 2: Choose a projection function, χi, and a weighting function, w. Compute the
inner product for all of the H optimality conditions or functional equations, where
i=1,...,H: χi =
∫
S
∫
X
∫
s
∫
x
w(S,X, s, x)R(S,X, s, x; θ)χidSdXdsdx
Step 3: Choose the value of θ that yields χi = 0 for i=1,...,H. Alternatively, find
θ that minimizes
∫
S
∫
X
∫
s
∫
x
R(S,X, s, x; θ)2dSdXdsdx
Step 4: Check the accuracy of the solution, θˆ. If the measure of error is too large,
then increase ρ and return to Step 1. For heterogenous agents models, nest Steps 1-4
within an aggregation algorithm.
For Step 0, consider the Bellman equation for an infinite horizon choice problem.
We know that V (si, xj) = maxsmu(si, xj, sm) + β
∑K
l=1 pj,lV (sm, xl), which implies
that R(si, xj; θ) = maxSm [V (si, xj)− u(si, xj, sm)− β
∑K
l=1 pj,lV
0(sm, xl)]. Here, an
ideal choice of g() might be V(). However, we might think about choosing policy
functions or Euler equations for g() instead.
In the next section, I will discuss the metrics that can be used to measure the
accuracy of all of the aforementioned solution methods; and make it possible to make
meaningful comparisons across alternatives.
7 Accuracy Measures
Four sufficient statistics are often used to measure the accuracy of solution methods:
1) second moments; 2) Euler equation residuals; 3) the DM statistic; and 4) law of
motion fit. This section will present each of these methods.
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7.1 Second Moments
Heer and Maussner (2008) use second moments as a means of evaluating the accuracy
of solution methods for standard business cycle models with flexible labor supply.
The approach they use is implemented as follows: first, generate a complete set of
exogenous shocks for the simulation period length. Second, solve the model under
all of the different solution methods you wish to test. Third, simulate the model for
each solution method, using the same set of shocks that was generated in the first
step. Fourth, compare the second moments of the aggregate variable time series.
The rationale behind this approach is as follows: since the exogenous processes are
identical in all simulations, the differences in second moments should arise entirely
from differences in the solution methods. This is especially useful in cases where one
solution method is faster, but the other is more accurate. If there are no statistically
significant differences in second moments, then it may make sense to use the faster
approach–especially if the research agenda only requires the computation of simulated
moments.
As an example of such a comparison, Heer and Maussner (2008) take the same
model and solve and simulate it using two broad classes of methods. The first class
is log-linearization around the steady state, which is fast but inaccurate. The second
class is the broad family of global solution methods, which are slower, but more
accurate for a given grid size. They find that the volatility of investment is different
under log-linearized solution, but all other differences are statistically insignificant.
They suggest that log-linearization is probably the better option for solving such
models, since there is a tremendous speed gain; and no substantial trade-off in terms
of accuracy.
While using second moments might be an appropriate strategy for comparing
global and non-global (local) solution methods, they become less useful when both
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methods are of the same type. For instance, if we have two global solution methods–
and it is not clear which is more accurate for a given grid size–then the most we can
say from second moment differences is that the solution methods differ. Additionally,
second moments often do not capture important differences between solution methods.
For this reason, we will mostly focus on other accuracy measures, as outlined in the
following three sections.
7.2 Euler Equation Residuals
Heer and Maussner (2009) find that there are substantial differences in accuracy
between global and local solution methods when Euler equation residuals are used as
the metric for accuracy. The general strategy behind Euler equation residuals is to
test the accuracy of the decision rules by determining whether or not they are broadly
consistent with the model’s Euler equations.
The Euler equation residual method is implemented in five steps. First, identify
the model’s Euler equations and write them in terms of residual equations that are
equal to zero if the agent has made an optimal decision. Second, solve the model and
recover the decision rules. Third, plug the decision rules into the Euler equations.
And fourth, evaluate the residual equations over a discrete state space grid. Finally,
compute descriptive statistics for the Euler equation residuals to use as a basis for
comparison.
It is important to note that there have been several notable refinements of the
original Euler equation residual approach, including Christiano and Fisher (2000).
However, for the purposes of this paper, we will focus only on the approach described
in this section.
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7.3 The DM Statistic
Den Haan and Marcet (1994) offer an alternative approach for evaluating the accuracy
of the solution method that also uses Euler equation residuals. This approach pro-
ceeds in the following steps: first, solve and simulate the model. Second, construct an
ex-post forecast error series, using the household’s simulated decisions. Third, regress
the error series on the previous period state variables. And fourth, perform an F-test
to check whether the coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero.
The general strategy behind the DM Statistic is to test whether or not the ex-
post forecast error is consistent with an optimal decision. That is, we want to know
if deviations are due to shocks or due to optimization errors. If deviations are due
only to shocks, then the decision rules are accurate.
7.4 Law of Motion Fit
Solution methods for models with many heterogeneous agents must incorporate a
step that approximates the behavior of the aggregate, endogenous state variables.
Such a step will enable agents to pin down contemporaneous factor prices and make
predictions about the future values of aggregate, endogenous states. For the purposes
of this paper, I will use the Krusell and Smith algorithm (1998) for this part of the
solution method. This entails estimating a separate law of motion for each produc-
tivity state. In the case where productivity follows a two-state Markov process and
where aggregate capital is the variable of interest, the following pair of regressions
are run, where K is the mass-weighted sum of the individual capital stocks:
ln(Kt+1) =

B1,H +B2,H ln(Kt), if productivity is high
B1,L +B2,Lln(Kt), if productivity is low
(24)
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According to Krusell and Smith (1998), there are several ways in which the accuracy
of the laws of motion can be tested. One way is to check the value of R2 for each of
the above regressions, which I denote as R2(H) (high productivity state) and R2(L)
(low productivity state) in the test results. A high value of R2 indicates that the law
of motion accurately predicts the next period value of aggregate endogenous state
variables.
A poor fit for the law of motion may indicate two problems with the solution
method. First, it might represent instability in the convergence of individual-level
decision rules. Large shifts in decision rules will lead to corresponding shifts in ag-
gregated individual capital stocks, which has the potential to slow convergence and
weaken fit. And second, a poor fit might indicate that decision rules perform poorly
in a way that is not measured by Euler equation residuals or other individual-level
measures of decision rule quality. In particular, crude decision rule parameterizations
may perform poorly far away from the steady state, which has the potential to intro-
duce influential observations into the Krusell and Smith algorithm (1998) regressions
and subsequently lower R2.
It is important to note, however, that R2 may be a weak measure of the accuracy
of the law of motion. As is pointed out by Den Haan (2010), R2 only captures
the accuracy of a one period ahead forecast. This is because the next period value
of aggregate capital (i.e. the dependent variable in the law of motion regressions)
is updated by aggregating individual capital stocks at the end of each period. This
prevents long term forecast deviations that would arise from repeated deviations from
accuracy from showing up in R2. Den Haan (2010) suggests several alternatives to
R2, including the mean squared error (MSE) of a multi-period forecast. In future
work, I will expand this paper by considering alternative measures of law of motion
accuracy; however, for the purposes of this paper, I will use R2, since it is the most
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popularly cited measure in the literature.
Overall, measures of fit for the law of motion provide another means of testing
the accuracy of different solution methods for the household’s optimization problem.
A poor fit indicates that the decision rules that emerged from a particular solution
method exhibit bad properties in the aggregation phase of the algorithm.
8 Results
In this section, we will test the algorithms that were described earlier. This will
proceed as follows. First, the baseline model will be presented. Next, the model will
be solved using the aforementioned algorithms. Third, the results will be compared
using the measures of accuracy described above. Moving forward, I will start by
outlining a standard business cycle model with no labor supply, which will be used
in the first set of tests. In the second set of tests, I will focus models with incomplete
markets, aggregate uncertainty, and many heterogeneous agents.
8.1 Neoclassical Model (Infinite Horizon)
Households in the baseline model are assumed to maximize expected, discounted
utility from consumption, ct:
maxc0E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [log(ct)] (25)
It is assumed that β ∈ (0, 1). Additionally, the household faces the following budget
constraint, where kt is the household’s capital stock, and rt is the return to capital:
kt+1 = (1 + rt)kt − ct (26)
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The firm produces output using aggregate capital, Kt with the following production
function:
Yt = ZtK
α
t (27)
Capital is assumed to depreciate at rate δ. Productivity, Zt is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process in logs:
lnZt = ρlnZt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ) (28)
The firm maximizes profit, yielding the following factor price for capital:
rt = αZtK
α−1
t − δ (29)
The economy is subject to an aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt − Ct (30)
Additionally, we assume that all individual variables are equal to aggregate variables
in equilibrium: ct = Ct and kt = Kt. Combining the first order conditions for the
household, the equilibrium conditions, and the first order conditions for the firm, we
get the following equations that characterize the model:
1
ct
= λt (31)
λt = βEtλt+1
[
αZt+1K
α−1
t+1 + (1− δ)
]
(32)
Kt+1 + Ct = ZtK
α
t + (1− δ)Kt (33)
Using the description above and the methods outlined earlier, it will now be
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possible to simulate, and test the accuracy of the model under each of the differ-
ent candidate solution methods. In particular, results will be presented for value
function iteration, parameterized expectations, projection methods, and ADP with
post-decision state variables (both forward-pass and double-pass).
8.2 Full Depreciation Case
In the case where δ = 1, the model has a known, closed-form solution. In particular,
the decision rule for capital is given as follows:9
kt+1 = αβztk
α
t (34)
This information could be used to perform two different tests. First, it could be used
to determine the optimal value of next period capital, k’, for each node in the state
space. This could then be compared to the values of next period capital implied by a
particular solution method at each node. This would yield a measure of accuracy that
differs from Euler equation residuals, the DM statistic, and second moments of the
time series; and provides an exact deviation from optimality. And second, it could be
used to perform a simulation-based test that captures multi-period deviations from
optimality that occur as a result of suboptimal choices in previous periods. This could
be done by setting k0, simulating a path for Zt, and then comparing the decision paths
for the exact solution and the solution methods under consideration.
In this paper, I do not perform tests using the full depreciation case. However,
in future work, I will exploit this method to provide an expanded evaluation of the
accuracy of the ADP algorithm with post-decision state variables.
9See the appendix for a proof.
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8.3 Heterogeneous Agents Model with Incomplete Markets
and Aggregate Uncertainty (Infinite Horizon)
The second set of tests will expand on the representative agent model by introducing
incomplete markets, aggregate uncertainty, and many heterogenous agents. This will
have three effects on the tests. First, it will substantially increase the dimensionality
of the state space. Second, it will introduce a source of instability (the aggrega-
tion step) that may cause less stable algorithms to periodically diverge, resulting in
higher run times or reduced accuracy. And finally, it will make it possible to incor-
porate the information-sharing algorithm described earlier to generate performance
improvements in the ADP tests. The model used for the second set of tests is given
below.
In the model, all household’s assumed to maximize expected, discounted utility
from consumption, ct:
maxci0E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [log(cit)] (35)
It is assumed that β ∈ (0, 1). Additionally, each household faces the following budget
constraint, where kit is household i’s capital stock, rt is the factor price for capital,
wit is the wage if employed, and w¯ is the home production wage for the unemployed:
kit+1 =

(1 + rt)kt + wit − cit, if eit = 1
(1 + rt)kt + w¯ − cit, if eit = 0
(36)
As shown by the constraint above, each household supplies labor perfectly inelasti-
cally, but is subject to an unemployment shock (e = 0). For simplicity, this shock will
depend only on the current level of productivity and not the previous employment
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state. As in the representative agent model, it will be assumed that productivity, Zt
follows an AR(1) process in logs:
lnZt = ρlnZt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ) (37)
The firm produces output using aggregate capital, Kt with the following production
function:
Yt = ZtK
α
t N
1−α
t (38)
The economy is subject to an aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt − Ct (39)
In contrast to the representative agent model, individual variables do not equal ag-
gregate variables. Rather, aggregate consistency conditions must be imposed:
Kt =
N∑
i=1
kitµi (40)
Ct =
N∑
i=1
citµi (41)
Nt =
N∑
i=1
niteitµi (42)
Finally, the model is closed with a law of motion to approximate aggregate capital
stock movements. In the simplest case where the productivity shock has two states
(low and high), the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm can be used to estimate and
update the following law of motion:
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ln(Kt+1) =

B1,H +B2,H ln(Kt), if productivity shock is high
B1,L +B2,Lln(Kt), if productivity shock is low
(43)
See Figure 2 for an example of this law of motion’s fit in a model solved using
PM. Note that the solid, blue line indicates the aggregate path of capital, simulated
according to the estimated law of motion above. The dotted, red line indicates the
actual path of capital, aggregated from individual household’s choices.
8.4 Model Calibration
Both the representative agent model and the heterogenous agents model were cali-
brated using the parameter values given in Table 6. Note the model is calibrated
for an annual time period, which offers two benefits. First, it allows me to use an
autoregressive parameter for the productivity process that is further from unity.10
And second, it makes it possible to use the ADP-BTT algorithm without a longer
simulation period. A model calibrated to a quarterly time period, for instance, would
require T − T¯ to be roughly four times as long in order to ensure that streams of
utility that arrive after T+1 are sufficiently heavily discounted.
8.5 Algorithm Refinements and Details
In earlier sections, I presented general algorithms for all of the solution methods that
will be tested in the following section. However, for the purposes of this paper, I
made several algorithmic refinements to ensure convergence in all of the tests. In
particular, the algorithm for PEA was adjusted to incorporate dynamic bounds for
10Many discrete approximations to continuous processes perform poorly when the series is highly
persistent. In this case, I have used the Rouwenhorst method (1995), which tends to perform better
than other discretization methods when series are persistent, but is still subject to the same problem.
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the household-level capital grid. To understand how this works, consider a grid for
capital, k ∈ [1, ..., kkn], which is centered around its steady state value, kkn/2+1. When
the algorithm is initiated, use the smaller grid, k ∈ [kn/2−j, ..., kkn/2+j], which is more
tightly centered around the steady state value of capital. After each iteration, expand
the grid by adding more nodes if any endpoint nodes were chosen in the previous step.
Without this refinement, the performance of PEA was substantially worse; and was
prone to divergence in heterogenous agents models.
In addition to the PEA refinement, I also incorporated my own refinement for the
ADP algorithms. Here, I exploited the value function’s monotonicity and concavity
in individual-level capital to update more than just the state visited. In particular,
the algorithm identifies states that have not been visited, but fall between states that
have. It then revises the values of those states to reflect the monotonicity of the
value function in individual capital. In particular, it scales the value of the state,
so that it falls below the value of the node above it, but above the node below it.
It exploits concavity by placing greater weight on the node above the state being
updated. This procedure is similar to linear interpolation, but is intended to update
unvisited states, rather than providing a value function estimate off of the grid. This
procedure substantially improved convergence speed for a given level of accuracy.
Finally, it is important to note that the PM approach used in this paper ap-
proximates the value function, rather than the Euler equations. The purpose behind
this decision was to make the PM algorithm sufficiently distinct from the PEA algo-
rithm, rather than performing the same set of tests twice. The algorithm works by
first performing VFI on a small grid. The resulting look-up table approximation is
then combined with the fixed point condition implied by the functional equations to
perform the projection. In the heterogenous agents model, both the PM and PEA
algorithms use third order Chebychev polynomials of the first type to transform state
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variables in the approximation equations. Additionally, all continuous state variable
transformations are interacted with the agent’s employment state. In the represen-
tative agent model, a simple, exponential polynomial of state variables is used to
parameterize PEA.
8.6 Simulation Results
We will now examine the results by comparing the solution methods using run time,
accuracy, and stability as criteria. Tables 1-2 in the appendix show the results for
the standard, representative agent business cycle model without labor. Tables 3-5
show the results for the heterogenous agents model with incomplete markets and ag-
gregate uncertainty. All simulations were performed using a quad-core 3.40 gigahertz
processor.
Note that “MAX,” “MEAN,” and “STD,” refer to the maximum, mean, and
standard deviation of the Euler equation residuals, which were computed on a grid
around the steady state. RT stands for run time and has the following format:
hours:minutes:seconds:hundredths of a second. In heterogenous agent model results,
R2(H) and R2(L) are the measures of fit for the laws of motion for capital in high and
low productivity states respectively. Finally, DMS denotes the Den Haan and Marcet
(1994) statistic. In heterogenous agent model tests, the test statistic is expensive to
calculate and less informative, so it is dropped. In representative agent model tests,
the fraction of DM test statistics above the 97.5% critical value in 1000 simulations
are provided for the first simulation.11
Table 1 provides the results for the standard business cycle model without labor.
11The distribution of the DM statistics is used to judge if a solution method is sufficiently accurate,
but is not a useful determinant of the degree of accuracy. For this reason, the DM statistic is only
used to establish that the least accurate set of solutions is sufficiently accurate. It is then dropped
in later simulations.
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All simulations were performed on a 500-node grid: 100 individual capital nodes,
and 5 productivity nodes. As expected, VFI is the most accurate solution method
for this grid size (as measured by max and mean Euler equation residual size), but
is substantially slower than the alternatives. For instance, it takes VFI 5.05 times
longer to converge than PM; and 13.23 times longer to converge than ADP. However,
it ultimately yields a solution that is an order of magnitude more accurate than PEA,
ADP, and ADP-BTT. Finally, note that the fraction of DM statistics that exceeded
the .975 critical value were under 2.5% for all methods other than VFI and ADP-
BTT. Moving forward, we will drop the DM statistic in favor of the more informative
(and less costly) Euler equation residual summary statistics.
Table 2 provides the results for the standard business cycle, but now with a 2000-
node grid: 100 individual capital nodes, and 20 productivity nodes. The purpose
behind this simulation was to examine algorithmic performance when computing ex-
pectations became more computationally expensive. As the table shows, all solution
methods other than PEA improved in accuracy by roughly one half an order of mag-
nitude. The limited parameterization of PEA (a simple, exponential polynomial)
fostered stability and rapid convergence, but prevented substantial improvements in
accuracy, even after the number of nodes in the state space was increased by a factor
of four. Conversely, both ADP and ADP-BTT have experienced substantial gains in
improvement; and at a low cost. Each algorithm took roughly five times longer to
converge. In contrast, PM took eight times longer to converge; and VFI took 26 times
longer to converge. This suggests that ADP and ADP-BTT will perform favorably–in
terms of the accuracy-run time tradeoff–as expectations become increasingly costly.
That is, if the stochastic component of the state space is very large, then ADP or
ADP-BTT should be able to achieve convergence at the desired level of accuracy in
a shorter run time than VFI or PM. Furthermore, without an improved parameteri-
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zation for PEA, it will be unable to generate the degree of accuracy obtainable with
PM, VFI, ADP, or ADP-BTT.
Next, we’ll consider the results for the model with incomplete markets and aggre-
gate uncertainty, which are given in Table 3. All simulations listed in the table were
performed on a 200-node grid: 10 individual capital nodes, 5 aggregate capital nodes,
2 productivity nodes, and 2 employment nodes. Additionally, the simulations were
performed for 3000 periods with a relatively small number of agents (200). From the
table, we can see that VFI yields the most accurate solutions with respect to Euler
equation residuals. Both the mean and max Euler equation residuals are nearly an
order of magnitude smaller than ADP with post-decision states (hereafter, ADP) and
ADP with post-decision states and backwards propagation through time (hereafter,
ADP-BTT). Next to VFI, PEA yields the most accurate individual-level solutions;
and is followed by ADP, ADP-BTT, and then PM. Additionally, with such a small
state space, VFI is also the fastest solution method, achieving convergence within 40
seconds. It is followed by ADP-BTT, PEA, ADP, and then PM. Additionally, among
all the solution methods, ADP, ADP-BTT, and VFI achieve the best law of motion
fit. PEA, while fast, is less stable at the aggregate level and achieves a substantially
worse fit.
The next set of simulations, shown in Table 4, expands the grid to 1000 nodes:
25 individual capital nodes, 10 aggregate capital nodes, 2 productivity nodes, and 2
employment nodes. Relative to the 200-node results, each solution method achieves an
accuracy increase of about one order of magnitude, measured by mean and max Euler
equation residual reductions. VFI, again, is the most accurate at the individual-level
and most stable at the aggregate level. However, VFI now takes 11.15 times longer to
converge, even though the number of nodes in the state space has only increased by a
factor of five. In contrast, ADP-BTT takes only 1.45 times longer to convergence, but
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also retains stability at the aggregate level while improving individual-level accuracy
by an order of magnitude. Furthermore, note that all solution methods now converge
faster than VFI; and that VFI now takes roughly 7 times as long to converge as
ADP-BTT.
Finally, Table 5 expands the grid to 4000 nodes: 50 individual capital nodes, 20
aggregate capital nodes, 2 productivity nodes, and 2 employment nodes. Again, all
solution methods experience an improvement in accuracy. This time, it is less than
an order of magnitude. VFI remains the most accurate and stable. PEA is the second
most accurate and also the fastest, but is substantially less stable at the aggregate
level. ADP-BTT is both accurate and stable and converges faster than anything other
than PEA by a substantial margin. Importantly, VFI takes 34.33 times as long to
converge as ADP-BTT.
These findings suggest that ADP-BTT may provide substantial improvements in
convergence time over common global solution methods when the state space is large.
In particular, ADP-BTT converges at roughly the same rate as PEA and is slightly
less accurate at the individual level, but is substantially more stable at the aggregate
level. Additionally, it is roughly as accurate as PM, but is substantially faster and
slightly more stable. Finally, in comparison to VFI, it is roughly as stable at the
aggregate level, but is approximately one order of magnitude less accurate. Impor-
tantly, however, it becomes substantially faster than VFI as the state space grows.
In particular, the difference in run times between the algorithms grows faster than
the difference in accuracy. This suggests that ADP-BTT will tend to dominate VFI
in problems with many continuous state variables, since VFI will become infeasible
if it isn’t performed on a highly coarse grid.
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9 Conclusion
The ADP-BTT algorithm provides a promising alternative to currently-used global
solution methods for DSGE models. For the state space discretizations tested, it
was roughly one order of magnitude less accurate than VFI, which was the most
accurate solution method tested. However, it was substantially faster than VFI; and
the difference in convergence speeds grew rapidly in the number of nodes in the state
space, while the difference in accuracy remained largely unchanged. This suggests that
ADP-BTT will tend to outperform VFI when a model contains many state variables
(e.g. models with heterogenous agents) and would require a coarse discretization for
VFI to converge within a reasonable amount of time.
The only solution method that outperformed ADP-BTT on individual-level mea-
sures of accuracy and also maintained a low run time was PEA. However, PEA was
substantially less stable than ADP-BTT at the aggregate level in models with many
heterogenous agents. Additionally, PEA is both sensitive to parameterization and
sensitive to the choice of parameterized equations.12 Furthermore, it can become in-
creasingly difficult to parameterize PEA in large models; and accuracy gains beyond
a certain magnitude will require the addition of higher order polynomial transfor-
mations of the state variables. Finally, PEA is designed explicitly to minimize Eu-
ler equation residuals–unlike all other solution methods tested–which may cause the
measures of accuracy considered (Euler equation residuals and the DM statistic) to
overstate its accuracy.
Furthermore, ADP-BTT tends to outperform VFI and PM when a model contains
many stochastic processes; or requires a fine discretization of one stochastic process.
This is because ADP-BTT does not require the explicit computation of expectations.
12Maliar and Maliar (2005) show that the choice of equation can lead to dramatic differences in
convergence speed
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Furthermore, the algorithm is arguably easier to implement than VFI; and is substan-
tially easier to implement than PM and PEA for new practitioners of computational
methods.
Finally, it is important to note that this paper does not fully showcase the set
of tools that ADP algorithms with post-decision states offer. In several places in
the paper, I have mentioned that ADP and ADP-BTT are particularly well-suited
to dealing with problems that have multiple, correlated exogenous processes or ex-
ogenous processes for which empirical data is available. In the paper, I provide only
algorithms for implementing these ideas–and not test results to demonstrate their
advantages. In cases where exogenous processes are complicated and exhibit de-
pendence, ADP’s value goes well beyond reductions in run time. It makes solving
computational models more accessible to non-computational economists; and permits
computational economists to solve increasingly sophisticated models by greatly sim-
plifying the programming task. For this reason, formal test results for accuracy and
run time may be less useful for these applications.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Pre-Decision State vs. Post-Decision State
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Figure 2: Law of Motion for Capital
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
2.9
2.95
3
3.05
3.1
3.15
Time (Years)
A
gg
re
ga
te
 C
ap
ita
l
Law of Motion for Capital (1000 Nodes)
 
 
Aggregation of Individual Capital Stocks
Law of Motion (Krusell & Smith Algorithm)
148
Table 1: Standard Business Cycle Model (100 Individual Capital Nodes,
5 Productivity Nodes, 3000-Period Simulation Length)
METHOD MAX MEAN STD RT DMS (.975)
VFI 1.700E-3 3.500E-3 1.700E-3 00:02:18:24 0.034
PM 7.500E-3 1.360E-2 7.500E-3 00:00:15:48 0.000
PEA 3.800E-2 3.640E-2 3.800E-2 00:00:00:65 0.003
ADP 2.620E-2 5.200E-2 2.620E-2 00:00:05:91 0.000
ADP (BTT) 2.820E-2 6.970E-2 2.100E-2 00:00:06:52 0.060
Table 2: Standard Business Cycle Model (100 Individual Capital Nodes,
20 Productivity Nodes, 3000-Period Simulation Length)
METHOD MAX MEAN STD RT
VFI 8.6594E-4 4.528E-4 2.463E-4 01:00:60:44
PM 5.800E-3 3.700E-3 1.700E-3 00:02:26:17
PEA 3.490E-2 3.410E-2 5.878E-4 00:00:00:80
ADP 2.060E-2 1.01EE-2 6.000E-3 00:00:35:47
ADP (BTT) 1.810E-2 8.500E-3 5.200E-3 00:00:31:73
Table 3: Heterogenous Agents Model (10 Individual Capital Nodes, 5
Aggregate Capital Nodes, 3000-Period Simulation Length, 200 Agents)
METHOD MAX MEAN STD RT R2 (H) R2 (L)
VFI 5.800E-2 2.480E-2 1.810E-2 00:00:40:00 0.9876 0.9641
PM 4.043E-1 1.586E-1 1.240E-1 00:01:21:50 0.9414 0.9397
PEA 1.033E-1 5.730E-2 2.940E-2 00:00:54:00 0.9079 0.9045
ADP 2.340E-1 1.114E-1 7.370E-2 00:00:88:20 0.9974 0.9996
ADP (BTT) 3.336E-1 1.764E-1 1.043E-1 00:00:44:02 0.9956 0.9939
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Table 4: Heterogenous Agents (25 Individual Capital Nodes, 10
Aggregate Capital Nodes, 3000-Period Simulation Length, 200 Agents)
METHOD MAX MEAN STD RT R2 (H) R2 (L)
VFI 4.800E-3 2.500E-3 1.400E-3 00:07:25:82 0.9947 0.9825
PM 1.660E-2 7.600E-3 4.400E-3 00:06:12:52 0.9534 0.9625
PEA 2.700E-2 1.420E-2 7.600E-3 00:02:55:91 0.8515 0.8391
ADP 3.680E-2 1.810E-2 1.110E-2 00:05:05:40 0.9735 0.9512
ADP (BTT) 4.640E-2 2.490E-2 1.340E-2 00:01:04:98 0.9907 0.9822
Table 5: Heterogenous Agents (50 Individual Capital Nodes, 20
Aggregate Capital Nodes, 3000-Period Simulation Length, 200 Agents)
METHOD MAX MEAN STD RT R2 (H) R2 (L)
VFI 7.300E-4 3.833E-4 2.172E-4 01:43:25:55 0.9991 0.9987
PM 1.000E-2 5.200E-3 3.100E-3 00:09:19:36 0.9660 0.9652
PEA 7.500E-3 3.700E-3 2.300E-3 00:01:10:05 0.8942 0.8914
ADP 1.430E-2 7.300E-3 4.500E-3 00:10:01:49 0.9905 0.9905
ADP (BTT) 1.360E-2 7.900E-3 3.600E-3 00:03:12:13 0.9941 0.9919
Table 6: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor .95
α Capital’s Share in Production .33
σ Standard Deviation of Technology Shock 0.035
ρ Technology Level AR(1) Coefficient 0.8
δ Physical Capital Depreciation Rate .1
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11.2 Proof: Closed-Form Solution for Full Depreciation Case
Assume that z is a Markov process. Additionally, let next period variables be de-
noted with primes. That is, xt+1 = x
′. Finally, assume that δ = 1 and recall the
budget constraint and Euler equation for capital from the representative agent model
described earlier:
c = k′ − zkα (44)
1
c
= βE
{
αz′
c′
∣∣∣∣∣z
}
(45)
Now, assume that the decision rule for capital takes the following form:
Ξ(k, z) = g0 + g1zk
α (46)
Next, plug the budget constraint into the Euler equation for capital:
1
k′ − zkα = βE
{
αz′k′α−1
k′′ − z′k′α
∣∣∣∣∣z
}
(47)
Now, add the assumed decision rule:
1
g0 + (g1 − 1)zkα = βE
{
αz′(g0 + g1zkα)α−1
g0 + g1z′(g0 + g1zkα)α − z′(g0 + g1zkα)′α
∣∣∣∣∣z
}
(48)
To simplify things, we will look for a solution where g0 = 0.
13 This allows us to
simplify the above equation as follows:
1
(g1 − 1)zkα = βE
{
αz′(g1zkα)α−1
g1z′(g1zkα)α − z′(g1zkα)α
∣∣∣∣∣z
}
(49)
13It can be shown that there will be no solution for the case when g0 6= 0.
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→ 1
(g1 − 1)zkα = βE
{
α
(g1 − 1)B1zkα
∣∣∣∣∣z
}
(50)
→ B1 = αβ (51)
We can then substitute this into our initial guess for the decision rule, yielding the
following:
k′ = αβzkα (52)
Note that we have demonstrated that the decision rule given above is compatible with
the model’s first order conditions.
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CHAPTER 3
A PREDICTIVE MODEL OF FINANCIAL
EPIDEMICS
Isaiah Hull
ABSTRACT
The SIR model is one of the most thoroughly developed frameworks for predicting the
dynamics of infectious disease. This paper demonstrates how the SIR model can be mi-
crofounded in an economic context to make predictions about financial epidemics, such as
the spread of asset-backed securities (ABS) and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), the prolif-
eration of zombie financial institutions, and the expansion of bubbles and mean-reverting
fads. The paper will proceed by developing the 1-host SIR model for economic and financial
contexts; and will then move on to demonstrate how to work with the multi-host version of
the model. In addition to showing how the SIR framework can be used to model economic
interactions, it will also: 1) show how it can be simulated; 2) use it to develop and estimate
a sufficient statistic for the spread of a financial epidemic; and 3) show how policymakers
can impose the financial analog of herd immunity–that is, prevent the spread of a financial
epidemic without completely banning the asset or behavior associated with the epidemic.
Importantly, the paper will focus on developing a neutral framework to describe financial
epidemics that can be either “bad” or “good.” That is, the general framework can be ap-
plied to epidemics that constitute a mean-reverting fad or an informational bubble, but
ultimately yield little value and shrink in importance; or epidemics that are long-lasting
and yield a new financial instrument that generates permanent efficiency gains or previously
unrealized hedging opportunities.
JEL Classification: C510, C530, C580, G140
Keywords: Econometric Modeling, Econometric Forecasting, Financial Econometrics, In-
formation Bubbles, Bubbles, Fads
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1 Introduction
In a recent op-ed for Project Syndicate, Robert Shiller (2012) described a speculative
bubble as “...a social epidemic whose contagion is mediated by price movements.” He
then explained how initially high prices result in positive investor narratives, which
spread to other investors, and result in the expansion of the bubble. He suggests that
these phenomena are largely social, are divorced from fundamentals, and have the
potential to result in substantial asset pricing anomalies.
Shiller’s work on speculative bubbles confirms this casual description (Shiller,
1990). In a series of questionnaires, Shiller surveyed wealthy individuals, individual
investors, and institutional investors about three different events: 1) the stock mar-
ket crash of 1987; 2) the real estate booms and busts of the late 1980s; and 3) the
underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). One common thread in Shiller’s find-
ings is that the decision making of investors often revolves around simple heuristics;
and is influenced not only through social dialogue, but also through the percep-
tion of what others investors or institutions might do. For instance, he found that
roughly two-thirds of investors surveyed in the U.S. and three-fourths of investors
surveyed in Japan viewed psychological factors as more important than fundamentals
when explaining the 1987 stock market crash. Additionally, when it came to real
estate booms, he found that homeowners were substantially more likely to discuss
the housing market–and, therefore, propagate positive narratives–when house prices
were rising than when they were flat. Finally, with respect to IPOs, he found that
wealthy individual investors were often more concerned with which types of compa-
nies other investors would find compelling than they were with the fundamentals of
the company.
This suggests that the investors (individual and institutional) may use internal
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models that rely on their perceptions of what others will do, rather than on fun-
damentals alone. Thus, when modeling the adoption of a financial instrument or
increased demand for existing instruments, it is important to incorporate channels
for investor-to-investor, investor-to-institution, and institution-to-institution interac-
tions. In fact, in the last decade, these channels for investor interaction (or, more
generally, for any agent interaction) have become increasingly developed in both the
macroeconomics and finance literatures.
In the finance literature, Hong et al. (2010) embed an epidemiological model of
opinion transmission within a standard asset pricing and trading framework. They
assume that the agents can be divided into “informed” and “uninformed” groups. The
informed group has recently received news or a common opinion about the value of an
asset being traded; and the assimilation of this information changes their demand for
the asset. The uninformed group has not yet received the news; and, thus, maintains
the same level of demand, conditional on price. Over time, the news about the asset
passes through the investor population, moving individuals from the uninformed to
informed group, and leading to changes in aggregate investor demand that affect
price. Hong et al. (2010) refer to this effect as “opinion diffusion”; and use it to
explain non-linearities in price drift and trading volume.
Shive (2010) tests whether epidemiological models have predictive power for stock
choice. The author uses municipality-level data in Finland to identify the number
of holders of the 20 most active stocks in Finland over a 9 year horizon. She then
attempts to predict the total number of buy orders placed per investor, using a
several controls, along with a common measure of disease transmission: the number
of investors who hold the stock, multiplied by the number of investors who do not. In
the SIR model, this is equivalent to the number of susceptible individuals, multiplied
by the number of infected individuals. The estimated coefficient gives us a measure of
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how social interaction affects stock purchase decisions. The author finds that socially
motivated stock trades not only affect the number of buy orders placed, but also the
returns to the stock.
In addition to Shive (2010), other recent finance papers have demonstrated the im-
portance of word-of-mouth effects and social interaction on buying decisions. Frieder
and Subrahmanyam (2005), Feng and Seasholes (2004), and Hong et al. (2005) all
document micro-level interactions between investors that are socially motivated. The
units of observation range from mutual fund managers to individual investors–all of
which were found to respond to other investors and other institutions in a way that
was divorced from fundamentals.
In the macroeconomics literature, Carroll (2003) suggests that expectations of
inflation are unlikely to be exactly rational. Rather, it is more likely that they fall
somewhere between adaptive and rational, given the empirical evidence. He then
uses a simple model from epidemiology–the single source model–to build expectations
that are forward-looking, but not perfectly rational. In his model, only a fraction
of households, λ, read the latest inflation prediction from a rational expectations
forecaster in each period. The rest of the households retain the forecast they used in
the previous period. He then shows that adjustment yields substantial performance
improvements generating model with contractionary disinflations, lagged effects from
monetary policy, inflation from rising growth rates, and increases in the natural rate
of unemployment from productivity slowdowns. He also demonstrates that this idea
is plausible by showing that the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters
can empirically be seen as the rational expectations forecast; whereas, population
measures of expectations, such as the University of Michigan’s Inflation Expectations
Survey, only contain a subset of that information.
Since Carroll (2003), several new additions to the macroeconomics literature have
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incorporated epidemiological modeling as a means of capturing expectations forma-
tion. Pfajfar and Santoro (2012) and Sommer and Carroll (2004), for instance, use
epidemiological modeling to capture the impact of news on inflation expectations and
the impact of expectations on consumption, respectively. Additionally, Capistran and
Timmerman (2006) and Brissimis and Magginas (2006) build off of Carroll (2003) to
consider whether or not there is substantial heterogeneity in inflation expectations;
and, if so, what impact it has on monetary policy.
My paper differs from the existing literature across several important dimensions:
first, it nests a complete SIR model from epidemiology within a finance model; second,
it generalizes the model to the case where there is more than just one class of agents;
third, it derives R0, the sufficient condition for the take off of a bubble, within a
financial context; fourth, it shows how R0 can be estimated in financial models and
used to predict the spread of new financial innovations; and fifth, it develops the
concept of “herd immunity” as a strategy for bubble prevention.
More generally, this paper is not only designed to develop a sufficient statistic
for bubble prediction, but also to provide a toolset for modeling contagion within an
economic and financial context. Those who have an interest in developing models of
contagion with multiple classes of agents may find this paper especially helpful.
Finally, it is important to note that the framework in this paper is designed to be
sufficiently general to cover bubbles, mean-reverting fads, informational bubbles, and
the permanent adoption of new financial instruments. That is, the purpose of using
R0 will be to detect a take-off, rather than to determine how such a take-off will end.
It may be possible to develop strategies to separately identify each of these categories
of event; however, that will not be the focus of the remaining sections.
This paper will proceed as follows. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, I will provide a brief
overview of the general methods used to solve epidemiological models for both the
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1-host and 2-host case. I will show how the model parameters can be used to compute
R0 and to check the herd immunity condition. In section 2.3, I will build a financial
model that explicitly nests the SIR model; and yields an estimable value for R0. In
section 2.4, I will show how comparative statics can be used to determine whether
herd immunity holds. I will then discuss and prove 12 theorems, which can be used
to simplify the estimation of R0 or to check the herd immunity condition in a 2-host
model. Finally, in section 2.5, I estimate R0 and check herd immunity in several
applications of my model.
2 An Overview of the SIR Model
In this section, I will discuss the basic mathematical tools that form the SIR model
in epidemiology. Beyond this paper, the toolkit described in this section may lend
itself to useful modeling and econometric applications elsewhere in economics and
finance; and, indeed, has made an appearance in a limited fashion in some of the
work referenced in the introduction. The purpose of this section will be to provide a
formal introduction to the toolkit that will be used later in this paper.
2.1 The Single-Host SIR Model
The single-host SIR model is one of the core analytical frameworks of mathemat-
ical epidemiology. It places structure on the flow of individuals into one of three
groups based on pathogenic status: “susceptible,” “infected,” or “recovered” (some-
times called “removed”). Typically, an epidemic is simulated in the SIR framework
by initially placing all individuals into the susceptible group. Next, an infected (or
some mass of infecteds) is introduced into the population. In SIR models with “per-
fectly mixed” populations, it is assumed that each infected individual has the same
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probability of transmission, c, per contact with a susceptible individual.1 It is further
assumed that the frequency of contact between individuals in a given period of time
is q. Thus, the disease transmission rate is given by β = qc.
For simplicity, the mass of individuals is typically normalized to 1 in SIR models.
This provides us with a convenient way to express the flow of individuals from the
susceptible group to the infected group: βIS, where S is the mass of susceptibles and
I is the mass of infecteds. Additionally, in some models, the population is assumed
to grow at a fixed rate, µg, and individuals in the susceptible group are assumed to
perish at rate µp. This leads to the following equation, which is one of the three that
will describe the single-host SIR model:
∂S
∂t
= µg − βIS − µpS (1)
Notice that µg is not multiplied by S, since we assume that the birth rate is determined
by the mass of the population–and not the mass of the susceptibles. On the other
hand, we must multiply µp by S to get the flow of individuals who exit the susceptibles
group, since the flow depends on the mass of S.
Next, we may write down the equation for the flows into and out of the infected
group:
∂I
∂t
= βIS − (µp + γ +m)I (2)
Here, µp is the mortality rate for individuals who perish for reasons other than expo-
sure to the pathogen, γ is rate at which individuals recover from the disease and gain
immunity, and m is the disease-induced mortality rate. If we want the population to
1For those interested in further applications of the SIR model, the modern epidemiology literature
contains many strategies for dealing with heterogenous populations, one of which will be applied in
this paper.
159
retain a mass of 1 at all times, we can simply set µp = µg.
Finally, we may close the model by specifying an equation for the flows into and
out of the recovered group:
∂R
∂t
= γI − µpR (3)
This equation simply states that the net flow of individuals into the recovered group
(which is now immune to the pathogen2) consists of two components: 1) the mass of
individuals who left the infected group by recovering γI; and 2) the mass of individuals
in the recovered group who died for reasons other than exposure to the disease, µpR.
Finally, note that the continuous time SIR model is typically numerically sim-
ulated using a variation of the Runge-Katta integration scheme (Keeling & Rohani
2008). In order to further illustrate the purpose and output from this exercise, two
graphs are provided in the appendix (Figure 1 and Figure 2) that illustrate the dy-
namics of a single-host SIR model. These simulations were performed in Matlab using
the Runge-Katta routine. For simplicity, we assumed that µg = 0 and µp = 0 (i.e.
the natural birth and death rates are zero). We also assumed that the disease was
non-lethal (i.e. m=0). Figure 1 shows the dynamics of an epidemic following the in-
troduction of an infected individual with mass of .01 into a population of susceptibles
when β = 1 and γ = .1. Figure 2 shows the results for the same simulation, but with
β = 1 and γ = 1.01.
Notice that the disease “invades” in Figure 1. That is, by the end of the epidemic,
every person in the population has been infected by the disease, and has recovered,
gaining immunity.
To the contrary, in Figure 2, the disease never invades. That is, not every sus-
2In some applications of the SIR model, immunity is only temporary. While this device may
have useful applications in economics, we will not discuss this further in this subsection.
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ceptible in the population becomes infected. Instead, the disease dies off before it
reaches most of the population. To see why this is the case, consider the differential
equation for the flows into the infected category at t=0:
∂I
∂t
= βIS − γI (4)
If βIS < γI, then more individuals will flow out of the infected group than will
flow into it. This means that the group of infected individuals will start to shrink as
soon as the disease is introduced into the population. This is called the “threshold
phenomenon” (Keeling & Rohani 2008), and is the basis for constructing the basic
reproductive number, R0:
R0 =
β
γ
(5)
R0 is an important ratio because it can be used to determine whether or not a pop-
ulation of susceptibles has “herd immunity.” In particular, from the equation for the
infecteds, we can see that a group will have herd immunity (that is, a new disease
will not spread to the entire group of susceptibles) if the following condition holds:
1
R0
> S (6)
Furthermore, we can extend the concept of herd immunity by determining the mini-
mum mass of susceptibles that must be immunized in order to achieved herd immu-
nity. We do this by rewriting S(0) as S(1-P), where P is the fraction of immunized
susceptibles
1
R0
> S(1− P ) (7)
Thus, if the condition below holds, then the population has herd immunity, and the
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infectious disease will not invade. Notice that P must increase as R0 increases in
order for the condition to hold:
P > 1− 1
R0S
(8)
The basic reproductive number and the associated concept of herd immunity are
critically important ideas in epidemiology. In the following sections, we will apply
these concepts to economics by constructing a sufficient statistic for the inflation of
bubbles. We will also see how the concept of herd immunity can be used to construct
policies that prevents the inflation of bubbles efficiently.
2.2 SIR Model Extension: Multi-Host
In this section, I will construct a general model of financial bubbles using a 2-host ver-
sion of the SIR model. From this, I will derive the basic reproductive number for the
2-host version–and, relatedly, determine the conditions under which herd immunity
holds. Finally, I will explain how to construct the basic reproductive number for the
general multi-host case. All of this will be done through the framework in McCormack
(2007). To this author’s knowledge, this has not yet been done in economics.
Figure 3 in the appendix shows the basic structure of a 2-host SIR model. Note
there are now two different categories of hosts, which are generically indexed 1 and 2.
Individuals in each group may move from susceptible to infected and from infected
to removed, as indicated by the solid arrows. Dotted arrows indicate that the mass
of the infected group impacts the flows of individuals between groups. In particular,
as the mass of infecteds of category 1 grows, susceptibles of category 1 and category
2 become more likely to encounter infecteds of category one. As a result, the flow of
individuals from the susceptible to the infected category increase for both categories.
162
Using the same notation from the previous section, we may write down the six
equations for a generic, two-host SIR model:
∂S1
∂t
= µg1 − β1,1I1S1 − β2,1I2S1 − µp1S1 (9)
Note that µg1 is the growth rate of individuals in category 1, β1,1 is the transmission
rate between category 1 infecteds and category 1 susceptibles, β2,1 is the transmission
rate between category 2 infecteds and category 1 susceptibles, and µp1 is the mortality
rate for reasons other than exposure to the infectious disease.
The remaining five equations follow a similar format and adopt identical subscripting
conventions, so I will comment only on the differences from the single-host SIR model:
∂S2
∂t
= µg2 − β2,2I2S2 − β1,2I1S2 − µp2S2 (10)
∂I1
∂t
= β1,1I1S1 − β2,1I2S1 − (γ1 + µp1 +m1)I1 (11)
∂I2
∂t
= β2,2I2S2 − β1,2I1S2 − (γ2 + µp2 +m2)I2 (12)
∂R1
∂t
= γ1I1 − µp1R1 (13)
∂R2
∂t
= γ2I2 − µp2R2 (14)
One important difference from the single-host SIR model is that we now have sub-
scripts on γ, µ, m. This is because we are allowing the removal (or recovery) rate,
the population growth rate, the population death rate (from reasons other than ex-
posure to the disease), and the infectious disease mortality rate to vary according to
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category.
With the definitions now in place for the six equations that characterize a generic
SIR model, I will now discuss how to compute the basic reproduction number (BRN)
for a two-host SIR model using the techniques described in Diekmann and Heesterbeek
(1990), van den Driessche and Watmough (2002), and McCormack (2007).
Using the framework in the aforementioned papers, R0 (the BRN) can be com-
puted from the spectral radius of the nxn matrix, Mn, where Mn = (Rj,k)nj,k=1. Each
Rj,k in the matrix is given as follows:
Rj,k =
Kjβj,k
Kk(γk +mk + µ
p
k)
(15)
Here, Kj and Kk are the carrying capacities for population groups j and k. Typically,
the population masses for category 1 and category 2 individuals are normalized to
1, causing the carrying capacity terms will drop out of the equation. However, even
without this normalization, the terms will cancel out in the special two-host case
when R0 is computed.
Note that Pq refers to the fraction of the population of category q that has been
immunized against the infection. These individuals are effectively removed from the
SIR model dynamics. From this, the special case for the two-host SIR model is given
as follows:
M2 =
 R1,1 R1,2
R2,1 R2,2

Taking the spectral radius of M2, BRN is computed as follows:
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R0 =
R1,1 + R2,2 +
√
(R1,1 − R2,2)2 + 4R1,2R2,1
2
(16)
Re-writing this expression in terms of the parameters and variables in the two-host
model yields the following:
R0 =
1
2
√(
β1,1
γ1 +m1 + µ
p
1
− β2,2
γ2 +m2 + µ
p
2
)2
+
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2 + µ
p
2)(γ1 +m1 + µ
p
1)
+
1
2
(
β1,1
γ1 +m1 + µ
p
1
+
β2,2
γ2 +m2 + µ
p
2
) (17)
Finally, I will construct a modified version of herd immunity that does not include S
(as it did in the previous subsection). Instead, I will use the fact that R0 is the average
number of secondary cases of the infection that arise from a primary case. This means
that the disease will invade (i.e. the number of individuals in the infectious category
will rise at t=0) if the following condition holds:
R0 > 1 (18)
That is, if each primary case tends to generate more than one secondary case, then the
infectious groups will tend to grow when the initial infected individual is introduced
into the group. Otherwise, the epidemic will not invade.
3 A Two-Host SIR Model of Financial Epidemics
Using the basic structure given in the previous section, I will now construct a model
of financial epidemics. In particular, this model will feature interactions between two
types of economic agents (i.e. the two types of hosts)–financial intermediaries and
investors–that can lead to the inflation of bubbles, the creation of a fad, or another
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variety of financial epidemic.
First, assume that there exists a continuum of both financial intermediaries and in-
vestors; and that their respective masses are normalized to one. Additionally, assume
that each financial intermediary receives deposits from investors, and may choose to
invest those deposits in one of two assets: 1) a conventional asset, which generates
a normalized return of 1 with certainty, or 2) an unconventional asset, which has a
uniformly-distributed, time-varying return:
b(t, i) ∼ U [bL(t), bH(t)] (19)
For simplicity, assume that the upper and lower boundaries decline linearly over time:
bH(t) = bHmax{(1− δt), 0} (20)
bL(t) = bLmax{(1− δt), 0} (21)
In the above two equations, bH , bL, and δ are constants. Given the assumptions made
so far, the probability that a financial intermediary receives a return lower than some
arbitrary threshold, T¯ , as given as follows:
pr{b(t, i) < T¯} = T¯ − b
L(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) (22)
Next, two additional assumptions are needed: 1) in each period of time, an investor
who is initially holding conventional assets will search a fixed number of financial
intermediaries, q, to determine the return they offer on investment. If an investor
searches an intermediary that is investing in unconventional assets, it will switch
to this intermediary with a fixed probability, c. Taken together, this gives us the
transmission rate from financial intermediaries (category 2) to investors (category 1):
166
β2,1 = qc.
Additionally, assume that investors watch the behavior of other investors, and
choose whether or not to lend to financial intermediaries based on that.3 Similarly,
the transmission rate will be defined as the product of the frequency with which
investors observe each others’ investment decisions and the probability of switching
from conventional to unconventional assets after observing a investor who invests in
an unconventional asset intermediary: β1,1.
Next, assume that financial intermediaries monitor a fixed number of other finan-
cial intermediaries in each period; and have a constant probability of copying the ones
who invest in unconventional assets if they monitor them in that period. This gives
us the intermediary-to-intermediary transmission rate: β2,2. Finally, intermediaries
come into contact with investors who are searching rates at different intermediaries.
Observing the outcome of this process spreads information about investor preference
for the unconventional asset–and results in conventional asset intermediaries becom-
ing unconventional asset intermediaries with rate β1,2.
With a theoretical foundation for the transmission rates in place, the remaining
dimensions of the model can now be calibrated:
1. µg1, µ
g
2 - Investor and financial intermediary entry rates.
2. µp1, µ
p
2 - Investor and financial intermediary exit rates.
3. m1,m2 - The rates at which investors and financial intermediaries go bankrupt
as a result of the unconventional asset’s poor performance.
4. γ1, γ2 - The rates at which investors and financial intermediaries stop investing
in the unconventional asset and instead invest in the conventional asset.
3Papers such as Shive (2010) and Hong et al. (2010) suggest that there is empirical evidence for
socially-motivated trades.
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Note that the rates described do not have to be structural parameters; and, in fact,
could emerge from optimization problems. In order to limit the scope of this paper,
however, I will assume that entry and exit rates are set to zero or will be estimated
using data.
Next, I microfound bankruptcy rates induced by poor unconventional asset perfor-
mance. I do this by assuming that all investors start at t=0 with D units of currency
to deposit; and that they place those funds in financial intermediaries that invest
in conventional assets, since the unconventional asset has not yet been invented at
t=0. Furthermore, I assume that all banks start with τD in capital. Applying the
Law of Large Numbers (LLN) yields the following bankruptcy rate, m2, for financial
intermediaries:
m2 = pr{(1− b(t))I1D > τI2D} = pr{1− b(t) > τI2/I1} (23)
= pr{b(t) < (I1 − τI2)/I1} (24)
→ m2 =
I1−τI2
I1
− bL(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) (25)
Note that the conventions from the SIR model have been retained, even though we
are now using an entirely financial model. That is, the bankruptcy rate, m2, is the
mortality rate from the SIR model. Additionally, I1 denotes the fraction of investors
who are investing in financial intermediaries that purchase unconventional assets and
I2 denotes the fraction of financial intermediates that purchase unconventional as-
sets. Similarly, in the SIR model, this would denote the fraction of infecteds in each
population.
With this in mind, the interpretation of equation 25 is simple: if an intermediary
invests in an unconventional asset, and that asset generates a return lower than the
principal invested, then the intermediary will have to use capital to repay investors.
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If the capital is not sufficient to repay principal, then the financial intermediary will
go bankrupt after dividing all remaining funds among investors.4
One important feature of this setup is that bankruptcy rates depend on financial
intermediary leverage. As the mass of unconventional asset investors grows relative
to capital holdings in unconventional asset intermediaries (i.e. as a rough measure of
leverage increases), the bankruptcy rate for intermediaries accelerates.
Next, consider the bankruptcy rate for investors. Note that investors in this model
do not face a capital constraint; and, thus, will not go bankrupt if they lose some
of the principal invested. Instead, investors will only go bankrupt if they lose their
initial endowment, which happens with zero probability:
m1 = 0 (26)
I will now place structure on the rate at which unconventional asset intermediaries
switch back to purchasing conventional assets permanently. For the sake of simplicity,
I will retain the term “recovery rate.” In this model, I assume that this happens when
such an intermediary experiences a loss that reduces its capital holdings, but isn’t
sufficiently large to trigger bankruptcy. As a result of the intermediary losing some
of its initial capital holdings, they choose not to continue purchasing unconventional
assets permanently5–and instead dump the remaining principal in conventional assets.
Next, the recovery rate for the financial intermediary is computed. Two conditions
must be satisfied in order for an intermediary to move from the infected to recovered
category: 1) the intermediary must experience a loss–that is, b(t) < 1; and 2) the loss
4Of course, this is a strong condition for bankruptcy. Firms may often choose to initiate a
strategic bankruptcy, even if their capital holdings are not completely depleted; however, I will
maintain this assumption in the model for tractability.
5Note that this “recovery” could be temporary–or it could allow them to issue conventional
assets again with the possibility of moving back to unconventional ones. There are modifications of
the SIR model that permit both options.
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must be smaller than the amount of capital the intermediary holds: I1D(1− b(t)) <
τDI2. Again, taking advantage of the LLN and the uniformly distributed returns
assumption yields the following rate of return for financial intermediaries:
γ2 = pr{I1(1− b(t)) < τI2|b(t) < 1} (27)
→ γ2 =
τI2
I1
bH(t)− bL(t) (28)
Finally, the rate at which investors switch from unconventional assets to conventional
assets (i.e. the investor recovery rate) is computed. Recall that a financial interme-
diary will repay principal until it has exhausted all of its capital. This means that
an investor will not incur a loss unless the financial intermediary becomes bankrupt.
Thus, the fraction of investors who hold unconventional assets and then “recover,”
switching back to conventional assets permanently, is equal to the fraction of firms
that become bankrupt. Recall that this was computed earlier as the bankruptcy rate
for financial intermediaries:
γ1 =
I1−τI2
I1
− bL(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) (29)
Taken together, equations (9)-(14), (19)-(21), (25), (26), (28), and (29) specify a
complete, two-host SIR model of financial bubbles. In the remaining sections, I will
1) use the fully-specified model to perform comparative statics on R0 and 2) estimate
the model parameters and compute R0 for three applications.
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3.1 Comparative Statics
Recall that herd immunity requires the following condition on R0 to hold:
R0 =
1
2
√(
β1,1
γ1 +m1 + µ
p
1
− β2,2
γ2 +m2 + µ
p
2
)2
+
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2 + µ
p
2)(γ1 +m1 + µ
p
1)
+
1
2
(
β1,1
γ1 +m1 + µ
p
1
+
β2,2
γ2 +m2 + µ
p
2
)
< 1
(30)
Furthermore, note that herd immunity in this context refers to a state in which an
unconventional asset will not spread to the entire population of intermediaries and
investors that could potentially hold it.
Now, assume that µp1, µ
p
2 = 0. That is, investors and intermediaries do not be-
come bankrupt for reasons other than receiving poor returns to the unconventional
asset.6 Additionally, recall that m1 = 0–that is, investors are assumed not to become
bankrupt as a result of the unconventional asset. The condition on R0 now is now
simplified to the following:
2 >
√(
β1,1
γ1
− β2,2
γ2 +m2
)2
+
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)γ1
+
(
β1,1
γ1
+
β2,2
γ2 +m2
)
(31)
Using assumptions and simple algebraic manipulations, it is now possible to deter-
mine the conditions under which markets will be susceptible to the spread of the
unconventional asset. For expository purposes, I will relegate most of the algebra to
the appendix and focus primarily on the results.
6This is certainly not an accurate assumption; however, in more rigorous applications, this rate
can be calibrated to match real bankruptcy rates.
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3.1.1 Cross-Transmission Only
If it is assumed that cross-transmission (i.e. intermediary-to-investor and investor-
to-intermediary) is the only channel for persuading intermediaries and investors to
switch to the unconventional asset, the following assumptions are imposed on the
model: 1) β1,1=0, and 2) β2,2 = 0. This reduces the herd immunity condition to the
following:
2 >
√
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)(γ1)
(32)
→ (γ2 +m2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (33)
The above equation provides proof for our first theorem:
Theorem 1. If β1,1 = 0 and β2,2 = 0, then herd immunity will hold whenever (γ2 +
m2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1.
This result suggests that higher recovery and bankruptcy rates will drain the pool of
unconventional investors and intermediaries faster. If they do this sufficiently fast–
relative to the cross-transmission rates–then the unconventional asset will never take
off. That is, an epidemic invasion–as described in the SIR model–will not occur.
Next, I will consider placing additional restrictions on the parameter values. This
may be helpful to do if certain parameters are inestimable; and we need to determine
them by theory in order to check herd immunity.
First, we note that γ2 + m2 = max{ 1−bL(t)bH(t)−bL(t) , 0} and γ1 = max{
I1−τI2
I1
−bL(t)
bH(t)−bL(t) , 0}
because both are probabilities. This is used to construct the next theorem:
Theorem 2. If β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, β2,2 = 0, β1,1 = 0, and either b
L(t) = 1 or bL(t) ≥
I1−τI2
I1
and bL(t) < 1, then herd immunity is violated.
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This theorem states that the unconventional asset will spread to all susceptible con-
ventional intermediaries and investors if 1) cross transmission is the only channel
for switching to the unconventional asset, and 2) the lower bound for the return on
the unconventional asset is high enough to ensure that no financial intermediaries
investing in it become bankrupt.
Theorem 3. β1,2 > 1, β2,1 > 1, β2,2 = 0, and β1,1 = 0, then herd immunity is violated
if bH(t) ≥ 1.
Since γ2 + m2 ≤ 1 and γ1 ≤ 1 (since it is a probability), the inequality in equa-
tion 33 will not hold if β1,2 > 1 and β2,1 > 1. This suggests that if the strength of
cross-transmission is sufficiently large, then the unconventional asset will continue to
spread, regardless of bankruptcy and recovery rates.
3.1.2 No Intermediary-to-Intermediary Transmission
With no intermediary-to-intermediary transmission, β2,2 is effectively set to zero.
That is, we assume that financial intermediaries consider only the decisions of in-
vestors when deciding whether or not to switch to the unconventional asset; and do
not pay attention to the choices of other intermediaries. This reduces the condition
for herd immunity to the following:
2 >
√(
β1,1
γ1
)2
+
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)γ1
+
β1,1
γ1
(34)
Some algebraic manipulation yields the following, simpler condition:
(γ1 − β1,1)(γ2 +m2) > β1,2β2,1 (35)
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This yields the first theorem for the case with no intermediary-to-intermediary trans-
mission:
Theorem 4. If β2,2 = 0 and (γ1 − β1,1)(γ2 + m2) > β1,2β2,1, then herd immunity
holds.
Next, note that 1 > (γ2 + m2) ≥ 0, as was shown earlier. Since β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0,
and β1,1 > 0, the left hand side will be smaller whenever β1,1 > γ1. This gives yields
the next three theorems.
Theorem 5. If β2,2 = 0 and γ1 < β1,1, then herd immunity is violated if β1,2β2,1 >
(1− γ1)β
2
1,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m1).
Theorem 6. If β2,2 = 0 and β1,1 ≥ 1, then herd immunity is violated if β1,2β2,1 >
(1− γ1)β
2
1,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m1)
Theorem 7. If β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, β2,2 = 0, and b
L(t) ≥ 1, then herd immunity is
violated.
3.1.3 No Investor-to-Investor Transmission
If there is no investor-to-investor transmission, then β1,1 = 0. This reduces the con-
dition for herd immunity to the following:
2 >
√
β22,2
(γ2 +m2)2
+
4β2,1β1,2
(γ2 +m2)γ1
+
β2,2
γ2 +m2
(36)
→ (γ2 +m2 − β2,2)γ1 > β2,1β1,2 (37)
This expression gives us our first investor-to-investor theorem:
Theorem 8. If β1,1 = 0 and (γ2 +m2− β2,2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1, then herd immunity holds.
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Next, consider the conditions under which the left hand side will be nonpositive (and,
thus, herd immunity will be violated).
Theorem 9. If β1,1 = 0 and β2,2 > (γ2 +m2), then herd immunity is violated.
Theorem 10. If β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, β1,1 = 0, and b
L(t) ≥ 1, then herd immunity is
violated.
Theorem 11. If β1,2β2,1 > 2, β1,1 = 0, then herd immunity is violated.
Theorem 12. If β2,2 > 2, β1,1 = 0, then herd immunity is violated.
We now have 12 theorems that can be used to place theoretical restrictions on pa-
rameters. In some cases, making a couple of weak theoretical restrictions will make
it possible to check the herd immunity condition by estimating only one parameter.
3.2 Empirical Applications
In this section, I will discuss three applications of the SIR model that involve estimat-
ing R0. In the first, I will 1) estimate one equation from the SIR model, 2) use the
results to compute R0, 3) use the delta method to compute the standard error of R0,
and then 4) perform a hypothesis test to determine whether or not the new financial
security will spread. In the second application, I will 1) estimate two separate 1-host
models for a related phenomena, 2) impose theoretical restrictions, and then 3) de-
termine whether or not herd immunity is violated in the 2-host version of the model.
In the final application, I will show how estimating R0 25-quarters after ETFs were
released in the U.S. could have been used to predict their widespread popularity. In
addition to this, I will demonstrate an alternative method of estimating R0 directly,
rather than constructing it using β and γ estimates.
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3.2.1 Detecting the Spread of a Financial Innovation
In the first application, I consider the introduction of non-agency, non-GSE secu-
ritized debt. The purpose of this application will be to demonstrate how to make
predictions about the spread of new financial securities or the inflation of bubbles
using the 1-host SIR framework.
The dataset was constructed using three series: 1) the level of GSE-securitized debt;
2) the level of household debt; and 3) the level of non-GSE securitized debt. The
series for S (i.e. the fraction of debt that is susceptible to private securitization) is
constructed as follows:
S =
Total Debt - GSE-Securitized Debt - Privately-Securitized Debt
Total Debt - GSE-Securitized Debt
(38)
For simplicity, I will assume that there is no recovery in the model. That is, financial
firms that stop securitizing do not do so permanently. Instead, they simply stop
securitizing for now, but remain open to the possibility in the future. This simplifies
the model by allowing us to compute I (the fraction of securitizers) as follows:
I = 1− S (39)
This framework is called the SIS model, and has an R0 that is identical to the one
derived earlier for the 1-host SIR model. Without placing any additional structure
on the problem, it is possible to estimate equation (4):
∂I
∂t
= βIS − γI (40)
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Notice that γ measures the rate at which financial firms exit the securitization business
and return to issuing non-AB securities. Note also that β is the contact rate multiplied
by the probability of becoming a securitized. That is, in each period, a financial firm
scans some fraction of other financial firms to determine which products they offer.
If the firm encounters a securitizer, then it also becomes a securitizer with some fixed
probability. The product of these two numbers is β.
Equation (5) was estimated with IV on quarterly data from 1983-1998, using lags
of I, SI, and S as instruments. The results are given in Table 1 in the appendix. The
transmission rate (β = 0.2525) was found to exceed the mortality rate (γ = .2309),
indicating that an epidemic invasion (i.e. the spread of ABS) was highly likely. Table
1 also provides R0 and its standard error.
Note that R0 was computed as
β
γ
, yielding 1.0936. R0’s standard error was then
computed as follows: let Σ represent the covariance matrix and let D = [ 1
γ
,− β
γ2
] be
the row vector of partial derivatives of R0. Then, by the delta method, the variance
of R0 is var(R0) = DΣD
′. In this case, SE(R0) = 0.1836. Now, recall that herd
immunity will hold (i.e. the innovation will not spread) if:
1
R0
> S(1− P ) (41)
Since we have the standard error for R0, we can perform a hypothesis test using data
on S and P to see if herd immunity is violated. If it is assumed that P=0 and the test
is performed at the end of the period (1998), then we may reject the null hypothesis
with 95% confidence. That is, in 1998, an estimate of R0 would have provided support
for the claim that private securitization was likely to spread rapidly, which is precisely
what happened until the financial crisis occurred in 2007.
In practice, we could use new data to update S, P, and R0 in each period; and
177
then check whether or not herd immunity holds. If herd immunity does not hold,
then it may make sense to monitor the financial instrument carefully, as it could play
an increasingly important role in determining the stability of the financial system.
Alternatively, if herd immunity does hold, then this could suggest that the spread of
the instrument will cease in the future, potentially bursting a bubble.
From a policy perspective, we might consider adjusting P. That is, policy-makers
might consider increasing P if they worry that a risky and untested financial instru-
ment is likely to spread rapidly (i.e. has a high R0). They could achieve this by
placing temporary legal limits on the issuance of the security until we have a longer
period of time to evaluate its performance.
Finally, notice that we completely ignored the returns to privately-issued asset
backed securities when we performed this analysis, even though this is likely to play
an important role in determining entry and exit. In the next section, we will consider
an example that makes a more serious attempt to use the theory developed earlier to
guide estimation.
3.2.2 Checking the Susceptibility of FDIC-Insured Banks to a Zombie
Invasion
During the S&L Crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, many savings and loan institutions
became insolvent, but were able to continue operating because of implicit and explicit
government guarantees, such as deposit insurance. Kane (1987) coined the phrase
“zombie bank” to describe such institutions, which were effectively dead, but were
able to continue to lend and to collect deposits.
Kane (1987) points out that zombie institutions were particularly worrisome be-
cause they were tempted to “gamble for resurrection.” That is, knowing that equity
holders would get wiped out by an asset revaluation with certainty, they would find
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ways to attract depositors (e.g. by offering higher interest rates); and then invest the
new funds in increasingly risky projects. If the bank was lucky and the investments
paid off, then the institution would not be insolvent at revaluation, saving the equity-
holders. If, on the other hand, the investments did poorly, then the new depositors
would effectively subsidize the equity holders by bearing some of the losses.
The behavior of zombies is problematic for two reasons. First, it encourages
institutions to lend to increasingly risky borrowers. And second, it encourages nearby
institutions to do the same. If they did not, then they could not compete with the
rates zombie banks offer depositors (and creditors more generally), which results in a
shift of deposits away from healthy institutions.
While the industry has undergone substantial reform since the S&L crisis, zombie
banks still exist; and still have the bad incentives that come from implicit and explicit
government guarantees. In a recent paper, Zwick (2012) describes a strategy for
identifying zombie banks in FDIC data; and uses it to examine their impact on the
Great Recession. 7
I follow Zwick’s zombie-detection approach by constructing an unbalanced panel
out of 12 years (2001-2012) worth of institution-level cross-sections from the FDIC’s
call reports. I then use the FDIC certificate from the call reports to match the insti-
tutions to the ones listed in CalculatedRisk’s unofficial record of Prompt Corrective
Actions (PCA) and Desist orders. The combined dataset allows me to identify banks
by location (state and county), balance sheet data, and zombie status (i.e. if they
were given an order). It also permits me to link banks across time.
From there, I construct the model variables, S and I. Initially, I assume that all
banks are susceptible to zombification, and identify the institutions that are given a
7It is important to note that Zwick (2012) is more concerned with the “evergreening” phenomena
that is described by Caballero (2008), rather than risky lending. In fact, his paper suggests that
banks may tend to repeatedly rollover loans, rather than originating new, risky loans.
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PCA or Desist order as infected institutions. The reason I label them as infecteds
prior to the order is because this is when banks are most likely to engage in high
risk behavior in an attempt to divert debt-financed funding from other institutions.
Furthermore, I define the mass of infecteds, I, as the fraction of deposit volume held
by these institutions. I then estimate the following equation with OLS to recover the
transmission and mortality rates:
Ii,t+1 − Ii,t = βIi,tSi,t − γIi,t + φl + ut + i,t (42)
Note that φl is a county fixed effect and ut is a time effect. The fixed effects will
allow us to sweep out any variation that is attributable to county-specific idiosyn-
crasies and has little to do with the interaction between zombies and non-zombies.
The time effects will sweep out the effect of national trends, such as expansions and
recessions that might create a common time trend in the fraction of deposits held by
zombies.
The results are given in Table 2 of the appendix. Notice that there are separate
regressions in this table: one for the fraction of deposit volume held by zombies and
another for the fraction of asset volume held by zombies within a county. The purpose
behind this is to test whether zombie banks create a pure deposit-diversion epidemic
or whether zombie behavior also has a substantial impact on assets.
The results suggest that there is evidence for strong deposit-side transmission
at the county level. Additionally, the relative rates of transmission and mortality of
infecteds suggests that deposit-side zombification (i.e. diversion of deposits away from
healthy banks) is susceptible to an epidemic if some shock introduces a small number
of zombies initially. In particular, recall that a county will have herd immunity if the
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following condition holds:
1
R0
≥ St(1− P ) (43)
R0 is given in Table 2, and was constructed from β and γ, which were recovered
from the regression. For deposits, R0 = 1.2087 and has a standard error of 0.0825,
which was calculated using the delta method. This implies that a county will lose herd
immunity with 95% confidence if St(1−P ) > .8183. That is, if a county initially has
no zombies S = 1, but then a financial shock hits and causes an institution to have
negative net worth (i.e. become a zombie), then that institution will tend continue
to divert deposits away from healthy institutions and convert healthy institutions
into zombies. Additionally, this process can be affected by regulatory measures that
reduce the stock of susceptible deposits by affecting P.
It is important to note that the “epidemic” described is with respect to volume
of assets being held by zombies, rather than the proportion of institutions that are
zombies. It is entirely possible, for instance, that measures targeted at regulating non-
zombies more thoroughly (i.e. increasing P) could increase the deposit flow volume
to zombies, which would not necessarily help to impose herd immunity. However,
if herd immunity is achieved, then the interpretation behind the epidemic’s end is
simple: zombies will be identified and dismantled by regulatory agencies faster than
they are able to divert deposits, resulting in a net decrease in deposit inflow to zombie
institutions.
Next, consider the results for the asset regression. Here, we can see that trans-
mission is not particularly strong (i.e. statistically insignificantly different from zero).
That is, an increase in contact between zombies and non-zombies does not lead to
particularly large increases in zombie asset volume. Furthermore, the zombie mor-
tality rate is large and statistically significant, which leads to a low R0 of .4623. In
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this case, a zombie-driven epidemic is simply not possible on the asset-side of bank
balance sheets, even if P=0.
With these results in hand, we may now return to the theoretical model of “fi-
nancial intermediaries” and “investors” to take advantage of the theorems derived
earlier. In the zombie bank model, the depositors are equivalent to the investors
and the banks are the financial intermediaries that choose between normal and risky
assets. Furthermore, assume that we want to know if a joint epidemic (deposits and
assets) is possible if we allow for cross-transmission–that is, allow the deposit epidemic
to affect the asset epidemic.
From the asset regression in Table 2, we know that there is no statistically sig-
nificant intermediary-to-intermediary transmission (i.e. β2,2 = 0). This means that
we can use the theorems derived in section 2.4.2. In particular, Theorem 7 states
the following: if β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, and β2,2 = 0, and b
L ≥ 1, then herd immunity
does not hold. In words, this means that a county will be susceptible to an epidemic
when a zombie is introduced if two conditions are met: 1) all zombie institutions
in the county are receiving weakly positive excess returns; and 2) there is positive
cross-transmission from financial intermediaries to investors and vice versa (even if it
is very small).
3.2.3 Predicting the Displacement of Existing Funds by ETFs
As a final example, I considered the expansion of exchange-traded funds (ETFs),
which were introduced in the United States in 1993, and then steadily grew in popu-
larity thereafter. In particular, I use data from the 1990s to estimate R0, compare it
to the fraction of other fund volume that was susceptible to being converted into an
ETF (e.g. close ETF substitutes), and then check whether or not the ETF takeoff
could be predicted.
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For the purposes of this exercise, I used Flow of Funds (FoF) data from financial
businesses, which was listed in the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ data download
program. I computed the total volume of funds susceptible to ETF conversion by
adding up the volumes for all assets in the same category as ETFs. This included
several varieties of money market mutual funds, mutual funds, and closed-end funds–
all predecessors to ETFs and also likely substitute investment vehicles.
I then used the total volume of funds to compute S and I. S was defined as the
fraction of asset volume that was concentrated in non-ETFs. And I was defined as
the fraction of total asset volume concentrated in ETFs. With these definitions in
place, I used the first 25 quarters of data to recover an early estimate of the basic
reproductive ratio and then used the delta method to compute its standard error. I
found that R0 = 1.0267 with a standard error of 0.1510. When R0 was computed, the
fraction of susceptible funds (0.9817) was greater than 1
R0
, which suggests that herd
immunity was already violated and an invasion was likely. Figure 4 in the appendix
plots the growth of ETFs as a fraction of total fund volume over time. The dotted
black line marks the data that was used to make the prediction.
Finally, note that ETFs were later introduced in Europe in 1999. This means
that European regulators could have used the estimate of R0 from 1998 to determine
how to handle the introduction of ETFs. In particular, knowing that they were
likely to become a popular asset class might have encouraged regulators to handle
their introduction with greater scrutiny; and to dedicate more resources to their
monitoring.
3.3 Estimating R0 Directly
Notice that we can rearrange the flow equation for infecteds as follows:
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It+1 − It = γ(R0ItSt − It) (44)
Now, assume that ItSt and It are I(1) processes and It+1 − It is an I(0) process.
Instead of estimating the above equation, we may estimate the implied cointegration
vector, (R0, 1). In this case, the normalization choice is clear, since we wish to recover
R0 directly. We may do so by estimating the following equation via OLS:
It = R0ItSt + t (45)
There are two important benefits of this approach. First, under the null hypothesis
of cointegration, estimates of R0 will be superconsistent, converging at rate T, rather
than T 1/2. This eliminates the need for IV. The second benefit is that we do not need
to compute the standard errors for R0 separately with the delta method, since R0 is
estimated directly using OLS.
In order to provide a complete demonstration of this approach, I use it to repeat
the estimation exercise for ETFs and to confirm the value of R0. In addition to this,
I also check the assumptions of the approach by performing nonstationarity tests for
It and ItSt, and by testing whether the two series are cointegrated under the vector
(Rˆ0, 1).
I start by performing the following two regressions:
It = α + ρIt−1 + uˆt (46)
ItSt = α + ρIt−1St−1 + uˆt (47)
I then use the residuals from each regression to perform two separate Phillips-Perron
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tests, where the null hypothesis is that the series is nonstationary. As described
in Hamilton (1994), the Phillips-Perron Zρ test statistic can be computed in the
following set of steps:
s2 = (T − 2)−1
T∑
t=1
uˆt
2 (48)
cˆj = (T )
−1
T∑
t=j+1
uˆt ˆut−j (49)
λˆ2 = cˆ0 + 2
4∑
j=1
[1− (j/5)]cˆj (50)
Zρ = T (ρˆ− 1)− 1
2
(
T σˆρ
s
)2
(λˆ2 − cˆ0) (51)
The test statistic, Zρ, is then compared to the relevant 5% critical value, which is
-12.5 for T=25 and K=2. For equation (46), Zρ = 3.5132 > −12.5, which means we
fail to reject the null of nonstationarity. For equation (47), Zρ = 3.4670 > −12.5,
which again means we fail to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity.
Next, equation (45) can be estimated using OLS to recover Rˆ0. Here, I find that
Rˆ0 = 1.0697, which is close to the previous subsection’s estimate of 1.0267. With
Rˆ0 recovered, the cointegration of ItSt and It can be tested next. To do this, I first
compute the series, z, using Rˆ0:
zt = Rˆ0ItSt − It (52)
Next, I perform a Phillips-Perron test using the residual from the following regression:
zt = α + ρzt−1 + uˆt (53)
185
The null hypothesis is that the cointegrating relationship does not hold. For equation
(53), Zρ = −18.2163 < −12.5, which means we may reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. Combined with our earlier findings, this suggests that the estimate of
R0 is superconsistent.
It is important to note that there are alternative approaches to estimating R0 that
may have better statistical properties in certain circumstances. However, if It and
ItSt are cointegrated, then recovering R0 becomes simple. All a practitioner must do
is define the three groups (S, I, and possibly R), transform the data to match the
group definitions, and then estimate equation (45). If there is any doubt about the
underlying assumptions needed for superconsistency, then the set of tests performed
in this subsection can be employed.
4 Conclusion
The SIR model is one of the most thoroughly developed frameworks in mathematical
epidemiology. It has many tools for prediction that can readily be applied to problems
in economics and finance after appropriate adjustments have been made for context.
In this paper, I describe how the multi-host version of the SIR model can be used in
economics to make predictions about financial innovations, bubbles, and fads.
In addition to importing the multi-host SIR model, I also develop its tools for
use in economics. In particular, I construct a financial model that yields R0 as a
predictive measure of the take off of new financial innovations; and I explain how R0
can be computed when the model has more than one host.
Beyond importing the basic tools, I prove 12 theorems that can be used to work
with the finance model. These theorems permit us to place very weak restrictions on
certain model parameters in the 2-host case, making it possible to determine whether
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the herd immunity condition has been violated, even if we can only identify a subset
of the model’s parameters.
Finally, I provide empirical evidence for the approach by using R0 to predict the
take-off of asset-backed securities and exchange-traded funds in the 1990s. I also use
the tools developed in this paper to demonstrate that the introduction of a zombie
bank (i.e. a bank with negative net worth) into county with a sufficiently high fraction
of susceptible banks will lead to a zombie bank epidemic, where an increasing fraction
of deposits are diverted to zombie institutions. I also showed that, in insolation, the
introduction of a zombie bank will not lead to an increasing concentration of assets
within zombie institutions; however, if zombie banks are receiving weakly positive
excess returns and cross-transmission is positive, then the epidemic will span both
sides of the balance sheet, concentrating both deposits and assets in the hands of
zombie institutions.
Future work could expand on the approach introduced in this paper by construct-
ing a richer and more detailed financial model; and by relaxing the assumption about
the data generating process for returns. In addition to this, future empirical work
could identify R0 for many classes of assets that were not considered in this paper,
yielding useful information for regulators.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Epidemic Invasion
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Figure 2: No Invasion
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Figure 3: Two-Host SIR Model
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Figure 4: ETF Invasion Prediction
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Table 1: Asset-Backed Securities Bubble Regression
ABS
β 0.2525**
(0.0278)
γ 0.2309**
(0.0261)
R0 1.0936**
(0.1836)
Robust SE X
N 60
R2 0.25
* Note that p < .01 is denoted by ** and p < .05 is denoted by *.
Table 2: County-Level Regression Results for Zombie Banks
Deposits Assets
β 0.3036** 0.1022
(0.0684) (0.0709)
γ 0.2512** 0.2211**
(0.0313) (0.0307)
R0 1.2087** 0.4623**
(0.0825) (0.1077)
County FE X X
Time FE X X
Robust SE X X
N 7131 7131
R2 0.25 0.20
* Note that p < .01 is denoted by ** and p < .05 is denoted by *.
6.2 Proof: Theorem 1
We start with condition for herd immunity:
2 >
√(
β1,1
γ1
− β2,2
γ2 +m2
)2
+
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)γ1
+
(
β1,1
γ1
+
β2,2
γ2 +m2
)
(54)
Next, we impose that β1,1 = 0 and β2,2 = 0–that is, we have cross-transmission only.
This gives us the following, simplified condition for herd immunity:
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2 >
√
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)γ1
(55)
→ 4 > 4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)γ1
(56)
→ (γ2 +m2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (57)
6.3 Proof: Theorem 2
As in Theorem 1, we assume cross-transmission only. However we add to this three
more assumptions: 1) β1,2 > 0, 2) β2,1 > 0, and 3) either b
L(t) = 1 or bL(t) ≥ I1−τI2
I1
.
From here, we may skip to the final equation in the proof of Theorem 1:
→ (γ2 +m2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (58)
Now, recall the definitions for γ1, γ2, and m2:
γ1 = max
{
I1−τI2
I1
− bL(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) , 0
}
(59)
γ2 = max
{
τI2
I1
bH(t)− bL(t) , 0
}
(60)
m2 = max
{
I1−τI2
I1
− bL(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) , 0
}
(61)
After substituting in these definitions and performing some algebraic manipulations,
we get the new condition for herd immunity:
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(1− bL(t))( I1−τI2
I1
− bL(t))
(bH(t)− bL(t))2 > β1,2β2,1 (62)
Since β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, and (b
H(t) − bL(t))2 ≥ 0, we know that herd immunity will
be violated whenever:
(
1− bL(t))(I1 − τI2
I1
− bL(t)
)
≤ 0 (63)
Thus, if I1−τI2
I2
< bL(t) and bL(t) < 1, then herd immunity will not hold. Alternatively,
if bL(t) = 1, then (1− bL(t)) = 0, so herd immunity will not hold.
6.4 Proof: Theorem 3
Again, we assume that cross-transmission is the only channel that causes investors
and intermediaries to switch to the unconventional asset. This allows us to start with
the simplified condition for herd immunity:
(γ2 +m2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (64)
Now, we assume that β1,2 > 1 and β2,1 ≥ 1 or β2,1 > 1 and β1,2 ≥ 1–that is, the right
hand side of the equation is greater than 1. Since γ1 is a probability, it will be no
greater than 1. Thus, if γ2 + m2 ≤ 1, then herd immunity will not hold. Note that
we may rewrite this as follows:
1− bL(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) ≤ 1 (65)
→ 1 ≤ bH(t) (66)
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6.5 Proof: Theorem 4
We start by setting β2,2 = 0. This gives us the following condition for herd immunity:
2 >
√(
β1,1
γ1
)2
+
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)γ1
+
β1,1
γ1
(67)
→ (2γ1 − β1,1)
2
γ1
> β21,1 +
4β1,2β2,1
(γ2 +m2)
(68)
(γ1 − β1,1)(γ2 +m2) > (γ1 − 1)
β21,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m2) + β1,2β2,1 (69)
Note that γ1, γ2, and m2 are probabilities. Thus,
(γ1 − 1)
β21,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m2) ≤ 0 (70)
This means that herd immunity will hold if the following condition is true:
(γ1 − β1,1)(γ2 +m2) > β1,2β2,1 (71)
Note that the above condition is stronger than the one in equation 57 and does not
allow us to avoid estimating any parameters; however, it will be useful for proving
the remaining theorems.
6.6 Proof: Theorem 5
We start from equation (69):
(γ1 − β1,1)(γ2 +m2) > (γ1 − 1)
β21,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m2) + β1,2β2,1 (72)
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Since β1,1 > γ1, the left hand side will be negative. This suggests that herd immunity
will be violated if the right hand side is positive:
(γ1 − 1)
β21,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m2) + β1,2β2,1 > 0 (73)
Re-arranging the equation yields the proof:
(γ1 − 1)
β21,1
4γ1
(γ2 +m2) < β1,2β2,1 (74)
6.7 Proof: Theorem 6
Since γ1 is a probability, 1 ≥ γ1. Using this, the proof for Theorem 6 is identical to
the proof for Theorem 5.
6.8 Proof: Theorem 7
Recall the definitions for γ1, γ2, and m2 from the proof for Theorem 2. If b
L(t) ≥ 1,
then γ1 = 0, γ2 = 0, and m2 = 0. Thus, the condition for herd immunity will be
violated trivially.
6.9 Proof: Theorem 8
Theorem 8 states that if β1,1 = 0 and (γ2+m2−β2,2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1, then herd immunity
holds. To prove this, we start with the condition for herd immunity, which we get
from imposing β1,1 = 0:
2 >
√
β22,2
(γ2 +m2)2
+
4β2,1β1,2
(γ2 +m2)γ1
+
β2,2
γ2 +m2
(75)
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→
(
2− β2,2
γ2 +m2
)2
>
β22,2
(γ2 +m2)2
+
4β2,1β1,2
(γ2 +m2)γ1
(76)
→ 4− 4β2,2
γ2 +m2
+
β22,2
(γ2 +m2)2
>
β22,2
(γ2 +m2)2
+
4β2,1β1,2
(γ2 +m2)γ1
(77)
→ (γ2 +m2 − β2,2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (78)
6.10 Proof: Theorem 9
Theorem 9 claims that herd immunity will be violated if β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, β1,1 = 0
and β2,2 > (γ2 +m2). From equation (64), we can see that the left hand side will be
negative, violating the condition for herd immunity.
6.11 Proof: Theorem 10
Theorem 10 states that if β1,2 > 0, β2,1 > 0, β1,1 = 0, and β
L(t) ≥ 1, then herd
immunity is violated. To begin the proof, we start with the simplified condition for
herd immunity:
→ (γ2 +m2 − β2,2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (79)
Next, we use the definitions for γ2 and m2 to re-write the condition:
→
(
max
{
1− bL(t)
bH(t)− bL(t) , 0
}
− β2,2
)
γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (80)
Since bL(t) ≥ 1, we may re-write this again:
→ −β2,2γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (81)
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Since β2,2 and γ1 are nonnegative and β1,2 and β2,1 are positive, it must be the case
that:
β1,2β2,1 > −β2,1γ1 (82)
Thus, herd immunity is violated.
6.12 Proof: Theorem 11
Theorem 11 states that if β1,2β2,1 > 2 and β1,1 = 0, then herd immunity is violated.
Again, recall the herd immunity condition from equation (64):
→ (γ2 +m2 − β2,2)γ1 > β1,2β2,1 (83)
Now, if β1,2β2,1 > 2, then herd immunity will be violated if (γ2 + m2 − β2,2)γ1 ≤ 2.
Additionally, note that γ1, γ2, and m2 are probabilities, which means that the left
hand side will be no greater than (2 − β2,2). This is maximized when β2,2 = 0; and
herd immunity is violated here. Thus, herd immunity will always be violated under
the stated conditions.
6.13 Proof: Theorem 12
Theorem 12 states that if β2,2 > 2 and β1,1 = 0, then herd immunity is violated.
Again, using equation (71), if β2,2 > 2, then (γ2 + m2 − β2,2)γ1 ≤ 0, which means
that:
→ (γ2 +m2 − β2,2)γ1 ≤ β1,2β2,1 (84)
Thus, the condition for herd immunity is violated.
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